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The Systems Engineering and Analysis 21 Bravo (SEA 21B) Integrated team 
project represents a cross campus multi-disciplinary effort at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) to investigate Expeditionary Operations in the Contested Littorals. The 
project team’s sixteen members hale from both military and civilian backgrounds 
representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, and defense industry from the nations of the 
United States, Singapore, and Israel. The SEA 21B team capitalized on the diversity of its 
membership by bringing a wealth of real-world tactical and technical experience to bear 
on the assigned team tasking. 
The SEA 21B team was tasked to investigate the feasibility of over-the-horizon 
(OTH) amphibious raid capabilities from beyond the reach of modern anti-access / area 
denial (A2AD) weapons systems using small unit formations. Our goal was to design a 
fleet system of systems to include a concept of operations (CONOPS), potential force 
packages, and command and control courses of action (COA) to deploy and support 
company-sized, rapid response expeditionary assets in a contested littoral region in the 
2025–2030 timeframe.   
We applied the systems engineering (SE) approach to craft our tasking statement 
and the SE method to determine the best solution. The first step in our SE design process 
was to define the problem. Our team worked with our primary sponsor, The Naval 
Warfare Integration Division (N9I), and other potential stakeholders to refine the problem 
statement in order to reach a consensus on what future capabilities we were going to 
develop. After we established an agreed upon direction for our team, we were ready for 
the second major step in the SE process. The second step in our SE process was to 
generate a series of possible solutions that would act as COAs we could recommend to 
our primary sponsor. To generate a set of possible solutions, the team divided into three 
main groups that each focused on an Army, Navy, and Marine service-centric solution. 
The team’s approach was to utilize legacy systems from each of the services with realistic 
options for near-term future system development. Each group created a set of possible 
COAs using service-based legacy systems. Afterward, the final step in our SE approach 
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was to evaluate each COA using an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) approach. The result 
of the AoA ultimately yields a potential collection of system COAs that would best meet 
the needs of the sponsor and system stakeholders. 
Due to the assigned timeframe of ten to fifteen years in the future, each design 
group focused on exploring platforms that either are currently in the United States’ 
inventory, or are nearing the final stages of procurement. Primarily, the Air Force and 
Army group explored a variety of air-drop techniques utilizing C-2 and C-130 cargo 
aircraft. The Navy focused on ships and aircraft currently in the fleet, such as the littoral 
combat ship (LCS), joint high-speed vessel, MV-22 Osprey, and special operations 
capable submarines. Additionally, the Navy explored platforms currently in use by allied 
navies that could be rapidly procured and deployed in an off-the-shelf manner. 
Exploration led to the inclusion of a long-range landing craft, similar to France’s 
catamaran-style L-CAT. 
Once each group had thoroughly researched and agreed on its available platforms, 
they were tasked with developing a series of concepts of operation (CONOPS) that could 
be employed to meet the requirement of rapidly deploying a company-sized landing 
force. The Air Force group focused on developing a capability of parachuting personnel 
and heavy equipment precisely onto a small island while the Navy group developed a 
series of options for delivery of personnel and equipment. These options ranged from 
employing the LCS as a miniature amphibious ship, to submarine insertion, to OTH 
landing craft operations. Concurrently, the Army and Marine Corps groups developed 
platoon-sized force packages, each group with a particular mission in mind. The logic 
was to enable a land force to tailor its composition to match an expected threat precisely. 
For example, if a landing force was anticipating being dropped off on an island, without 
sustained naval or air support, they might need an intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) platoon to operate unmanned surveillance vehicles, an Air Defense 
platoon armed with surface-to-air missiles, and a Sea Control platoon armed with 
containerized anti-ship cruise missiles. Once the platoons were developed, these groups 
developed a series of potential deployment packages based on various plausible threats. 
 xxv 
The team created and utilized dozens of models, incorporating stochastic, 
deterministic, and tabular methods in order to quantify both feasible options within each 
model and each COA’s performance in relation to each Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). 
Additionally, several models pertaining to specific COAs were created to explore specific 
aspects of a particular COA. The tools used to create the models included SIMIO™, a 
visual object oriented discrete modeling system; MANA for agent based simulation; 
Microsoft Excel™ for both stochastic and deterministic general purpose modeling; and a 
custom 3-D JavaScript simulation capable of quantifying a COA’s ability to deliver U.S. 
and/or allied (Blue) forces to a location before adversary (Red) forces can arrive. These 
models are based on multiple mathematical methodologies including simple tabulation, 
statistical binomial distribution, trigonometry, and Hughes’ salvo equations (Hughes 
1988). 
Analysis of the models provided insight into the performance of each COA, the 
ability to quantify that performance, and the ability to compare that performance to other 
COAs. Additionally, the models provided dimensions to search for the “best” option 
irrespective of the specifications of a COA. For example, while all COAs are compared 
based on the blue forces originating from the same location the models provide insight 
into COA performance if blue forces originated from a different location. 
The final goal of SEA 21B was to develop a menu of force package employment 
options for decision makers. As it is impossible to anticipate every eventuality, or the 
factors that might be most important in any given scenario, our most useful contribution 
would be in developing a variety of options, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. 
By analyzing the strong suits and pitfalls for each CONOP, decision makers are provided 
with a master menu, which would provide options for a wide range of eventualities. 
The resulting team product was the development of a system trade space our 
stakeholders and decision makers can utilize to evaluate potential system configurations 
based upon stakeholder need 
An example of a force package menu in practice would be to have multiple 
existing Department of Defense (DOD) systems and their various capabilities integrated 
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into one System of Systems (SOS) for short notice reaction to rising threats anywhere in 
the world. By combining assets from the Air Force, Navy, Marines and the Army 
together into once systems capable of producing different combinations of force packages 
an emergence of new capabilities occurs.    
A hypothetical scenario for this system would be to have an aggressive state actor 
advancing towards a disputed island territory for the purposes of seizing the island and 
establishing and A2AD environment. In addition, once the island is seized by an 
aggressive state there is little chance that the situation will resolve itself quickly without 
the threat of armed escalation. Therefore, the DOD must react to this threat in a timely 
manner and deploy DOD assets to the disputed island territory before another state actor 
arrives to make a claim.   
By experimenting and combining different DOD systems our team discovered 
different COAs suitable for a range of scenarios.   One such COA would be to have MV-
22 Ospreys leave forward operating bases in the South Pacific with Marines at specific 
times to mass a landing force together with C-17s loaded with paratroopers out of Hawaii 
while support is delivered via navy ships forward deployed to friendly ports in the area. 
Reconnaissance to support the mission would be an integrated effort across the DOD 
using an integrated network of satellites, stationary sensors, and drones. Planners could 
use a fore package menu system to assess the threat and available options quickly. 
Afterwards, decision makers could select the force package that best suits the needs of 
the tactical situation. Is getting to the island quickly important?  Then delivery via air is 
selected and a combination of support that can sustain light airborne infantry in an island 
environment is also selected.  
We found through analysis that Air Force C-17s and C-130s are the best options 
for delivery of an expeditionary force when considering average performance ability 
across the entire range of inputs we explored. It is possible for individual leader inputs to 
change the most favorable anticipated outcomes based on reconfiguration of MOE 
weights on a case-by-case basis. Such priority-result sets were detailed in Chapter XI and 
Appendix F. representing our stakeholders, our team found speed to be the top priority. 
Therefore, to accomplish the given mission we submit for recommendation a force 
 xxvii 
package that utilizes COA E (Air Force C-17 and C-130) aircraft deployment of land 
force packages COA 6 for small islands or COA 8 for large islands 
Unfortunately, the ability to network and pull disparate systems together quickly, 
in order to seize an island, does not exist. For instance, deploying a C-17, with C-130s, 
supported via Littoral Combat ships (LCS) using airborne Soldiers and/or Marines to 
seize territory, does not exist in a form capable of reacting quickly to global threats. 
Current DOD practices and doctrine do allow for joint operations. However, the process 
is slow—taking days to weeks, or longer to plan and execute. Our project demonstrates 
that current DOD capabilities within existing service inventories are well suited to taking 
on the challenge of quickly deploying to high threat areas as an integrated system. As a 
result, our project team recommendation is for the DOD to develop the plans to seize 
small island areas on short notice in the A2AD environment using existing capabilities 
integrated for a short-notice flexible response. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROJECT TEAM 
The Systems Engineering and Analysis 21 Bravo (SEA 21B) integrated team 
project represented a cross campus multidisciplinary effort at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) to investigate Expeditionary Operations in the Contested Littorals.  The 
project team’s sixteen members hailed from both military and civilian backgrounds 
representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, and defense industry from the nations of the 
United States, Singapore, and Israel. The SEA 21B team capitalized on its’ members 
experience and as such brought a wealth of real-world tactical and technical experience to 
bear on the assigned team tasking.  Table 1 lists the students, their backgrounds, and their 
particular areas of functional expertise. 
Table 1.   SEA21A Team Members 
Team Member Nation Service/ Company Specialty 
Juan Carleton USA Army Aviation, Ground Operations (OPS) 
Steven Fischbach USA Navy Aviation, ISR, Carrier OPS 
Brandon Naddell USA Navy Surface Warfare, Surface OPS 
Francisco Martinez USA Navy Undersea Warfare, Submarine OPS 
Eugene Lee Singapore ST Kinetics Land Armored Track Platforms 
Reginald Johnson USA Navy Aviation, Airborne Battle Management, 
Datalink 
Yoav Shaham Israel IDF Software Engineer 
Cheng Hong Low Singapore ST Aerospace Airborne Sensors and Software Engineer 
Wei San Lee Singapore ST Electronics Shipboard Integrated Communications 
Jordan Bradford USA  Navy Surface Warfare, Missile Warfare 
Brian Piggrem USA Navy Airborne ISR, Anti-Submarine/ Anti-
Surface Warfare 
Edwin Tan Singapore Army Combat Engineer, Crossing OPS 
Zibin Chen Singapore Army Artillery, Strike OPS 
Bing Yong Lim Singapore Air Force Ground Based Air Defense 
Matthew Kleine USA  NAVY SWO  
Damion Jones USA  Navy Surface Warfare, Amphibious and Mine 
Warfare OPS 
Alfred Williams USA Navy Submarine OPS, Information Dominance 
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The role of the students on the project team is that of a lead systems engineering 
group working in cooperation with stakeholders who have interests in the project 
topic.  Students are expected to integrate ideas and requirements from fellow NPS 
students and faculty from various academic departments at NPS as well as stakeholder 
information and expertise from outside the NPS within the public and private sectors. 
1. Team Organization 
The SEA 21B team initially organized into three groups that each supported a 
pillar of the team’s collective research plan. The three pillars shown in Figure 2 represent 
efforts by Group Alpha (offensive functions), Group Bravo (defensive functions), and 
Group Charlie (stasis/deterrence functions) to develop preliminary architectures and 
perform functional analyses. The plan was for these three groups to approach the problem 
statement from three independent interest areas of thought. After gathering the requisite 
knowledge base, each group then explored an individual solution with an in-depth 
analysis.   
The team’s task was to look at both offensive and deterrence operations within an 
A2AD environment while leveraging almost exclusively United States military 
capabilities delivered by components of its land, sea, and air forces. Given our knowledge 
of lessons learned from previous SEA projects and our requirement to tailor the problem 
statement, to our particular interests, it was prudent for our team to organize in such a 
way that supported joint operations in order for our team to explore force options from all 
services.   
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the SEA 21B team into three separate groups 
that worked to support each other’s tasking throughout each phase of the Project. Phases 
were built around the three-quarter NPS system and deliverables were established for 
each academic quarter. 
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 SEA 21B Project Team Initial Organization Figure 1. 
Team members from various backgrounds organized into three groups in order to 
capitalize on the perspectives and specialization of each member and to represent each of 
the major functional domains needed to address the tasking as shown in Figure 1. The 
general breakdown of positions and responsibilities throughout the duration of the project 
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reflected expertise in areas such as naval surface warfare, ground operations, intelligence, 
aviation, and other specific operational areas (OAs) within the Department of 
Defense.  The three groups (Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie) eventually transformed into 
solution specific research groups dedicated to the Naval, Marine, and joint Army/Air 
Force solutions. Finally, our technical group worked concurrently with each of the first 
three groups to produce relevant analytical models that we would later use to evaluate 
various potential systems as a part of our Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).   
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 Solution Research Areas Figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows the group research areas that eventually became the primary 
framework the project team proceeded under while researching potential solutions.  A 
primary assumptions our team made is that our solution will likely be performed by either 
a specific branch or joint force originated from the Department of Defense 
(DOD).   Dividing team members into groups by DOD service allowed group members to 
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focus on solution areas that were realistic, based upon group member expertise.  The 
groups became simply known as the Navy, Marine, and Army / Air Force groups. 
2. Technical Group 
The SEA Capstone Project is a cross campus effort that brings together students 
from outside of the Systems Engineering curriculum to participate in the systems 
engineering process with SEA curriculum students.  The added value for the team is that 
some of the student team members bring modeling and simulation knowledge that helps 
support solution development.  Since modeling and simulation knowledge is a niche area 
of expertise the team elected to create a group that would focused solely on the modeling 
and simulation efforts to support the three DOD groups in the evaluation of various 
courses of action (COA) solutions. The Technical group was responsible for developing 
the technical tools necessary to support the team’s research and final solution space 
analysis.  The Technical group worked with the other groups to develop specific models 
for each COA.  The Technical group also organized the team’s efforts during AoA 
portion of the SE process. 
B. CROSS CAMPUS TOPIC EFFORT 
The SEA 21B team project is conducted as one part of the NPS Warfare 
Innovation Continuum, “Warfighting in the Contested Littorals” series of cross-campus 
educational and research activities beginning in the summer of 2014 through the spring of 
2015. The purpose of the Warfare Innovation Continuum is to provide a central theme 
that is relevant to the U.S. Navy, such as combat in the contested littorals, to students and 
faculty at the NPS for the purposes of studying utilizing the research and analysis tools 
unique to NPS within the DOD.   
The central theme of this cross campus effort was to explore future methods of 
warfighting in contested littoral areas. Emerging technologies such as unmanned systems, 
laser weapons, and advanced computing and sensor capabilities provide the armed forces 
with future opportunities to fight effectively against sea denial forces in the complex and 
electromagnetically challenging littoral environment. 
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 The SEA 21B team integrated our efforts with those of fellow students and 
faculty at the NPS in researching tactics, techniques, and procedures that will support 
U.S. military operations as a counter to the anti-access/ area denial (A2AD) strategies 
currently employed by U.S. adversaries in littoral areas around the world. 
C. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
Systems engineering (SE) is a multi-disciplinary engineering field that uses the 
tools of systems thinking, business analysis, engineering, operations research, and 
modeling to advance the needs of project stakeholders from a simple idea representing a 
customer’s need through to a functioning model of a potential system that answers that 
need.  The general idea of the SE field is to map system development and sustainment 
directly to the needs of the customer in order to work out detailed system design before 
any system building actually begins.  The ideas, wants, and requirements of the customer 
ultimately should manifest themselves into an end product system comprised of 
components that work in an effective and suitable manner to fulfill the customer’s 
requirements. 
1. Approach 
The team’s approach to implementing the SE process was to use an interactive, 
Waterfall-like process with recursive information loops that aided in the eventual 
formation of our team’s tailored systems engineering process and preliminary system 
design.  Figure 3 illustrates a textbook example of the Waterfall SE process that shows a 
full system life cycle starting with definition of a need all the way through system 








Many of the development steps shown in Figure 3 either did not apply to the 
scope of our tasking statement, or the steps we wanted to use were not detailed enough to 
guide our process.  Based upon our team assessment, we decided that a combination of 
classical Waterfall processes shown in Figure 3 in combination with a tailored SE process 
specific to our team’s focus and timeline would be a better fit to our team’s structure and 
project design goals. 
3. Tailored Systems Engineering Process 
Figure 4 is the result of early team collaboration to select a process model we 
wanted to follow.  Our model borrowed the three-quarter timeline design used by the 




 SEA 21B Tailored Systems Engineering ProcessFigure 4. 
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4. Quarter 1: Project Initiation and Problem Definition 
The first step in the SE process is to define the problem being solved. Is there a 
problem?  Can that problem be solved some other way outside of developing an entirely 
new system?  The problem we faced had one advantage over a specific engineering 
design task in that we were tasked with composing a System of Systems (SOS) design 
concept and with identifying potential new system requirements or capability gaps within 
the DOD (Langford, 2014).   
Applying the SE process as an approach to defining the problem allowed us to 
relate our project to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) in order to identify a material solution or a non-
material solution that is based on changing one or some combination of existing Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and 
Policy (DOTMLPF-P) systems. JCIDS’ process is a DOD specific acquisitions process 
that supports the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) at the national strategic 
level. The primary purpose of the JCIDS is to help planners identify capability 
requirements of the warfighter and pair those requirements with performance criteria that 
then assist the JROC with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) 
Process from which the DOD defense budget originates. For our project, we focused on 
the first step of the JCIDS to produce a report similar to a CBA using our tailored SE 
process. According to the JCIDS, once a capability gap or change in the DOTMLPF-P is 
identified, it is then sent to the JROC to begin the planning process of the PPBE cycle.   
The final product of our SE design project could serve as a standalone CBA that 
would result in one of the following: 
a- A material solution resulting in an Initial Capabilities Document  
b- A non-material solution resulting in a DOTMLPF-P Change Request 
It was important to our team that we conducted our SE project in a way that 
reflects the realities of the DOD acquisitions process. The SE discipline plays a vital role 
throughout the JCIDS process and we reflected this need in our project. Stakeholder 
analysis, scenario development, and threat assessment are all related to defining the 
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problem statement. We began the process with the following three questions. What is the 
problem?  Who has a stake in the problem?  And what influence does an adversary have 
on our solution space?  In Chapter II, we discuss these questions and our team findings in 
greater detail.   
There were two major outputs from the first quarter’s effort. The first was a 
refined problem statement agreed upon by the team and our stakeholders. The second was 
a list of Critical Operational Issues (COIs) our stakeholders felt were important. A COI is 
a concern stated in the form of a question asking fundamental questions about a system 
and its’ nature in terms of operational suitability and operational effectiveness. Typically, 
only a positive response is acceptable for satisfying primary stakeholder concerns (DAU 
2015). COIs and their associated measures are critical for system validation. Specifically, 
such questions should yield confidence that the SOS solution this team developed is 
suitable for the environment in which the SOS will operate, and that it will perform to a 
level that meets requirements. Each COI is evaluated via appropriate Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). Langford (2012) states that 
an MOE is a system-level metric that compares the extent to which a function or process 
accomplishes a mission or task. In other words, effectiveness is determinable by what is 
appropriate and suitable, i.e., aligned with fitness for purpose, and not the desired 
outcome. Further, an MOP is the quantifiable actions of a function, as characterized by 
the performances of a function. In the following chapters, we will clarify the MOE and 
MOP concept as it applies to our system. 
5. Quarter 2: System Design and Models 
During Quarter 2 of the project, our team split into four groups. The first three 
groups focused on exploring the solution space in terms of a component of the DOD. We 
had our Navy, Marine, and Army & Air Force groups look at the requirements of the 
system and the functional decomposition of the system as it pertained to the mission 
found within the tasking statement we received. Each group created solutions based upon 
existing force structure and equipment organic to units within each DOD component. The 
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result of our team’s effort is a refined list of system requirements along with a better 
definition of system Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).   
6. Quarter 3: Analysis of Alternatives and Preliminary Design 
During the last quarter of our team project we combined our four groups together 
and collaborated as a team to combine our system concepts and the models we would use 
later on to evaluate each system fairly against other system concepts within the team. The 
major undertaking during Quarter 3 was to develop each system concept and the MOEs 
and MOPs linked to each individual system into one standard set of systems and system 
measures. The resulting team product was the development of a system trade space our 
stakeholders and decision makers can utilize to evaluate potential system configurations 
based upon stakeholder need. The following chapters elaborate on the process our group 
used and the final product we created to answer our tasking statement. 
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II. PRELIMINARY DESIGN: PROBLEM DEFINITION PROCESS 
A. ORIGINAL TASKING STATEMENT 
The original tasking was to design a fleet system of systems, concept of 
operations (CONOPS), and command and control to employ expeditionary assets in a 
range of missions to augment naval operations or conduct specified tasking in a contested 
littoral region in the 2025–2030 timeframe. We were to consider both manned and 
unmanned offensive and lift systems to execute missions of mine warfare (offensive and 
defensive) while facilitating raids upwards of company size. We were also to consider the 
capabilities of legacy systems and programmed systems to identify gaps and generate 
requirements. In addition, we were to evaluate the value of the architecture alternatives to 
larger campaign contributions, and assess the value of the adaptive mission package 
concept for inclusion in the alternative solutions. A caveat to this tasking was to consider 
only fleet forces and structures that currently exist or are already under development. We 
were then to use those timeframe considerations as a baseline for generating capability 
gaps, requirements, and a CONOPS. Alternative architectures were also deemed 
necessary for evaluation of platform and manning requirements, command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), as well as procedures for operational 
use. Finally, we were to address the costs and effectiveness of each of the alternatives. 
From the beginning of the project, there was a healthy disagreement amongst the 
team members as to what direction to move forward with the project. In order to resolve 
any debate on where to take the project our team worked through interpreting the original 
tasking statement utilizing the SE process to help redefine the problem in such a manner 
that both the team and project stakeholders could agree on a final project end state. The 
following sections described how our team was able to accomplish this first step in the 
SE process.   
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B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
In considering the problem of conducting expeditionary operations under an 
A2AD threat, all aspects of expeditionary operations must be considered, and a multitude 
of stakeholders come into play. 
1. Key Stakeholders Identified 
If the problem as proposed thus far in conducting an amphibious raid is 
considered from the perspective of the Navy, then the stakeholders outlined below are 
limited to Navy representatives. Primary stakeholders address the issues that are most 
relevant to the aim of this study. The secondary stakeholders listed below were found to 
be representatives or organizations who were able to provide valuable input to the 
investigative process of this thesis report, and whose responsibilities were aligned with 
question posed by this document. 
Primary Stakeholders 
 Mr. Bob Novak, Deputy N9I  
 Professor Jeff Kline, CAPT (Ret), Systems Engineering Analysis Chair 
 Dr. Gary Langford, Advisor 
 SEA 21B Team 
Secondary 
 Rick Williams, RADM (Ret), Mine and Expeditionary Warfare Chair 
 Jerry Ellis, RADM (Ret), Undersea Warfare Chair 
 NPS Faculty 
 LCS Squadron 1 
2. Stakeholder Primitive Need Identification 
Table 2 provides a summary of each stakeholder’s primary concerns. 
Table 2.   Primitive Stakeholder Needs 
Stakeholder Needs 
Mr. Bob Novak, Deputy N9I  Capability gap analysis, preliminary analysis 
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Stakeholder Needs 
Professor Jeff Kline, CAPT 
(Ret), SEA Chair 
Capability gap analysis, cohort completion of capstone 
project, viable recommendations to N9I 
Dr. Gary Langford, Advisor Cohort completion of capstone project, quality educational 
experience for the team, viable recommendations to N9I 
SEA 21B Team Capstone project completion and follow on graduation 
Rick Williams, RADM (Ret), 
Mine and EXWAR Chair 
Insight and preliminary analysis of the future of 
expeditionary operations, viable recommendations to N9I 
Jerry Ellis, RADM (Ret), USW 
Chair 
Insight into the potential impact and implications of the 
future USW environment with regard to expeditionary 
operations in the contested littorals 
NPS Faculty Innovation for use in further research 
LCSRON 1 Feasible, realistic options for tactical employment of LCS 
 
3. Stakeholder Interviews and Information Collected 
Numerous stakeholders were engaged to obtain insight that could feed into project 
requirements. The information obtained from these discussions can be broadly divided 
into structural, operational, and technological categories. However, some information 
easily fits into these multiple categories. 
4. Original Problem Statement Feedback 
Stakeholders expressed a common need for clarification of the original problem 
statement and the meanings of multiple terms used in it. This included determining the 
purpose of the company-sized raid in relation to the rest of the statement. Other needs 
expressed by at least one of the primary stakeholders included clearly defining a scope 
for the solution. We assume that a target island is either uninhabited or that a friendly 
nation has invited our forces to its inhabited island. 
a. Information Sharing 
Stakeholder requirements for shared operational related information included: 
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(1) The need to get to the desired location prior to the enemy was repeatedly 
emphasized. This emphasis on the need to arrive first fed into scoping the 
problem in such a way that friendly forces were not expected to have to 
fight their way ashore. This insight correlates to the fact that blue forces 
are invited by the host nation. 
(2) Successful system employment requires host nation “buy-in” to the 
operation, and the need for their support in terms of basing and troops. If a 
nation wants our help in defending their islands then they need to facilitate 
the system’s employment by providing pre-staging locations as well as 
cultural acclimatization. 
(3) Small, fast ships must be part of the solution vice more expensive ships. 
While these smaller ships are less capable they also have the following 
benefits: lower cost, higher stealth, and lower desirability as targets. 
(4) Potential landing sights are highly varied.   They include islands with 
modern infrastructure including airfields and paved roads all the way to 
atolls that might not always be above water. 
(5) While the landing force would not have to fight their way onto the island, 
they would need to be able to present a viable deterrent in order to 
mitigate the chance of an enemy invasion or counter-attack. 
(6) The landing force and their delivery vessels could not be the primary 
defensive force. The system would need to be protected by an umbrella of 
joint assets in order to provide defense against the full threat spectrum. 
Any attempt to make the landing force the sole defense would result in a 
rapid increase to personnel and supply requirements. 
(7) Landing forces must be supplied in such a way that the effects of a surface 
blockade can be negated.  
Do not underestimate the difficulties Red forces could face in this 
problem. This notion is especially relevant in a South China Sea scenario. 
Particularly, Red forces may have difficulty with maintaining supply lines, 
deterrence provided by the presence of blue forces, and political 
difficulties related to the risks of removing blue forces from an island 
(risking escalation to a kinetic conflict).  
(8) Water and fuel for electrical generation are the primary supply items. 
Decreasing requirements for both result in a less vulnerable supply chain. 
b. Impact of Technology 
Common technological themes included: 
(1) An island surrounded by sea mines could pose a significant threat to 
surface platforms and operational success. However, standard mine 
clearance techniques would be detrimental to the requirement to get to the 
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location first. Rapid mine clearance and other unconventional techniques 
would be required in order to counter a mine threat while meeting that 
requirement. 
(2) Speed of initial delivery would have to be augmented by speed of resupply 
in order to counter a possible enemy blockade. As such, high speed 
surface vessels could be used to deliver a large initial amount of supplies 
in order to mitigate the initial effects of a blockade. Precision air drop 
could be used to maintain stockpiles for the duration of the blockade. 
(3) Organic defense systems would need to be capable of rapid deployment, 
operations and maintenance by a minimal number of personnel, and 
integration into the Joint command & control system.  
(4) There are numerous unmanned systems that can be deployed as part of the 
system. These systems have the benefit of augmenting organic ISR and 
defense capabilities far beyond those of a typical rifle company. However, 
these systems induce added requirements for maintenance, supply, and 
communications. 
C. REFINING THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Scoping the Problem 
Following stakeholder analysis and conducting a thorough review of the original 
problem statement, the team decided that some revisions were necessary to refine the 
original problem statement.  A refined problem statement would help focus the problem 
more on stakeholder needs and provide a manageable challenge to the project group.  The 
presented problem statement, in general, was very large in scope and presented many 
challenges that required more time and resources for assessment than were available to 
our project team.   Establishing baseline assumptions, the team was able to determine the 
in-scope and out-of-scope details for this project. 
a. In-Scope Assumptions 
Retains expeditionary (read: “amphibious”) operations as the main tasking for the 
project.  The reason for this focus is because the Marine Corps currently are not 
accustomed to operating at the company level. 
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b. Out-of-Scope Assumptions 
The mine warfare aspect of the original tasking for the purpose of this project is 
considered to be out of scope. During functional decomposition our group discovered that 
focusing on mine warfare distracted from the greater overall problem statement given to 
our team. Our team defined mines as a condition. A belligerent either possesses mines or 
it does not possess mines.   The project group wanted to focus on an area that has yet to 
be addressed and therefore we did not impose this condition on the report. A secondary 
reason for excluding mine warfare from our study is because mines were recently 
evaluated in a NPS Thesis (Frank 2014)  
The scenarios for this project are un-imposed amphibious landings of uninhabited 
islands. Any type of opposed landing would be considered to be out of scope and 
consistent with current United States military amphibious landing doctrine. 
2. The Refined Problem Statement 
Based on the feedback received from stakeholders, the team added depth to key 
elements while eliminating other elements from the original tasking statement. In this 
way we established the scope of our problem and solutions. We maintained that we 
would design a fleet system of systems, as well as its CONOPS, force package levels, and 
command and control to deploy and support company-sized, rapid response 
expeditionary assets in a contested littoral region in the 2025–2030 timeframe. Keeping 
the originally tasked timeframe meant also incorporating only joint platforms that already 
exist or are in funded development with initial operating capability within a few years. 
The team decided that capabilities, requirements, CONOPS, and alternatives for each, 
along with the manning and C4I, all of which were necessitated by the original tasking 
were still items to complete.  We added the need to incorporate manned and unmanned 
offensive, as well as transport, systems to execute any necessary missions or neutralize 
potential threats.  We included an evaluation of the value, cost, and effectiveness of our 
architecture and alternatives as applies to larger campaigns, including an assessment of 
the value of an adaptive mission package concept in our alternatives. 
 21 
a. Effective Need Statement 
The question, “How do we conduct over-the-horizon (OTH) amphibious 
operations in an A2AD environment at a company sized level?” drives the team’s 
effective need statement: A joint system-of-systems is required to conduct company sized 
expeditionary operations in an A2AD environment.   
b. N9I Brief and Problem Statement Approval 
On November 18, 2014, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations N9I Deputy 
Director visited Naval Postgraduate School to receive briefs on progress that the System 
Engineering Analysis 21 cohorts had made to date.  This visit was the first opportunity 
for SEA 21B to brief a primary stakeholder on their problem statement redefinition and 
planned way forward.  The resulting feedback from the brief was positive and confirmed 
the direction that the project team would head in the future. 
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III. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH 
A. HISTORY OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
1. Historical Claims 
The South China Sea is an area rich in history of trade relations between the 
nations of Southeastern Asia and the archipelagic nations of the Southwestern Pacific 
Ocean. The region’s history also includes multitudes of mainland conquests and control 
shifts between historical dynastic empires. Some of these empires, particularly that of 
Japan in the 1930s and 1940s sought to assert control of the regional maritime domain as 
well. The Spratly Islands, shown in Figure 5, are located far to the south of what is now 
China and Taiwan, southwest of Japan, west of the Philippines, north of both East 
Malaysia and Brunei, and east of Vietnam. In what can only be described as a maritime 
crossroads, outright control of some or all of the Spratly Islands has been pursued by all 
of its neighbors, with no indigenous population to claim sovereignty as a group of 
islands. More than just for trade route interests, the Spratly Islands have been identified 
as a likely source of a wealth of oil and natural gas resources to fuel future hydrocarbon 
needs. 
Figure 5 shows not only the proximity of the islands to some of the surrounding 
nations, but also illustrates the waters claimed by many of the parties involved. Of 
particular interest is China, who claims the zone outlined in red as a part of their 
historical “9-dash line” claim circa 1953, which was derived from a strategically mapped 
11-dashed line idealized by Chiang Kai-Shek during the era of the Second World War 
(Malik 2013).Vietnam in particular disputes that China has any right to claim maritime 
domain other than the coastal waters immediately adjacent to its mainland and Hainan 
Island (BBC 2015). In spite of these disputes over precedent, The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of Sea, of which China (regrettably it seems) is a signatory, 
specifically rejects historical claims (Malik 2013).  
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 9-Dash Line Zone and UNCLOS (from BBC 2015) Figure 5. 
2. Present-Day Disputes 
In recent decades there have been multiple incidents where inflammatory rhetoric 
has escalated to isolated armed conflicts. These small-scale violent events have primarily 
occurred in the form of naval standoffs between China and Vietnam or between China 
and the Philippines. The following are examples, all eight bullets points listed below are 
as quoted from “Dispute 2015” in the reference list: 
 In 1974 the Chinese seized the Paracels from Vietnam, killing more than 
70 Vietnamese troops. 
 In 1988 the two sides clashed in the Spratlys, with Vietnam again coming 
off worse, losing about 60 sailors. 
 In early 2012, China and the Philippines engaged in a lengthy maritime 
stand-off, accusing each other of intrusions in the Scarborough Shoal. 
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 In July 2012, China angered Vietnam and the Philippines when it formally 
created Sansha city, an administrative body with its headquarters in the 
Paracels, which it says oversees Chinese territory in the South China Sea. 
 Unverified claims that the Chinese navy sabotaged two Vietnamese 
exploration operations in late 2012 led to large anti-China protests on 
Vietnam’s streets. 
 In January 2013, Manila said it was taking China to a UN tribunal under 
the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to challenge its 
claims. 
 In May 2014, the introduction by China of a drilling rig into waters near 
the Paracel Islands led to multiple collisions between Vietnamese and 
Chinese ships. 
 In April 2015, satellite images showed China building an airstrip on 
reclaimed land in the Spratlys. (all bullet points from “BBC” 2015) 
3. Potential Conflicts 
China’s unprecedented industrial growth since the mid-twentieth century has 
afforded it not only an enhanced voice in global affairs, but also a regional hegemony 
from a military if not an economic perspective. Though many of the smaller nations who 
contest China’s claim to the disputed areas in the South China Sea (particularly the 
Spratly Islands) have called for multi-lateral boundary negotiations, China has insisted on 
strictly bilateral talks. This stance allows them to presumably bully the contestant nations 
individually, while demanding that potential power brokers like the United States avoid 
involvement. Attempts to resolve maritime disputes via U.S. mediation or the World 
Court’s International Tribunal have met in some cases with utter outrage from senior 
Chinese officials (BBC 2015). They seem to view such efforts as intervention from 
entities that have no stake, but fail to acknowledge the objective viewpoint that such 
measures can provide to a passionately volatile situation. Regardless, any ruling from 
external agents is not obligatory for China, so as it continues to assert its claims through 
island-building efforts, the potential for armed conflicts with other claimant nations 
continues to grow.  
Southwest of China’s Nine-Dash Line’s limits lies the Natuna archipelago; part of 
the Riau Islands and sovereign territory of Indonesia. The island of Natuna Besar (or 
Greater Natuna), has an area of 1720 square kilometers (Brandon-Jones 2004) and is 
strategically located such that it could potentially grant China an enormously large 
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staging point for continuous, expanded military operations to assert dominance of the 
South China Sea areas it lays claim to (see Figure 5, an island halfway between mainland 
Malaysia and Brunei). This island provides an important possibility for the SEA 21B 
team to explore, which is the feasibility and consequences of implementing our theories 
in a populated environment. 
B. RED GROUP ANALYSIS 
Opposition force research was focused on what the group assessed to be the worst 
case scenario: China. A near-peer competitor with the United States armed forces, China 
is particularly worth assessing as a potential adversary for the team’s tasking, especially 
given the possibility of future conflict with allies of the United States. Further research 
delved into capabilities that other possible adversaries could leverage, but the focus of 
opposition modeling revolved around Chinese forces.  
This assessment had four components: 
1. Red force assumptions 
2. Red force capability assessment 
3. Red force most feasible tactics 
4. Red force most feasible force package 
The Red group relied on a number of assumptions for the analysis of Red forces. 
Firstly, Red forces were prepared for the scenario, with ample time for pre-scenario 
actions (planning, consecration of forces, exercises and more) but with low-signature or 
in decoy, such that Blue forces were afforded the shortest possible reaction time. The 
assumption from these considerations was that the evident actions will be six hours prior 
to H-Hour. Secondly, Red forces were not able to use any Weapons of Mass Destruction 
throughout all of the various scenarios. Thirdly, Red forces maintained a surface screen 
for the purpose of local sea control around the target island at every opportunity. Red 
forces assumed any Blue forces or threats of force were valid. Finally, Red forces made 
every effort to prevent entry access to any military or civilian entity attempting to 
penetrate local sea or air space within the blockaded “sanitation zone,” even in the case of 




The Red force capability assessment was based on a report by the Congressional 
Research Service: “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy capabilities - 
Background and Issues for Congress” by Ronald O’Rourke. The report highlighted four 
main points: 
(1) The Chinese Navy is having an accelerated modernization effort, which 
started at the beginning of the 1990s. 
(2) The Chinese Navy is focused on improving the quality more than quantity. 
This is the reason we could try and forecast the amount of Chinese naval 
assets. The full list of current and forecast Chinese assets can be located in 
Appendix E. 
(3) The DF-21 (a theater-range ballistic missile equipped which designed to 
hit moving ships at sea (O’Rourke 2014, 5)) which the Chinese are 
developing and testing at  is a “game changing” weapon, because of their 
high accuracy which can presumably hit aircraft carriers and other high-
value assets, in addition to their range and maneuverability which makes 
them hard to intercept. The DF-21 is a major component in the Chinese 
ability to create A2AD environment.  
(4) The Chinese are planning to expand their aircraft carrier fleet, and under 
the currents plan, they will have a total of three operational by the 
project’s scoped time frame. Employment of that force is assumed to be in 
that of battle groups similar to U.S. doctrine, but divided into their own 
theatres of interest.  
b. Limitations 
Here are the major limitations that the report claims about the Chinese capabilities 
that could affect the blue force efforts. It is important to mention that in the 10–15 years 
between this release and the scoped time frame, some (and maybe all) of the identified 
capability gaps could be closed by the Chinese: 
(1) Carrier-based aircraft, the J-15, is limited to air-superiority and ship-
defense rolled only. They lack air-offence capability due to carrier 
limitations.  
(2) The Chinese Marines to this point have never conducted a division-scale 
amphibious warfare exercise. They have limited joint operations with 
other services of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
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(3) The Chinese submarines are not currently as stealthy as the United States 
Navy (USN) submarines. Because of that, they are largely limited to a 
coastal defense role. There is a low probability that the submarines will be 
used as access denial enforcing system. 
(4) The Chinese has a dependency on Russia for military-grade technologies 
and some critical spare parts. 
(5) The People’s Liberation Army Navy has not undertaken a large-scale or 
long-range amphibious operation in modern times. Furthermore, the 
PLAN has had no recent experience with the massive logistical 
infrastructure required to support such an operation, and also lacks 
experience in operating in a joint or integrated fashion, which is a 
prerequisite when facing a modern, peer adversary. The United States, in 
contrast, has very recent logistics experience in supporting overseas 
operations due to its activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, the 
U.S. pioneered joint air, land, and sea operations, and maintains high 
training standards for amphibious operations as a matter of routine. This 
lack of operational experience on behalf of the Chinese provides some 
incentive for them to avoid direct, armed conflict with the United States.  
2. Other Adversaries and Emerging Technologies 
As stated before, our study’s main adversary was the Chinese military, especially 
the Chinese Navy. In order to be complete, and to be prepared for all of the scenarios, we 
conducted a research on additional threats other adversaries can impose on the USN. Our 
goal is not to create a comprehensive list of adversaries’ capabilities, but to identify the 
“game changing” assets and technologies.  
We also researched emerging technologies that can be developed and adopted by 
any adversary that can be part of this scenario.   
(1) Russia 
Russia has much stealthier and more sophisticated submarines than the 
Chinese.  For example, Russia launched in 2014 a new Kilo-class submarine for the 
black-sea fleet (“Russia” 2014). There is evidence that a Russian submarine (although not 
a littoral type) has sailed in the Gulf of Mexico without detection by the USN (Gertz 
2012).   
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The Kilo-Class submarine can be a high threat blockade assets, because their 
ability to operate in the littoral, as a stealthy threat which prevent the USN approaching 
the island, without knowing where the threat is located. 
(2) North Korea 
North Korea Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capabilities, which includes the 
Nodong (1,000 Km range), the Taepodong-1 (2,200Km range), the Musudan (4,000 Km 
range), and the Taepodong-2 (6,000 Km range) can impose a severe threat on United 
States forces and allies in the East-Asia region, as a means of effecting a blockade 
(“BBC” 2013).  
3. Technological Improvements and Plausible Alternatives for Red 
Group Assets (Based on 2025–2030 Timeframe) 
Based on the capabilities presented by both North Korea and Russia, swift 
launching of assets in a first-strike environment could lead to a swift and decisive victory 
for either party.  The various technology improvements that could possibly evolve into 
viable future weaponry include the following: 
(1) High-Powered Microwave   
This technology could potentially disrupt the Blue Force’s communications and 
electronics assets; and often, the Blue Force would not be able to discover them.  A high-
powered microwave can be disguised by embedding the system(s) into locations such as 
shipping containers or even large cavities like well decks or cargo holds. 
(2) High Energy Laser   
Cost effective and highly lethal, these laser weapons can potentially destroy or 
degrade armaments or aircraft bodies in the skies, disrupting friendly aerial assets from 
ingress into the area of operations (OPAREA). 
(3) UAV Swarm  
These minute flying machines can be left unmanned once launched, and upon 
doing so be deployed near the Blue Force’s OPAREA for maximum disruption.  The 
drones to be used for swarming are relatively inexpensive and payloads can be added to 
cause even more mayhem in deployed locations. 
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IV. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
A. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
In framing our approach to the approved problem statement, it was important to 
create a narrative framework that would help scope and define the specifics of our 
tasking.  The first step in creating a narrative was to generalize the potential scenarios 
with a series of assumptions or factors derived from the problem statement.  This 
statement specified that our workspace must include an A2AD environment and should 
focus on rapid company-sized amphibious troop deployments.  From there, we made the 
assumption that our efforts should be aimed at a near peer adversary capable of deploying 
A2AD measures in a littoral or amphibious region.  Finally, considering the inherent 
limitations of a company of Marines or soldiers as well as the implications behind a 
“rapid” deployment, we decided our goal would be to place a company of troops on an 
island within a specific time frame.  Essentially we would be “racing” an adversary to an 
island and, if our troops arrived first, that would be assumed as a sufficient deterrent to 
the adversary contesting American control of the island(s).  In crafting a narrative, it 
would be easy to stack the cards in favor of the United States, but this would not generate 
any worthwhile results from our study and so we, rather than create an easy or overly 
“realistic” scenario, focused on developing a worst-case possibility. 
1. Scenario 1: The Baltic Sea 
Our first scenario took place in the Baltic Sea.  In this narrative the United States 
received intelligence indicating Russia plans to seize Gotland, a Swedish island with a 
strategically valuable location in the Baltic.  Analysts believe that Russians are not 
willing to go to war with the United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) over this island and so, if there was an increased troop presence, this would 
deter Russian aggression.  The Swedish government has requested a NATO exercise on 
Gotland and the United States has agreed to deploy a company of Marines in a show of 
force.  These Marines will augment Sweden’s own Amphibious Corps (the coastal 
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defense branch of the Swedish Navy) and must arrive on the island within twenty-four 
hours, with a target time of eighteen hours. 
This scenario provided a rough framework, but lacked the challenge of other 
geographic areas.  The forward-deployed American units and equipment in Europe as 
well as the existing NATO infrastructure and capabilities of other NATO nations 
removed much of the challenge that American forces would otherwise face.  Thus, 
although useful in framing the problem, this scenario was determined to not be our 
primary focus.  Any data or system utilized in our solution would be applicable to this 
scenario; it simply was not designed with it specifically in mind. 
2. Scenario 2: South China Sea Race to the Spratlys 
With the lessons of Scenario 1 in mind, we selected a region that posed a greater 
challenge to American lift capabilities for our next scenario—the South China 
Sea.  Considering our timeline of ten to fifteen years in the future, it is reasonable to 
assume that the People’s Republic of China will continue its economic and military 
growth at, at least, its current rate.  Thus, by 2025, China will represent a near-peer 
adversary threat to the United States.  Couple this power with the fact that China is a 
pioneer of the A2AD strategy and has several territorial disputes with American allies, 
and the South China Sea became a clear choice as a potential “worst-case” scenario. 
Following the framework of Scenario 1, Scenario 2 begins with the United States 
receiving intelligence that China has plans to seize an island, this time in the Spratly 
Island chain.  The Spratly Islands consist of more than one hundred land formations 
spread across 410,000 square kilometers of the South China Sea.  Combined, the total 
landmass of the islands is less than five square kilometers of harsh rock and sand, yet an 
estimated $5 trillion in maritime trade passes through the chain each year (“Sea” 
2012).  Between its allies’ interest and territorial claims in the region and the potential 
economic disruption if trade were to be halted or re-routed, the American government is 
certainly concerned with any changes to the islands’ current status quo. 
With this in mind, Scenario 2 tasks the United States with placing a company of 
Marines or soldiers on the designated island in the Spratlys faster than China can get its 
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own troops to it.  The company would be assumed to be a forward-deployed “ready” 
company that could deploy on short notice utilizing Navy and Air Force assets in the 
region.  Although speed of deployment would obviously be an important metric in this 
situation, additional concerns are the visibility (or detectability) of the deployment system 
and the amount of lift capacity it has for troops and materiel. 
Although this narrative was objectively improved over that of Scenario 1, in that 
it would better stress American capabilities, this scenario proved difficult in other 
ways.  First, is there an island with large enough above-sea surface area in the Spratly 
chain on which to garrison an entire company?  What equipment would the company of 
Marines or soldiers have with them?  How do we quantify “beating” the Chinese to the 
island without being presumptuous regarding their ability to embark troops, which bases 
they would operate out of, and their potential speeds of advance?  We addressed the first 
question by assuming an island big enough to accommodate whatever number of 
personnel and equipment we chose to land. The consequence of this assumption is that 
both the Chinese and the Americans will only land on the same minimum square 
footage.  This is an important step in ensuring our solution translates to any geographic 
region, and not just the space-constrained South China Sea. The other questions, 
however, were not so easily addressed and so we chose to evolve the narrative further. 
3. Scenario 3: Expanding Our Own A2AD Envelope 
For our third scenario, we explored another South China Sea narrative, but with a 
very different framework.  Considering the People’s Republic of China already occupies 
several islands in the Spratly chain and is actively working to grow the landmasses its 
troops already reside on, it makes little sense to focus on beating the Chinese to another 
island in the chain.  Winning such a race would perhaps provide little strategic gain for the 
United States and losing would provide little loss for China.  Thus, we sought to create a 
more realistic scenario that would help drive more useful requirements for our system. 
As a solution, we looked at a potential political shift in the Pacific where China 
installs its A2AD technology on its outposts in the Spratly Islands and then declares the 
archipelago closed to international maritime traffic.  Such a scenario would be 
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devastating to the international economy and would absolutely draw a swift response 
from the United States.  Furthermore, given the U.S. Navy’s tradition of conducting 
Freedom of Navigation missions, this is a scenario easily understood by American policy 
makers. 
In this scenario, the United States makes the decision to land a company of 
Marines on an outlying island in the Spratly chain with the means of securing the nearby 
sea lines of communication.  This company, or follow-on companies, will be 
“leapfrogged” across the uninhabited islands of the Spratlys in an effort to provide the 
United States with its own A2AD “bubble” that will protect merchant and military 
shipping and deter Chinese aggression.  However, due to the existing anti-ship cruise 
missile (ASCM) and submarine threat to large surface combatants and amphibious 
assault ships, the United States will not utilize a conventional amphibious landing to 
accomplish the insertion.  The desire is, instead, to develop a system of systems that 
utilizes low-cost, A2AD-survivable platforms in an effort to minimize the potential loss 
of a large ship costing billions of dollars and holding thousands of lives.  Due to the 
potential risk of operating within the Spratly Island chain in this scenario, it would be 
unlikely that the insertion platforms would remain in the vicinity of the islands and thus 
the company of Marines must be self-sufficient and capable of providing a reasonable 
deterrent to threats from the surface or the air. 
This scenario provided the clearest framework for developing requirements and 
drove our creation of three service-based groups: a Navy group, a Marine group, and a 
joint Army-Air Force group.  These groups were focused on different parts of the 
assignment, with the Navy group focusing on delivering the Marines inside of the A2AD 
environment, and the Marine group focusing on developing a series of specialized, self-
sufficient platoon-sized force packages, each with a specific mission in mind. The Army-
Air Force group focused on aerial delivery and the creation of Army-based force 
packages.   
In short, our final scenario met all the requirements laid out in the assigned 
mission statement.  The economic and military ramifications of losing access to the 
waters surrounding the Spratly Islands (and therefore many ports around the South China 
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Sea) would prompt an immediate response by the United States.  The threat posed by 
A2AD weapons would rule out traditional amphibious operations and thus prompt the 
creation of a new system.  It would need to be rapidly deployable, reliable, roughly the 
size of a single company, and would need to be capable of self-sustainment in an A2AD 
environment.  Furthermore, the deployment capabilities and various force packages 
would all be easily translated to any other geographic theater.  The ability of a company 
of Marines to unilaterally provide a “bubble” of sea and/or air control in addition to their 
possession of the land itself, could provide military decision makers with a host of new, 
flexible options in future conflicts.  The ability to rapidly deploy and sustain such a 
company with minimal platform dedication is just another major benefit. 
B. RED FORCE SCENARIO 
Red forces are best assessed by making assumptions about the nation in question. 
This discussion is best accomplished by examining the options available and determining 
a most likely COA, to include movements and tactics. 
1. Possible Red Force Ingress 
The analysis is done for both air ingress and sea ingress scenarios, and the 
conclusion is that the Red group possesses the capabilities to stage an earlier ingress into 
the OPAREA, provided that they could launch air assets from nearby islands.  One of the 
islands in contention for such a scenario is the Paracel Islands, which include assets as 
significant as a full length runway for fast and efficient launching of Red force aircraft. 




 Red Force Ingress Options (after Google 2015) Figure 6. 
2. Possible Red Force Tactics 
As a primary means of disrupting Blue Force’s shallow water tactics, the Red 
force can utilize an array of anti-ship missiles. This arsenal may include Anti-Ship 
Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) and ASCMs. If the Blue force instead opts for fixed or rotary 
wing airborne insertion of troops, the Red force possesses anti-aircraft missiles, and Man-
Portable Air Defenses (MANPAD).  This arsenal may even include the FN-6, a 3rd-




 Red Force Tactical Assessment Figure 7. 
3. Red Force Deployment 
Based on the current Red force’s asset availability, an assessment is required for 
the most likely order-of-battle in the contested region as a counterforce to the Blue force. 
A primary assumption for these scenarios is that the Red force deploys a force package 
similar to that employed by the Blue Force. Table 3 illustrates the estimated force 
package that the Red force would make available for the contested littorals. 
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Table 3.   Red Force Mission Package 
Assets Type Quantity Remarks 




200 Includes supporting equipment 
Amphibious Landing Ship 072 1 Includes 4x Z-8 Super Frelon 
Rotary-wing aircraft  
Missile Boat 022 8 Small Combatant Ship 




Strike Aircraft J-15 10 Carrier-Based 
Mine Countermeasure 081 1  
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
(ASBM) 
DF-21 1 Launched from mainland 
 
Two destroyers and two frigates are included into the list of deployable assets as 
the Aircraft Carrier escorts. Missile assets such as the DF-21 ASBM can be deployed and 
launched from within the confines of their country; hence, these assets will not be 
brought to the contested littorals. Nevertheless, they are also included in Table 3 to 
indicate overall type and quantity of assets that is involved in the Red group’s force 
package. The deployable assets discussed in Appendix B provide the necessary 
infrastructures and launch-platforms for the aforementioned Red force tactics. 
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V. SYSTEM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
A. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TRACEABILITY  
The process of defining system requirements and ensuring traceability between a 
stakeholder and a system component is a fundamental, and recursive, step within the SE 
process. The requirements traceability process begins with analyzing who the 
stakeholders are and also analyzing what stakeholders individually and collectively view 
as important. In the case of DOD stakeholders, the concept of COIs helps with 
identifying fundamental system requirements. COIs do this by posing questions about 
operational effectiveness and operational suitability (“DAU” 2015). COIs are best used 
phrased as a question made by the stakeholder. In the case of our system, the stakeholder 
COIs our team developed were the following; 
 
COI 1: DEPLOYABLE: Can we beat the adversary to an island with our 
system? 
 
COI 2: SUSTAINABLE: Can we deliver initial troops and supplies? 
 
COI 3: DEFENDABLE: Can we defend the island? 
 
COI 4: RELIABLE: Can we use this system on short notice? 
 
COI 5: AFFORDABLE: Can we afford the system? 
 
1. Stakeholder to Component Traceability  
The COIs listed above reflect our team’s collective effort to represent concerns 
about stakeholder requirements. In this case, our team chose to assign a stakeholder role 
to each of the DOD service components. As a result, relationships between stakeholders 
and COIs formed a branching effect that resulted in some stakeholders having multiple 
COIs. Under such a paradigm, each COI could result in multiple operational requirements 
that in turn could each lead to multiple system requirements.   
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Figure 8 shows the relationship between the high level needs off the stakeholders 
traced to the many system components comprising a system and the respective MOEs 
and MOPs utilized to evaluate the system. 
 
 Stakeholder to System Models Traceability Figure 8. 
Traceability helps to ensure that every requirement is addressed within a system 
design. For every stakeholder requirement there needs to be a corollary component, or 
collection of components, within the system that serve to meet that stakeholders’ stated 
need. Likewise, for every stakeholder requirement there needs to be a validation process 
using MOEs and MOPs where the effectiveness and performance of the system is 
evaluated (“DAU” 2015). This process yields a result where every physical component 
comprising a system is designed and made for a specific purpose within the completed 
system that supports a stakeholder requirement. 
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B. STAKEHOLDER CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
To begin the design process our team needed to clearly define the stakeholders’ 
COIs and in what way those COIs would influence our team’s design decisions. The 
following section elaborates on each COI and describes how our team understood the 
impact those COIs on our system design.  
1. COI 1: Can We Beat the Adversary to an Island with Our System? 
COI 1 asks a fundamental system design question about operational suitability 
and operational effectiveness. In order for or our system to be effective at deterring 
adversaries from seizing islands in an A2AD environment the system must allow our 
forces to move to a specific geographic location first. As mentioned in the scenario, the 
advantage goes to the first force able to land on an island first. Beating an adversary to an 
island is ultimately a race between two competitors to see who can reach an advantageous 
position first. The first force that is able to arrive at an island first can then claim that 
island as rightfully theirs. As a result, the first force to an island is able to establish a 
defensive occupying force.   
Defensive forces hold a numerical advantage over attacking forces in the classical 
3:1 ratio where there is a requirement for 3 attackers for every 1 defender to reach parity 
in combat strength. The 3:1 combat ratio is a traditional force planning measure used by 
the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to assist in planning for force requirements. The 3:1 
combat ratio makes actual combat unlikely in our scenario because the risk of escalation 
is too great. The later arriving force would then need to bring a minimum of 3 times the 
defending force’s number in order to conduct an in opposed amphibious landing onto an 
occupied island. Opposed amphibious landings are inherently dangerous and require the 
attacker to invest more in resources along with the possible escalation of tensions at the 
strategic level. Therefore, the force ratio advantage goes to the force that is able to 
occupy a contested island area first. The capability of arriving at a contested island first 
provides two important advantages to an amphibious landing force. The first advantage is 
that landing on an unopposed beachhead places the fastest force in a position of an 
occupying defending force. The second advantage is that the force can be small initially 
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in an unopposed landing scenario. Hence, it is vitally important that our system allows us 
to deploy to a disputed territory before our enemy deploys his forces. 
2. COI 2: Can We Deliver Initial Troops and Supplies? 
COI 2 asks a question about system suitability. Is this system suitable for the 
intended mission and operating environment?  Our stakeholders require that the system 
delivers small units to amphibious areas in contested littoral regions. Given the timeframe 
of 2025–2030 our team determined that small units in the Marines and Army would 
remain primarily manned versus unmanned. That is to say, the primary fighting 
instrument our system would incorporate would remain the combat infantryman. Making 
this assumption opened up volumes of doctrinal information on Infantry combat loads, 
consumption rates, fighting capability, and other various forms of data that are readily 
available as combat proven information. This assumption did not preclude the use of 
unmanned systems augmenting future small units with additional capability. The Infantry 
fighting force at the small unit level would be a base case to make assumptions on in 
order for us to begin working our system designs and models. 
3. COI 3: Can We Defend the System in an A2AD Environment? 
One of the primary concerns in manned systems is the ability to defend against 
enemy attack. COI 3 is a question of system operational effectiveness. How effective is 
the system at deterring aggressive enemy action towards itself? And once the system is 
operating within the boundaries of an A2AD environment can the system protect itself 
against outside threats?  Our team determined that the system needed to possess some 
level of lethality in order for the system to pose a credible force against the most probable 
adversarial threats.   
4. COI 4: Is the System Reliable? 
An early system Key Performance Parameter (KPP) that our group determined as 
essential for system success was speed. A KPP is defined as a, “Performance attribute of 
a system considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military 
capability” (DAU 2015). COI 4 is a question about both operational suitability and 
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effectiveness. A system that will deploy on short notice to an island ahead of detected 
adversary movement to that same island is essential to accomplishing a deterrence 
mission over island land grabs. A primary measure of a highly deployable system is the 
reliability of that system. Is the system ready to deploy at a moment’s notice? 
5. COI 5: Is This System Affordable? 
COI 5 is a question of operational suitability within the confines of the DOD’s 
current budget constraints. Our group made two general assumptions going forward into 
the system design phase on the issue of affordability. The first assumption was that 
within the time frame of 2025–2030 there will be no major technological breakthroughs 
beyond one generation of improvements on current legacy systems. The second 
assumption we made as a group regarding affordability was to say that all introduced 
technology had to maintain at least a technology readiness level (TRL) of “8” or higher in 
order for it to be considered ready for system implementation. According to DOD Desk 
book 5000.2-R Appendix 6, TRL 8 is defined as, “Actual system completed and qualified 
through test and demonstration.” 
C. DESIRED SYSTEM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Each COI previously listed must be answered positively by the system design 
outcome for the system to be considered a success. Inherent in each COI are System 
Operational Requirements (SOR) that the system must perform in terms of, “system 
deployment, utilization, effectiveness, and accomplish of its intended mission” in order to 
achieve a particular COI (Blanchard 2008). SORs are requirements that the stakeholders 
and system developers formulate based upon stakeholder COIs and the agreed upon 
operational scenario. For example, COI 1 calls for the system to be deployable. Where 
and when a system is deployable largely depends upon the context of an operational 
scenario. The scenario in this case is to deploy the system to an A2AD threat 
environment. The scenario along with the COIs help assist system designers in 
formulating the “who, what, where, when, and for how long?” types of questions 
concerning how a system will operate (Blanchard 2011). Therefore, the SORs that answer 
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the COIs in terms of an appropriate scenario are SORs that addresses system operation in 
an A2AD environment.    
1. Stakeholder COIs to SORs to STR Traceability 
The formulation of Stakeholder COIs and the problem scenario drove the analysis 
behind discovering SORs. Each group developed specific SORs that supported COI 
accomplishment. Table 4 represents the Marine group’s example of tracing SORs to 
COIs within the context of the scenario. 
As each of the groups worked through the SOR-to-COI traceability in 
requirements a natural outgrowth of the process was the continued refinement of system 
requirements at a level below the SORs. System Technical Requirements (STRs) are 
system specifications for system attributes such as how fast, how big, at what 
frequencies, and for how long a system will operate (Blanchard 2011). STRs are closely 
aligned with the Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) that serve as bench marks for 
evaluating if a system is achieving a certain STR. By definition, TPMs are “measures for 
characteristics that are, or derive from, attributes inherent in the design itself” (Blanchard 
2011). TPMs for our project are covered in greater detail in Chapter VII. 
The recursive loop included in the SE process is required throughout the design 
process due to its integrative nature and is especially important in refining the STRs. The 
initial STRs are first developed with a vague understanding of their parameters. For COI 
1 the system must deploy. And in order to deploy the system has the SOR 1 of deploying 
to an A2AD environment. And in order for the system to perform SOR 1 to answer COI 1 
the system must process certain set of yet unknown physical characteristics. The system 
must deploy within X hours with a minimum speed of Y knots, and shall be detected no 
early than Z kilometers from the landing site. The aforementioned STRs are unknown 
and are not assigned a specific value at first because in later stages of the SE process the 
groups built models to attempt to define what is feasible and what is not, within  the 
team’s scope. How fast can a system we create actually arrive at an island?  At this point 
any threshold values would be either artificially imposed, hindering thought, or both. 
Establishing solid STRs based upon rigorous analysis is a fundamental part of ensuring a 
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system is developed that can achieve the higher levels of the requirements hierarchy 
previously discussed and shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Example Marine Group System Operational Requirements 
COIs    SOR Marine Group System Operational Requirements 
COI 3 M-SOR 1 The system shall deter adversary from occupying an island– COI 3 
COI 3 M-SOR 2 The system shall defend against credible threats (DF-21, Cruise missile, 
Land mines, aircrafts, ships, EW & GPS, SWARM, UAV) – COI 3 
COI 3 M-SOR 3 The system shall be able to effectively defend against 1x company of 
enemy marines – COI 3 
COI 2 M-SOR 4 The system shall maintain communication links with USMC and USN high 
HQ – COI 2 
COI 2 M-SOR 5 The system shall communicate with coalition forces – COI 2 
COI 3 M-SOR 6 The system shall have the capability to detect and identify friend or foe 
(surface and air) up to a range of 120 NM – COI 3 
COI 1 M-SOR 7 The system shall be deployable to the targeted location in less than <72 
hours from Warning Order – COI 1 
COI 2 
COI 4 
M-SOR 8 The system shall support indefinitely the logistics requirements for men and 
equipment operating within the system in an A2AD environment – COI 2 
and 4 
 
2. Requirements Analysis Hierarchy 
Figure 9 is a system requirements hierarchy showing traceability from the 
stakeholders traced down thru to individual STRs. The format for the functional 
decomposition is borrowed from Blanchard and Fabrycky’s format of functional 
decomposition to support requirements traceability (Blanchard 2011).   
As previously described, stakeholder needs begin with an analysis of the enemy’s 
current posture and probable future plans. From this analysis of the enemy are born the 
stakeholder needs that are voiced through COIs. The COIs in conjunction with an 
operational scenario lead to the development of SORs. And in order to perform the SORs 
a certain set of STRs must be established by the system design group through modeling 





 Requirements Analysis Hierarchy  Figure 9. 
The system requirements were continually developed and updated by the design 
group throughout the SE process. The sum total of system requirements are what then 
drives the functional analysis process described in Chapter VI. 
Stakeholders 












SOR1: Shall Deploy to 
an A2AD 
Environment 
STR1: Shall have a 
speed of less than X 
hours 
STR2: Shall avoid 
detection within X 
NM 
SOR2: Shall maintain 
C2 in A2AD 
STR3: Shall maintain 




SOR3: Shall maintain 
Sustainment in A2AD STR4:Shall deliver X 
tons per day 




with X% of current 
systems 
COI3: DEFEND 
SOR5: Shall defend 
against at 1:3 
STR6: Defend against 
adversary  raiding 
force 
COI4: RELIABLE  
  
SOR5: Shall maintain 
>90% readiness for 
deployment in SEA  
STR7: Shall maintain 
an MTBF of X hrs  
COI5: 
AFFORDABLE 
SOR7: Shall cost less 
than current A. Raid 
Methods 
STR8: Component 
costs shall not exceed  
X.XX 
SOR8: Shall achieve a 
80% learning curve 
per island 
STR: Training 




VI. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
Functional analysis (including decomposition, analysis, and synthesis) is a 
fundamental step within the SE process where the complexity of a system or a system 
concept is divided into functional and sub-functional areas. Decomposing a complex 
system into smaller subset functional areas assists system designers in visualizing and 
designing smaller and more manageable parts of a larger system. Designers can take a 
system such as a vehicle and decompose it down to functional areas such as the drive 
system, communications system, fuel system, chassis and others. The result of functional 
decomposition is a more granular understanding of a system design at a functional level, 
from which functional requirements are determined. 
The functional decomposition process begins with analyzing who the stakeholders 
are and analyzing what stakeholders individually and collectively view as important. In 
the case of DOD stakeholders the relevance of a system is based upon how well that 
system serves its purpose in supporting mission accomplishment.   
B. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
The concept of a military mission and the systems that support mission 
accomplishment are two different concepts and is a unique point of consideration when 
designing DOD specific systems. A mission is a defined tactical task that contains agreed 
upon supporting tasks that define mission accomplishment and the conditions under 
which those tasks must be carried out along with the standards that measure how well the 
performer achieved those tasks in support of accomplishing a mission.   
Our team began the functional decomposition process with an in depth analysis of 
the doctrine supporting our DOD stakeholders mission accomplishment needs. Military 
doctrinal tasks exist separately from any one type of system because they represent an 
enduring set of needs. To attack, to defend, and to seize are all examples of doctrinal 
tasks that have endured as military commander’s needs since ancient warfare and these 
tasks along with others will exist well into the foreseeable future. How those tasks are 
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accomplished does change with various systems (e.g., sword, horse, armor, tank, 
airplane), and it is from the system’s framework that our team began the process of 
designing our specific system. 
1. Doctrinal Mission Tasks for Amphibious Raid 
Our team focused in on the specific wording of our tasking statement where the 
need for an amphibious raid capability was addressed by the stakeholders. Amphibious 
Raids are a mission area for the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and U.S. Navy as described in 
the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) (OPNAVINST 3500.38 2007). However, when 
appropriate, the U.S. Army is also capable of conducting Amphibious Raids as per the 
Army Universal Task List (AUTL) (Army FM 7 15 2003). Raid missions generally include 
small units exercising offensive operations to seize an area quickly in order to gain 
information, capture personnel or equipment, confuse an enemy, or destroy an enemy plan 
or capability followed by a planned withdrawal from the area (“Joint Task” 2015).   
In order to narrow the scope of the problem and tailor system development to a 
specific force package our team made the decision to focus on the Marine Corps version 
of Amphibious Raids as a tactical task. The reasoning behind this decision follows that 
the Navy plays a supporting role in the delivery and support of amphibious raid forces 
and the Army defers to Marine Corps doctrine in amphibious operations. Therefore, any 
solution requiring Marine personnel would also be applicable to Army forces. Our team 
moved forward using amphibious raid doctrine as a conceptual framework following 
Navy Tactical Task 1.5.2.4 and Marine Corps Tactical Task 1.12.1.2 from the UNTL. 
The UNTL defines an Amphibious Raid as: 
To conduct short-duration, small-scale deliberate attacks, from the sea, 
involving a swift penetration of hostile or denied battlespace. Amphibious 
raids are conducted in order to secure information, to confuse the enemy, 
or to seize, destroy, neutralize, capture, exploit, recover, or damage 
designated sea-based or shore-based targets. Amphibious raids end with a 
planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. 
Marine Corps doctrine further defines the conduct of Amphibious Raids with 
Marine Corps War Publication (MCWP) 3–43.1; Raid Operations. The center piece of the 
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Marine Corps raiding force is the ground combat element (GCE). The organization of the 
raiding force depends on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 
available and time available (“Raid Operations” 1993).   
Augmenting the Marine Corps component of the raiding force are the naval tasks 
in support of amphibious raids. Conducting an amphibious raid is no small undertaking, 
as represented by the sheer number of blocked tasks shown in Figure 10. Our team began 
the functional decomposition process with a breakdown of all the tactical tasks associated 
with conducting an amphibious raid. Our premise was that if we knew what must be 
accomplished we could then better understand how we might tailor a system capable of 
accomplishing established doctrinal mission tasks. A functional decomposition of Navy 
and Marine Corps tasks to support a small Marine raiding force yielded a staggering 179 
high-level tactical tasks (see Appendix A). The majority of this task burden falls on the 
Navy in the form of overall support to the raiding force.   
 
 Amphibious Raid Tasks Load  Figure 10. 
Figure 10 illustrates the information contained in Appendix A. Only a fraction of 
the 179 tasks involved in conducting and Amphibious Raid are conducted by the Marine 
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GCE. On this point our team made the decision to scope our problem down to developing 
only the raiding force system elements required to penetrate an A2AD bubble and 
support accomplishing our stakeholder’s needs.  
2. System Boundaries 
Our team bounded the system by focusing on the assaulting force and the 
supporting mechanisms of the system by which a raid is conducted. Our team consensus 
on bounding the problem is shown in Figure 11. In order to conduct an amphibious raid 
within the parameters of our problems statement a system must deliver an assaulting 
force, sustain that force, and defend that force as primary system functions.   
 
 
 System Functional Boundaries Figure 11. 
3. Chosen Doctrinal Tasks 
MCWP 3–43.1 describes the essential raiding force organization as having the 
elements shown in Figure 12. Paring our analysis of the bounded system functions with 
Marine Corps Doctrine we were able to scope some of the organizational requirements 
away to exist outside of our system. 
 









Elements such as the Recon Element and Reserve element were considered out of 
bounds from the core raid system our team focused on designing. Our team determined 
that we could exclude the Recon element on the grounds that a reconnaissance mission is 
an entirely other task set that requires specialized systems dedicated to intelligence 
gathering. The black arrow in Figure 13 represents moving the reconnaissance element 
outside the boundaries of our system. We also determined that a reserve element was not 
required based upon our problem scenario and as a result we eliminated the reserve 
element entirely from our system as depicted in Figure 13. Our scenario calls for the rest 
of the fleet to anchor outside of the A2AD bubble and if needed, can assist in a reserve 
capacity. 
Figure 13 shows the genesis of doctrinal scoping that our team conducted in order 
to establish a doctrinal framework from which to base our system design upon.   
 
      
 Scoped Organization of the Raid Force  Figure 13. 
The resulting configuration of a raid force supports our team’s assessment of the 
problem boundary defined in Figure 11, where our system development focuses on 
assaulting the objective (deploying to a location) supporting the raiding force 













Support Assault Defend 
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4. Operational Activities 
In order to make the transition from doctrinal decomposition to system functional 
decomposition it is necessary to define Operational Activities (OAs). OAs are defined as 
activities analogous to supporting tasks within military doctrine (“DAU” 2015). They are 
the activities associated with mission accomplishment and in the case of system design 
OAs help describe different modes of system operation (Blanchard 2011). The 
decomposition of OAs is done through assigning functions to accomplish each OA. It is 
through this subtle connection that the transition from doctrinal decomposition to 
functional decomposition transpires. 
The OAs that best describe the mission accomplishment of conducting a raid are; 
Assault, Sustain, and Defend which are the same items listed as elements in our doctrinal 
description. We focused our design efforts in systems design on these three main OAs.    
5. Functional Hierarchy 
Figure 14 shows the functional decomposition of our system where all of the 
system requirements listed in Chapter V are collected as one centralized set of 
requirements describing what the system must do (SORs) and how the system must 
accomplish its mission (STRs). Below the system requirements in the hierarchy are the 
system OAs showing the three primary modes of system operation followed by high level 
system functions. System functions describe in functional action verb terms what the 
system is physically performing in order to accomplish a particular OA. Functions are 
best used in the design process by designers describing what a system must do before the 
how is defined (Blanchard 2011).   
At the very end lies the system component level. The component level is the 
actual piece of equipment, network, or otherwise physical thing that is brought into 
existence for the purpose of accomplishing some assigned function. The collection of 
components ultimately should meet the stakeholder’s COIs along with every system 




 Functional Decomposition Mapped to Platforms Figure 14. 
a. General System Functional Decomposition 
Listed after the OAs are the primary system functions our team used as a primary 
case towards achieving our system design. Broadly stated, our system needs to maneuver 
an amphibious force to an island in a contested littoral area. And after establishing a 
foothold on a contested island, the system must then support the assaulting force and any 
follow on force reinforcements that arrive to the island. In order to support the force the 
system must then provide logistical support to the force and enable the force to 
communicate with assets outside of the A2AD bubble. Lastly, defending the force is a 















Figure 14 represents general items that could guide our team’s search for feasible 
components capable of fulfilling our system’s functional requirements. As stated 
previously the expectation is that the systems currently in existence in today’s fleet will 
continue to be operationally relevant in the 2025–2030 timeframe.   
6. Functional Flow Bock Diagram 
Functional flow block diagrams (FFBDs) are an additional method designers 
employ to accomplish functional decomposition of a system (Blanchard 2011). The 
FFBDs are useful in depicting a sequence of functional events that can have either linear 
or parallel relationships. The FFBD shows system flows along a timeline of a system in 
operation. Normally the FFBD begins with the initial function required for system 
operation and then closes with the final system function required for system 
accomplishment. FFBDs at lower levels of system functions may be embedded to show 
internal functional flows within higher level system functions. Figure 15 is a depiction of 





























 System Top-Level FFBD Figure 15. 
The open parenthesis box in Figure 15 refer (REF) to a function that may be 
decomposed further than what is depicted. In Figure 15, the function “F1: Deploy” is a 
major function with multiple sub-functions and sub-functional flows contained within the 
function itself. The reference function for Function “F5: Return to Base (RTB)” is similar 
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in that the parentheses inform the reader that there are sub-functions and sub-functional 
flows contained within the RTB function.   
The bubble depicting a command order is used to show outside information either 
from another separate system or a performer, such as a military commander, is initiating a 
system functional flow. A command order to deploy an amphibious assault force and to 
initiate penetration of the A2AD bubble would be the prerogative of the local military 
commander. Our system then would react to this outside input and perform the functions 
in sequence as one continuous functional flow. 
a. System Requirements Traceability  
System functional traceability is ensured via strict adherence to placing functions 
within the system that directly support OA accomplishment. Accomplishing OAs with 
functions supports the fulfillment of system requirements and ultimately stakeholder 
COIs. Figure 16 shows an example of system traceability where a stakeholder sets a COI 
that initiates a process using SE techniques to positively answer the stakeholder’s COI. In 
the example shown in Figure 16 the component selected to fulfill the COI is an MV-22 
Osprey tilt rotor aircraft. In later section we will examine the component level of design 
through a series of COAs using various modeling techniques. Modeling the performance 
of the MV-22 in fulfilling a function to maneuver and an OA to assault will then inform 
our designers of the STR possible. Can the MV-22 deliver a force within X hours?  If the 
answer is negative then the process begins again to search out an alternative component. 
If on the other hand the answer is positive, then the question becomes one of fulfilling the 









 Stakeholder to Component Traceability for COI1: Deploy Figure 16. 
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VII. REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION 
A. FUNCTIONAL PACKAGING AND PARTITIONING  
After functional analysis is completed, the design group begins to form an 
operational picture of a high level system design. The next step in the SE process is to 
then begin the functional packaging and partitioning of the system design. Functional 
packaging is the process of grouping system functions together into groups of functions 
where similarities between multiple functions and multiple sub-functions exist. The goal 
is to ultimately partition the system into like functions where a set of components can 
accomplish multiple functions within a system. The end state is to have as few system 
components and system processes as possible to accomplish as many functions as 
possible within a system design. This methodology reduces system complexity and 
increases system efficiency by driving down the number of components and possible 
interactions between components while at the same time increasing the utility of each 
component within a system (Blanchard 2008) 
If the goal of the project was to build a completely new system our team would 
then have to develop “design to” requirements for various items of system equipment 
(Blanchard 2008). We would have to design our systems and sub-systems to meet 
stakeholder needs and build a custom system. This process is a detailed engineering 
endeavor in which every component, assembly, and sub-assembly within a system is 
designed and packaged to meet allocated system requirements.  
Ultimately the purpose of the SE process is to meet the expectation of the 
customer. For each stated requirement that a stakeholders expresses, there should be a 
component, or mixture of components that work to satisfy those stakeholder requirement. 
The existence of a component within a system such as a major end item like a chassis, or 
a small component like a headlamp, must exist within the system for some specific 
purpose in support of a stakeholder requirement. If a component exists within a system 
that serves no direct or indirect stakeholder need, then that component is superfluous and 
should be eliminated by the design group to reduce complexity. 
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B. ALLOCATION OF SYSTEM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
Our team framed the project problem scenario in the near term, 2025–2030, where 
we would look at existing technologies that are currently within the DOD inventory. At 
the heart of our team project was an emphasis on analyzing existing technologies capable 
of fulfilling our stakeholder needs. In order to accomplish this task we began by 
searching the DOD for systems that could potentially fulfill our system requirements.   
Within the DOD there exists an incredible variety of capability in terms of land, 
sea, and air domains. Much of this DOD capability exists in a compartmentalized format 
belonging to individual units, Combatant Commands, and services throughout the DOD 
with very little cross utilization. Our team’s approach was to take an academic view on 
creating the system and to ignore current DOD practices where dissimilar capabilities are 
not mixed and matched quickly in an integrated and responsive format. For instance, 
within the DOD, the ability to network and pull disparate systems together quickly, in 
order to seize an island, does not exist. Deploying a C-17 cargo aircraft, with an MV-22 
tilt-rotor aircraft, supported via LCS using airborne Soldiers and/or Marines to seize 
territory, does not exist without substantial planning and joint coordination. Our team’s 
project examines this current gap in capability integration and our project proves that 
there are a set of existing capabilities within DOD, as a whole, to accomplish the mission 
of quickly seizing an island.  
1. Major Systems 
Major systems we considered were the various system platforms that exist within 
the DOD. For transportation and delivery requirements we examined large cargo 
transport aircraft such as the C-5 Galaxy and the C-17 Globemaster. We also looked at 
surface and subsurface naval assets such as surface LCS and SSGN class submarines. 
2. Sub Systems 
The sub-system portion of our analysis examined various Marine and Soldier 
Force Packages that would be operationally suitable for deployment to an island for the 
purposes of quickly occupying territory. Our team designed small, company sized, 
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Marine and Soldier force packages that were suitable and effective in a low, medium, and 
high treat mission environment.   
C. TRACEABILITY OF REQUIREMENTS 
Figure 17 shows the results of a notional SE process where the requirements 
analysis and functional analysis are complete and the design group experiments with 
selected components that meet allocated system requirements. In Figure 17 a C-17 is 
chosen for transportation and maneuvering to an island. The C-17 in this case would 
fulfill several system requirements such as speed, stealth, maneuverability, timeliness, 
and so on. Thus, the requirements in a sense were allocated to selected material solutions 
through the selection and testing of possible platform solutions. 
 
 
 Concept System (images in graphic from Jane’s 2015) Figure 17. 
The design group selects candidate components to form a system and then begins 




configurations. Many of the unanswered “X & Y” Technical Performance Parameters 
(TPM) shown previously in Figure 9 are then calculated and refined through this process 
of modeling and exploring of the design space. Hence, the iterative loops within the SE 
process shown in Chapter I are utilized. As the design group modeled and refined the 
design, more and more of the previously unknown design parameters are worked out and 
a system design begins to take shape and emerge and an integrated SOS. 
1. System Synthesis 
“Synthesis refers to the combining and structuring of components in such a way 
as to represent a feasible system configuration” (Blanchard 2008). Our design groups 
began the process by selecting a combination of existing platforms that they believed 
would support system requirements. After the system was formed the groups then ran 
each of the COAs through an agreed upon set of evaluation criteria models whereby each 
COA was fairly evaluated and creating options for our stakeholders to choose from that 
we believe are both effective and suitable for the mission within the problem statement. 
Figure 18 shows the processes we used to develop our COAs. The COAs were a 
combination of different existing platforms, each with defined technical parameters that 
we resourced from open and unclassified sources. At each modeling iteration’s 
conclusion, our design group refined its COA designs.  
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 COA Evaluation Process Figure 18. 
The process shown in Figure 18 is useful for exploring the design space. 
Questions during the process of system design often lead to more questions than to 
answers. In Figure 18 the example shows that the requirement is for the system to deploy 
to and A2AD environment and that the system must be able to deploy within X amount 
of hours. At this point in the design process a design group may know what the tactical 
requirement is, however they cannot know what is technically feasible until they examine 
the COA solution with some form of modeling analysis. The following chapters explain 
our process for developing COAs and our evaluation methodology in more detail. 
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VIII. U.S. NAVY GROUP SOLUTIONS 
A. SCENARIO RESTATED 
In approaching our development of potential Navy CONOPS, the Navy group 
focused on the final South China Sea scenario as both the most likely and most 
challenging for the fleet to support. This scenario demands the rapid insertion of a 
company of Marines onto an island in an A2AD environment in order to reopen the area 
to commercial and military traffic. The anti-ship cruise missile threat is deemed too 
severe to utilize traditional amphibious vessels and so the Navy must utilize lower-cost 
platforms to accomplish the same mission. Furthermore, the density of the threat to 
American naval platforms implies that fleet commanders would be unwilling to leave the 
ships next to the island in a support capacity once the Marines are ashore, thus leading to 
a requirement that the ground forces bring enough equipment and armament to defend 
themselves from a gamut of potential threats. If the ships were able to remain in place to 
support the ground forces, any capability they bring to bear would be considered an 
unexpected bonus.   
This scenario drove our overarching requirement to move approximately one 
hundred and fifty ground troops, with their supplies and enough heavy equipment to 
protect themselves from potential air or surface threats without utilizing our purpose-built 
amphibious ships or developing an entirely new platform. 
B. USN REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
1. Critical Operational Issues 
The Navy group has five specific COIs which help to define the systems 
requirements. The five COIs are: 
a. COI 1: Deployable 
Can the selected Navy force package beat the advisory to an island?  The 
designated location for forward basing will play a significant role in timeliness of 
reaching the island. 
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b. COI 2: Sustainable 
Can the selected force package deliver the necessary troops and supplies to 
accomplish the mission? 
c. COI 3: Defendable 
What defensive capability does the force package provide against air, land and sea 
threats? This is on the edge of our design space, it is assumed that intelligence and 
available sensor networks allow us to be informed of adversary’s landing force on the 
island. 
d. COI 4: Reliable 
Is the force package ready to be deployed on moment’s notice?  Can this posture 
be maintained indefinitely or is there a required downtime at a specific frequency? 
e. COI 5: Affordable 
Can we accomplish the mission without risking the loss of a high value asset?  
The force package will be comprised of legacy systems and must meet realistic DOD 
budget constraints. 
C. USN REQUIREMENTS 
These six system requirements must be met to accomplish corresponding COIs: 
1. The system shall be deployable to the targeted location in a time limit 
(such as less than <72 hours) from Warning order. – COI 1,4 
2. The system shall support indefinitely the logistics requirements for men 
and equipment operating within the system in an A2AD environment. – 
COI 2 
3. The system shall be capable of delivering troops and supplies that will 
deter an adversary from occupying an island. – COI 1 
4. The system shall provide fire support as necessary for forces occupying 
the island. – COI 3 
5. The system shall not require high value assets to enter the A2AD 
environment. – COI 5  
6. The system shall operate in an A2AD environment - COI 4 
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D. USN FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS: 
In designing courses of action, these six Navy functions must be considered: 
(1) Maneuver – (COI 1, 2, 4)  
The system must be able to move and transport personnel and goods within the 
A2AD environment, to include contested littorals.   
(2) Land – (COI 1, 2, 4)  
The system must be able to deliver its forces ashore, either via an airlift using 
organic assets (vertical takeoff and landing aircraft or helos), deployable small boats, or 
roll on roll off ramp pier side.   
(3) Provide Logistics – (COI 2)  
In addition to the initial landing of troops, hardware, and supplies, the system 
must be capable of follow on delivery of replenishment. 
(4) Communicate – (COI 3, 4)  
In order to facilitate operations ashore, the system must be able to communicate 
with the shore forces utilizing line of sight or other non-satellite based communications 
networks.   
(5) Provide Early Warning – (COI 3, 4, 5)  
In the vulnerable landing phase, and while troops are ashore, the system must be 
able to provide air, sea, and undersea detection coverage until such capabilities are 
replaced by the forces ashore.   
(6) Provide Fire Support – (COI 2, 3, 4, 5)  
The system should be able to provide close in fire support and answer calls for 
fire until the forces are established ashore.   
E. USN DESIGN SYNTHESIS: COAS 
The expected operating environments are high risk in nature. Due to this fact, the 
Navy desires to maintain all high value assets outside of the respective A2AD 
environment. The following COAs have been designed to meet the developed system 
requirements. 
 66 
1. COA A: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Ferry 
 
 
 OV-1: LCS Ferry Figure 19. 
As discussed in our chosen scenario, the goal of our operation was to penetrate an 
A2AD environment in the South China Sea without risking major assets. A natural 
response to this caveat would be to explore what forward-deployed assets would be 
available within the next ten to fifteen years. With the current plan to base them out of 
Singapore, the LCS was a suitable fit for our first CONOPS. Its fast speed and large 
cargo capacity meant it would take relatively few platforms to move the required number 
of marines and, coupling it with a joint high-speed vessel’s (JHSV) ability to transport 
heavy equipment, no asset costing more than $600 million would be needed to enter the 
high threat area. This meets COIs 1 and 3. 
Under this concept, the Marines and their equipment would be flown to Singapore 
where the equipment would be loaded on a JHSV and the troops would be divided 
between up to four LCS, depending on the number of troops required. Due to berthing 
and messing restrictions, an LCS would likely only be able to carry 75 Marines for any 
length of time, assuming containerized living units were available for installation. 
However, if the destination lay within a day’s steaming and overnight accommodations 
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were not required, that number could likely be doubled. A single JHSV, with its 600-ton 
capacity, is capable of transporting all of the equipment needed to support the Marines, 
regardless of which force package they deploy. 
Once the ships are loaded, they would sprint toward the target island at maximum 
speed. Once off the coast, the Marines would be delivered (COI 2) to the shore via the 
LCS’ three 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIB) while its embarked helicopters 
assisted in offloading cargo from the JHSV, assuming no shoreline was suitable for the 
vessel’s roll-on/roll-off ramp. The force packages are designed to be relatively self-
sufficient, however if the LCS are able to remain on-station, they could potentially 
provide support in the form of mine clearance, communications and networking (COI 5), 
anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and anti-surface warfare (COI 4). Most 
importantly however, would be the ability of the ships to receive and refuel helicopters, 
enabling them to act as mobile resupply stations for the Marines. 
A slight adaptation of this concept would be the employment of an afloat forward 
staging base (AFSB) or amphibious readiness group (ARG) just outside the A2AD threat 
area. Rather than flying the troops and equipment to Singapore, the ships could sprint to 
these larger vessels, receive their cargo, and then ferry it to the target island. The ARG or 
AFSB would then be kept outside of the most severe threat area and could also serve as 
logistics or command and control hubs. This potentiality, however, is dependent on the 
availability of sufficient forces and equipment near the target OA. Further information 
and specifications for the LCS and JHSV are referenced in Appendix B. 
2. COA B: Over the Horizon Landing Craft Utility (OTH LCU) 
The OTH LCU concept provides solutions to many of A2AD problems. Given a 
scenario where one or more landing platform docks (LPD) or landing helicopter docks 
(LHD) operate within the vicinity of the islands, there is definite potential to provide a 
rapid response to an island-grab threat.   
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 OV-1 Landing Craft Utility Figure 20. 
The OTH LCU concept provides solutions to many of A2AD problems. Given a 
scenario where one or more landing platform docks (LPD) or landing helicopter docks 
(LHD) operate within the vicinity of the islands, there is definite potential to provide a 
rapid response to an island-grab threat.   
The OTH LCU concept allows for the mobile positioning of assets offering a 
level of flexibility with regards to changing threat locations. Typical to the existing 
amphibious assault style, the LPD would have the capability of launching a single LCU 
at a distance beyond the A2AD environment. The LHD class of ship, however, is capable 
of supporting a capacity load of three LCUs. The LCU’s would then be able to infiltrate 
the threat area and approach the island as both a smaller target than the amphibious ship, 
and as a distributed force (COI 1). Additionally, the LCUs are capable of multiple round 
trips, providing the potential to deliver not only troops, but cargo and supplies as well 
(COI 2). The limiting factor in the number of LCUs involved is directly impacted by the 
number and class of amphibious ships operating within the vicinity of the A2AD 
environment.   
 69 
When acting independently, a LCU possesses no significant offensive or 
defensive capability. Its only objective is to transit from ship to shore as expeditiously as 
possible. However, there are numerous tactical aircraft and support elements organic to 
the larger ARG on which the LCU is operationally dependent. The LPD platform (San 
Antonio Class) is capable of carrying up to four CH-46 Sea Knights, or five MV-22 
Ospreys. The LHD (Wasp Class) carries a standard compliment of six AV-8B Harriers, 
four AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, four MV-22 Ospreys, four CH-53 Sea 
Stallions, and three UH-1N Iroquois, and is capable of handling several other helicopter 
variants. Between the two classes of amphibious ships, it is possible to provide air and 
surface support for inbound LCUs (COI 3 and 4).   
The drawback to operating amphibious vessels so close to an A2AD environment is 
the obvious cost associated with it. While able to bring many guns to the fight, the idea of 
introducing a large, high-value unit to the environment defeats the purpose behind using 
less expensive assets. The risks and rewards of such actions must be carefully weighed. 
Further information and specifications for the LCU are referenced in Appendix B. 
3. COA C: MV-22 with Amphibious Ship or Mobile Landing Platform 
Support 
COA C provides a combination of high speed and long distance, and may be a 
better consideration if the A2AD threat sphere is large in reference to the intended target 
island. The flexibility of the MV-22 allows it to either originate from shore, or as an 
embarked squadron aboard an L-Class ship (LHA/LHD/LPD). The result is all high value 
assets are maintained outside of the A2AD bubble (COI 5).     
While not a unique ability on its own, in that there are other aircraft such as the 
CH-46 and CH-53 that can perform similar operations, neither craft have the range and 
speed of the MV-22. Additionally, instead of an L-Class ship, if a Mobile Landing 
Platform (MLP) is in the area of responsibility (AOR), the MLP can serve as the host 
platform and prepositioning station for the materials needed (COI 1, 2). 
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 OV-1 Delivery via “Organic” Air Assets  Figure 21. 
Upon selection of that COA, the Marines and associated equipment would be 
flown to the nearest forward base of operations (e.g. Singapore or Manila, in reference to 
a South China Sea scenario). Simultaneously, the MV-22s would fly to the same location 
and be prepared for transport. If an amphibious landing ship is in the vicinity with an 
embarked MV-22 squadron, this asset could be maneuvered to respond directly to the 
situation, and act as the on-scene commander (COI 4). Once the troops, supplies, and 
equipment are loaded onto the MV-22s, the squadron would fly to the island, refueling 
midair or via “lily pad” in the form of a naval asset, and then deliver the ground forces to 
the island.   
Other than the speed and distance advantages, the airborne delivery negates any 
concern for potential naval mines, and mitigates any possible interception from enemy 
small boats. Future MV-22 upgrades including the CV-22 variant, may allow the aircraft 
to provide limited close in air support during the delivery (COI 3). Finally, the flexibility 
and payload capacity of the MV-22 allow for sling loading, midair refueling, and Para 
drops, should the mission parameters call for such options. Further information and 
specifications for the MV-22 are referenced in Appendix B. 
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4. COA D: SSGN with C-17 Support 
The SSGN concept provides a unique covert solution to the problems faced in an 
A2AD threat environment. The SSGN is a modified ballistic missile nuclear submarine 
that has the capability of transporting special operation forces (SOF) and some limited 
supplies. The actual troop capacity for an SSGN varies based on expected duration of the 
required underway time. Required transit or loiter durations exceeding two weeks reduces 
the troop capacity of an SSGN based on sustainment requirements. Potentially, in 10–15 
years the Virginia class submarine will have a payload module that would closely mirror 
the current SSGN SOF capability. This payload module would supplement the SSGN 
capacity increasing reliability and availability (COI 4). 
 
 OV-1 SSGN with C-17 Support Figure 22. 
The South China Sea scenario would require that all four SSGNs be forward 
based in either Singapore or Subic Bay to meet reliability and timeliness requirements 
(COI 4). Troops and supplies would also be forward based or flown in at moment’s 
notice. Once deployed the SSGNs would transit submerged to the selected island while 
remaining undetected. The SSGN in of itself is a high value asset but its ability to remain 
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undetected significantly reduces risk of loss during this scenario (COI 5). Once located 
off the target island, the SSGNs would verify that the environment was safe for surface 
operations without being detected (COI 3). After surfacing, troops with their supplies 
would man inflatable zodiac boats topside in preparation for heading ashore. Once troops 
were in route to the island, the SSGNs would transit to periscope depth were they could 
remain undetected while maintaining communications with the deployed troops as well 
as command and control (C2) (COI 1). The backup method of communications for land 
forces would be via line-of-sight to the offshore SSGN (COI 3). Troops on land or the 
SSGNs would provide coordinates to C2 for the purpose of supply airdrops via C-17s 
(COI 2). The C-17s would deliver the necessary material required for defense, support 
and sustainment (COIs 2 and 3). As necessary, the SSGNs could loiter in the AOR and be 
ready to provide fire support as necessary via Tomahawk missile strikes (COI 3).   
Some potential disadvantages of utilizing SSGNs is that they are limited in the 
amount and size of supplies they can carry, number of SSGNs required to deliver larger 
force packages and high value asset cost. The material carrying capacity of SSGNs is 
negated in this COA with the use of C-17s to deliver required supplies to the island. The 
risk of exposing a high value asset to the A2AD environment is reduced by the covert 
nature of the SSGN. The SSGN’s advantages over other similar adversary platforms, 
particularly in the areas of sensors and detectability (or lack thereof) cannot be 
overstated. Currently the United States inventory of SSGNs sits at four, which if this 
COA were utilized would require all four of them to be forward based to achieve the 
desired reliability and availability. A future Virginia-class submarine with an installed 
Virginia Payload Module could supplement the SSGN force and would ensure that 
SSGNs were available for other missions if this COA were put into place. Further 
information and specifications for the SSGN and C-17 are located in Appendix B. 
F. USN COMPONENT/PLATFORM MATCHED TO FUNCTION 
After careful analysis, it was determined that there are three major functions that 
any Navy COA should be able to support when combined with its attached Marine 
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package. Every system must have the ability to support, assault, and defend the respective 
territory to which it is deployed.   
1. Assault 
The ability to “assault” from a naval perspective must be given some flexibility 
with regards to interpretation. For this circumstance, “assault” is divided into two 
potential options: having the ability to deliver materials, and having the ability to deliver 
troops/personnel. In each of these circumstances, there is a limited selection of platforms 
that are provided to choose from: LCS, SSGN, C-130, LCU, MV-22, and JHSV.   While 
the LCS and the JHSV has the capability of supporting more troops and cargo carrying 
capacity, the MV-22, and C-130 can provide smaller numbers but more rapidly. The 
SSGN can infiltrate and deploy assets while maintaining a greater level of stealth and 
element of surprise; however its payload capability is limited. The OTH LCU, while not 
an asset currently in our arsenal, is one that can be easily augmented due to its current 
existence in other nations. While multiple trips with an OTH LCU are required, both 
cargo and troops can be transported. 
2. Sustain 
The ability to “support” is also divided into two subcomponents supporting the 
need to support personnel and sustain material on location. Also viewed as the ability to 
sustain assets in theater, the continued support of COA options can quickly become one 
of the most complicated processes. Providing the necessary resources (food, water, and 
medical supplies) for personnel becomes a requirement in any forward deployed area. 
Also, maintaining that all equipment continues to operate in theater also ensures that 
assets can support the third required function, to “defend.”  The LCS and JHSV can carry 
more supplies, but requires the use of a dock, small boats, and vertical resupply 
techniques in the movement of gear and cargo; whereas a C-130 can be used to drop 
supplies by air (a more visible approach and lower supply volume, yet effective when 
time is of the essence).   
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3. Defend 
In the defense of self and assets assigned to an island, there are two areas of the 
“defend” function that must be taken into account: the capability to provide surface fire 
as well as anti-air coverage. In an ongoing A2AD environment, a Blue force must be able 
to retain the capability to extend radar/early warning as well as engagement range. The 
most qualified asset for this exact function is addressed with surface ship platforms. 
Whether they are the assault asset or the sustain asset, they will all require to be the 
defending asset when in the OA.   
G. USN CONCLUSION 
In our development of four potential deployment methods, we did our best to map 
currently existing (or easily acquired) platforms to the functions demanded by our 
scenario. The platforms must be relatively cheap, fast, and capable of carrying large 
numbers of troops and equipment in over the horizon operations. Once the functions were 
determined, and platforms assigned to each, it became a matter of piecing the puzzle 
together to create a variety of options that each provided unique advantages and 
disadvantages. These factors were ultimately assigned numerical values in order to then 
determine which option is “best,” depending on the criteria assigned by stakeholders. 
Because no analysis can ever predict every possible eventuality, our approach evolved 
into creating a menu of options for a stakeholder, as opposed to settling on a single, “best 
all around” COA. 
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IX. U.S. MARINE CORPS SOLUTIONS 
A. USMC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
1. Elemental Framework 
The USMC is the smallest arm of the United States Armed Forces. Nevertheless, 
being a combined force arm, it is capable of being deployed to most parts of the world in 
a short period of time to wage asymmetric and flexible warfare in a myriad of changing 
battlefield scenarios. 
The key organizational structure of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
is generic across any size of USMC fighting unit for all missions and type of military 
operations. The four key elements comprising Command, Ground Combat, Aviation 
Combat and Logistics Combat make up this generic structure of the MAGTF. 
The unique framework shown in Figure 23 distinguishes the USMC from the U.S. 
Army (USA) in the sense that the various elements are combined under  a single 
commander at the lowest level of command, as compared to the USA where a single 
command for the mentioned elements are combined (joint) only higher up the command 
chain. By virtue of this generic organizational structure, USMC commanders have better 
command & control of air and ground elements, which greatly enhances the effectiveness 
of the USMC’s joint-warfare tactics (“USMC” 2009). 
 
 Overview of the generic organizational structure of a USMC unit Figure 23. 
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a. Command Element 
The Command Element is made up of ISR and communication units, and is 
directed by a headquarters unit. This element is the direct higher level authority that 
coordinates battle efforts amongst the three combat elements (“USMC” 2009). 
b. Ground Combat Element 
In Ground Combat Element, infantry units form the bulk of the force element, 
with sufficient support from armor, artillery, combat engineer and reconnaissance units. 
Figure 24 illustrates the standard make-up of the Ground Combat Element. 
 
 
 Overview of a Ground Combat Element (from USMC 2009) Figure 24. 
c. Air Combat Element 
In Air Combat Element, tiltrotor, fixed, and rotary wing aircrafts along with their 
crew make up the bulk of the force element. Additional units such as control & 
communications, motor transport, supply and  maintenance, and aviation command make 
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up the rest of the elements (“USMC” 2009). Figure 25 illustrates the standard make-up of 
the Air Combat Element. 
 
 Overview of an Air Combat Element (from USMC 2009) Figure 25. 
d. Logistics Combat Element 
Combat service support units make up the Logistics Combat Element. These units 
include motor transport, supply, medical & dental, and maintenance. Figure 26 illustrates 
the standard make-up of the Logistics Combat Element (USMC 2009). 
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 Overview of a Logistics Combat Element (from USMC 2009). Figure 26. 
2. Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces are units of varying size designed on an ad hoc 
basis to accomplish a single mission. There are three fundamental echelons of MAGTF 
force packages that will be described in this section. 
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a. Marine Expeditionary Unit 
The smallest fighting unit within the framework of a MAGTF of the USMC is the 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of approximately 2,200 men. Each MEU is 
commanded by a Colonel, and is designated to be a quick reaction force that is able to be 
deployed for any type of operations within the USMC framework. Figure 27 illustrates 
the standard make-up of a Marine Expeditionary Unit. In addition to the USMC elements, 
the MEU also includes supporting elements from the U.S. Navy (USN) (USMC 2014). 
 
 
 Overview of a Marine Expeditionary Unit with Support Ships Figure 27. 
(from USMC 2009). 
b. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 
The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is the next higher level of fighting unit 
within the USMC, and each MEB is commanded by a Major General or Brigadier 
General. Depending on the operational scenario, a MEB is made up of anywhere between 
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4,000 to 16,000 marines & sailors, made up of several MEUs depending on the mission. 
The MEB is designed to sustain itself for up to 30 days in an expeditionary environment. 




 Breakdown of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (from USMC 2014) Figure 28. 
c. Marine Expeditionary Force 
The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the highest level of a fighting unit 
within the USMC. Each MEF is commanded by a Lieutenant General, and consists of a 
headquarters group, Marine division, air wing and logistics group. A MEF is made of 
anywhere between 46,000 to 90,000 marines & sailors, made up of several MEUs. The 
MEF is designed to sustain itself for up to 60 days in an expeditionary environment 
(USMC 2014). 
3. Designing the Marine Force for Specific Littoral Missions 
For this SEA 21B project, the focus is on a modified & reduced USMC force 
structure that makes use of the general organizational structure consisting of upwards of 
company plus-sized scalable Marine force packages (shown in Figure 29), based on their 
capability functions as a reduced-size force. 
As such, ten different force packages were created, each with a varying force-size 
and composition to suit the option of fulfilling a given operational scenario and level of 
intensity. The ten force packages shall be discussed further in the Design Synthesis 
section.  
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The force packages provide key stakeholders with decision-making tools to select 
the USMC force structure and composition suited for a given operational problem. In 
Figure 29, the focus is on the lowest level fighting unit (encircled). 
 
 Overview of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force structure Figure 29. 
(from USMC 2014). 
B. USMC REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
1. Critical Operational Issues 
The five system COIs translate into requirements for the Marine group. The force 
packages would be created based on the requirements. 
(1) COI 1: DEPLOYABLE: Can we beat the adversary to an island with our 
system? 
The deployment of the ground forces, support and supply to the island would need 
to be faster than adversary. 
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(2) COI 2: SUSTAINABLE: Can we deliver initial troops and supplies? 
The delivery of personnel and sufficient logistics in the initial deployment efforts 
are to be sufficient for seven of days. 
(3) COI 3: DEFENDABLE: Can we defend the island? 
The ground forces on the island would need to have substantial equipment and 
weapons to defend themselves from air and sea threats. 
(4) COI 4: RELIABLE: Can we use this system on short notice? 
The systems deployed are considered based on the available land area and a 
credible yet sufficient force size is to be placed on the island. 
(5) COI 5: AFFORDABLE: Can we afford the system? 
The different force packages and their costs would be considered in the tradeoff 
analysis. 
2. Candidate Requirements 
The requirements of the system to achieve the corresponding COIs are as such: 
1. The system shall be deployable to the targeted location in a time limit 
(such as less than <72 hours) from Warning order to deployment– COI 1 
2. The system shall support indefinitely the logistics requirements for men 
and equipment operating within the system in an A2AD environment – 
COI 2 
3. The system shall deter adversary from occupying an island until relieved 
by the force commander. – COI 3 
4. The system shall demonstrate defensive capabilities against credible 
threats (limited missile threats, , landmines, aircrafts, ships, 
electromagnetic warfare, and UAVs) – COI 3 
5. The system shall be able to defend effectively against one company of 
enemy marines – COI 3 
6. The system shall have the capability to detect and identify friend or foe 
(surface and air) up to a range commensurate with the selected package – 
COI 3 
7. The system shall maintain communication links with USMC and USN 
higher HQ – COI 3 
8. The system shall operate in an A2AD environment – COI 2 and 3  
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C. USMC FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The functional decomposition (shown in Figure 30) is motivated by 
the system requirements and the operational activities (OA1 to OA3). Each 
operational activity would be fulfilled by the functions (described in green). 
The components (or platform) for each function would be discussed in the 





 Functional Decomposition of Marines Forces Figure 30. 
D. USMC DESIGN SYNTHESIS 
1. Component to Function 
There is no current Marines Corps force package that satisfies all of the required 
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determination. The first reason is that the minimum deployable, conventional Marine unit 
today is the MEU, consisting of approximately 2,200 marines and sailors.  For this 
mission the system requirement is to have a company size raid of only approximately 200 
marines. The second reason is that by having the Marine land forces broken into small 
units, such as platoon we can meet system requirements. This partitioning gives the 
solution higher degrees of freedom, because almost every function could be executed by 
a platoon, which its mission is to fulfill these functions. For the purposes of fulfilling the 
requirements of the SE process, the SOS design should meet the functional 
decomposition of the system and the requirements. The Marines functional 
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2. Solution Space 
There are two major example scenarios the Marine group used to frame the 
solution space: One scenario for the Spratly islands and the other based on Natuna Besar 
island operations. While the historical, geographic, and cultural considerations related to 
these different islands are significant, there are two major differences between the 
scenarios. The first major difference for analytical purpose is the size of the islands. The 
largest of the Spratly Islands has an area of 0.445 square kilometers, whereas Natuna 
Besar is vast by comparison at 1720 square kilometers. The second major difference is 
the location of the contested littorals relative to U.S. and allied forward operating bases in 
the Southeast Asia AOR. 
Evaluating force packages for their defensive capabilities, we designed three 
threat scenarios. In all three, the U.S. goal was to put troops on the ground (after clearing 
the area), sustain, and adopt a defensive posture to hold out against possible 
bombardment and amphibious assault. Each scenario evaluated distinct Red force threat 
environment levels – low, medium and high. In all environments, the landing and 
occupation are assumed to be unopposed; however allowances were made for a variety of 
potential threats. A low threat level refers to a completely unopposed occupation mission. 
The medium threat level requires the Blue force to have additional defense against 
attacks by manned or unmanned aircraft sorties of varying size as well as non-precision 
surface threats. Finally, the high threat level requires the Blue force to implement 
defensive preparations for cruise missile attacks against the friendly Marine force. 
The breakdown of this solution space is presented in Table 5. Note that it is 
possible to create small platoons to fulfill each functional need. Force package options 
are listed in the far right columns as outputs from each scenario, threat level, and 
functional input combination: 
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Table 5.   Marine Force Packages 
 
The solutions for each function were chosen among those functions that meet the 
feasibility requirement. Ten force packages were created as a result of the available 
options, and the approximate weight of each was calculated, in order to meet the naval 
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deployment requirements. Force packages were then compared to one another for each 
MOE, in order to determine the tradeoffs resulting from package selection (more on that 
in Section 4 of this chapter). The solutions for the individual components are: 
a. Land Forces 
The land forces that are to be used as a deterrent to the Red force consist of a rifle 
company and a logistics team. As the area of the Spratly Islands is limited, the number of 
personnel is restricted. The current rifle company in the USMC organization is 183 men 
and it does not include the logistics team. Hence the deterrence forces would be 
customized for the purpose of deployment to vastly different locations such as one of the 
many tiny Spratly Islands in contrast to an expansive island such as Natuna Besar. For 
modeling purposes, the land force package selection is based on the threat level and size 
of the island selected. 
Land forces composition L1 and L2 are applied to the Spratly Islands as shown in 
Table 6. As the surface area of the largest island is small, we would limit the logistics 
team to a minimum. The truck squad, maintenance squad, and engineer platoon are 
omitted. The logistics headquarters is not required for a small team of logistics personnel 
and can be replaced with one of the men in the company headquarters. For a low threat 
level, the air defense squad is omitted from the L1 composition. 
Land forces composition L3 and L4 are applied to Natuna Besar as shown in 
Table 7. As Natuna Besar has a much larger land area, the number of personnel deployed 
is not restricted. However, for increasing threat levels we will require increasing force 
size to act as a deterrent. For a low threat level, there would be one rifle platoon, but for 
medium or high threat levels, there would be three rifle platoons. Both L3 and L4 would 
have an air defense squad. 
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Table 6.   Land Forces for Spratly Islands 
 




b. Defense System  
(1) Surface Defense 
From the functional decomposition, F6 corresponds to providing surface fire, 
which is a component of OA3: Defend. The major threat the Marines are addressing is 
the Chinese small combatant ship. Type 022, equipped with Hongniao missiles. For the 
low threat level, we offer two solutions, which are both defensive in nature: Trenches and 
Mobile Concrete Igloos (MCI).  
Creating quality trenches is a relatively cheap process, requires very few types of 
tools, and allows Marines to rapidly access defensive positions that greatly reduce their 
exposure and therefore vulnerability to kinetic surface attacks.  
Mobile Concrete Igloos are currently in use as a means of both military and 
civilian defense in locations such as Israel (Stahl 2008). MCIs protect those inside from 
fragmentation and even some direct impacts from rocket attacks and other ballistic 
projectiles. Each igloo can serve up to 30 people (so the amphibious force would deliver 
several of them in order to protect a platoon). Each unit weighs 11,023 pounds (>5 tons) 
(“Modular” n.d.) and costs $36,000 (U.S.) (Stahl 2008).  
For the medium and high threat level, the mitigation of the surface threat is a 
combination of defense and offense. Defense hinges on actively intercepting threats like 
the incoming Hongniao missiles, while offense involves attacks against the Type 022 in 
order to eliminate the threat.  
The Patriot Missile is the preferred solution for active defense. It serves both as 
anti-missile defense and anti-air defense.  The reason the Patriot was chosen is due to its 
long range, which was deemed necessary for attacking threats such as the J-15, and 
because of its ability to engage both aircraft and other missiles. Specifications for the 
Patriot can be found in Appendix C. 
The Naval Strike Missile (NSM) is the preferred solution for attacking surface 
threats. It is Norwegian anti-surface, sea-skimming, subsonic missile that can be launched 
from land. It was chosen because it has the best tradeoff of sufficient large range and low 
weight. The characteristics of the NSM can be found in Appendix C at the end of this report. 
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(2) Air Defense: 
Against Swarms of UAVs or even single UAVs the Patriot is not an efficient nor 
cost effective solution. The high cost and weight of each Patriot round presents a 
challenge in warranting its legitimate use against relatively cheap UAV targets. 
The preferred solution for a UAV threat is the Avenger (AN/TWQ-1) by Boeing, 
which is a highly mobile short-range anti-air system. The main armament of the Avenger 
is the Stinger, which is a cheap ($38,000 per missile), short-range (8 kilometers) infrared 
surface-to-air missile. The Avenger can carry between four and eight Stingers. 
Specifications for the Avenger can be found in Appendix C. 
A different possible system against the UAV threat is a truck mounted Directed 
Energy Weapon (DEW), which can be described as laser against UAV. 
The primary advantage of a DEW is that each shot of the laser should be much 
cheaper than a missile, and it can work as long as it has source of power, compared to the 
consumable missiles. 
For land forces, Boeing has conducted DEW testing using an Avenger assembly, 
and has successfully shot down a UAV in a 2008 field test (Marks 2009). The system is 
not currently in operational forces, but it is completely plausible that such units would be 
deployed operationally in the 2025–2030 timeframe. In that event, we assume in the 
worst-case scenario it has the characteristics of a Stinger Avenger, and therefore we 
consider them interchangeably in this thesis report.  
c. Logistics  
The Marines logistics subsystem consists of the fixed assets and the supplies, 
which would be re-supplied after seven days of operation. The fixed assets include 
generators, transport vehicles, handheld and vehicular communication systems, and tools 
for an engineering group, while the supplies (consumables) include water, food, medical 
supplies, and fuel for generators and vehicles.  
The amount of water, food and medical supplies for seven days is estimated based 
on existing Marine Corps logistic models provided by Operations Department in Naval 
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Postgraduate School. The summarized costs are stated in Appendix C Communications 
and ISR. 
The Marines land forces possess handheld and vehicular communications for both 
short and long range communications. Alternative communications solutions mirror the 
Communications system design in Section H of Army/Air Force solutions.  
As for the ISR solutions, the Marines would provide specific systems based on 
three threat levels (low, medium, and high). The types of systems include:  
 Long-range radars (AN/TPS-80, JLENS) 
 Medium-range radars (Giraffe AMB) 
 Detection radar for Patriot missile (AN/MPQ-53) 
 Long-range optical sensors (JLENS, Predator) 
 Short-range optical sensors (RQ-7 Shadow, Quadcopter) 
 Unmanned underwater vehicles (REMUS 600/6000) 
The following ISR equipment items are shortlisted based on factors such as 
weather conditions and detection range. The C-band (4-8GHz) and S-band (2-4GHz) are 
selected as these frequency ranges are less prone to weather conditions. South China Sea, 
where Spratly Islands are located, experiences heavy rainfall and strong winds during the 
monsoon seasons. Another scenario for consideration is the Gotland Island in Baltic Sea. 
The Baltic Sea may have moderate rainfall but fog is common in spring and early 
summer. The rainfall and fog can greatly attenuate frequencies above 10 GHz, requiring 
the primary use of C-band and S-band. The detection ranges vary largely because there is 
a need to include low cost alternatives to the different packages at the same time. 
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Table 8.   List of ISR Equipment and Specifications 
 
 
Table 9 provides a matrix for ease of decision making when selecting ISR 
packages according to the scenario threat level and the size of the land area selected for 
occupation by Marine forces. 
Table 9.   ISR Packages and Their Costs 
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3. Modeling the Marine Corps Design 
a. Defense System   
The Marine defense is divided into three categories: 
1. Land defense 
2. Surface (sea) defense 
3. Air-defense 
The land defense is the natural state of an entrenched Marine rifle company. We 
assumed that the land battle will not be the first nor second choice of the adversary to 
kinetically attack the island. We assess adversaries will likely opt for battling for sea 
control or air superiority to maintain the A2AD environment well before selecting 
amphibious assault. Apart from the immediately high numerical casualties assured 
through those operations, there is also the fact that in order to successfully deploy land 
forces the adversary must negate A2AD measures implemented by Blue forces. It is 
much easier to surround, isolate, and if necessary bombard the island and eliminate the 
Blue force through missile attack or bombs than by landing assault forces. For these 
reasons, the group has only modeled the surface and air battle. 
We can compare between the different work packages by scoring them for how 
much they are able to defend the island, based on the modeling results that are described 
in the modeling sections. 
For each type of threat (air or surface), the group assigned point scoring according 
to thresholds of performance. No points were awarded if the system was completely 
unable to defend itself. One point was awarded if the system was unable to win a 
plausible battle but did present some capabilities for threatening the adversary. Two 
points if the system was able to defeat medium and low-level threats. Finally, three points 
were awarded if the system was assessed as likely able to win a battle against any threat. 
The low threat force packages have passive defense systems like concrete igloos. 
They are important for defense in case the threat level was incorrectly evaluated, but the 
score would be zero points regardless due to the inability to threaten an adversary. Table 
10 presents the assessed force packages and their scores. 
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Table 10.   Force Packages and Scores 
Force Packages/Battle Surface defense Air defense Total Score 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 2 1 3 
4 2 1 3 
5 2 1 3 
6 2 1 3 
7 0 0 0 
8 3 3 6 
9 2 3 5 
10 2 3 5 
 
 
 Score per Work Package Figure 32. 
Force Package 8 is the most suitable for a high threat environment, according to 
Figure 32, while force packages 1, 2 and 7 could only be considered suitable for low-
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level threats, because none of those packages included weapons for counter-attacking 
enemy threat platforms.  
b. ISR Model 
From Table 8 and Table 9, four ISR hardware packages were designed based on 
theoretical detection (radar or optical) capabilities for each of the ten Marine force 
packages. 
Based on the theoretical ISR packages, particular solutions within force packages 
were modeled as a means to test whether the solution were feasible. If the results were 
positive, then we feel confident in our ability to assume that the rest of the solutions 
within the four packages are feasible. 
In this model, four UAVs (RQ-7 Shadow) are utilized. Three UAVs programmed 
to patrol an area of five nautical miles from the target island while one of the UAVs is 
programmed to hover around the target island where the Marine force is defending. The 
model was created with Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA™) simulations 
program. MANA 
TM 
is an agent based simulator that allows for very detailed modeling of 
various military platforms. More detailed information on MANA and UAV search 
models is found in chapter XI section 6.    
The stationary UAV acts as the final line of detectability in scenarios where the 





 Four UAVs (One Stationary Over Defended Island)  Figure 33. 
In the model shown in Figure 33, the three UAVs shown as blue dots on 
randomized (optical) search patrol were able to detect all fifteen incoming hostile/ enemy 
ships shown with red dots coming towards an island perimeter depicted the white square. 
With this detection, the higher-level USMC authority can be alerted for possible counter-
offensive or defensive actions; and if the Blue Force’s capabilities are limited in the 
neutralizing the threat, the USN can be alerted to taking out the incoming threats. 
4. USMC System Tradeoff Analysis 
As are all systems, there is no one-size fits all solution. Due to system tradeoffs, 
ten different USMC force packages or COAs were selected in terms of counter-offensive 
scoring and the results were presented in the previous sections shown. This enables a 
stakeholder to make decisions on the various force packages that best fit an operational 
scenario (e.g., operational scope, logistics available, enemy size). 
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a. Weight Analysis 
The Marines land forces and systems are brought to the island via the USN ships 
or USAF aircraft, hence the weight analysis is crucial when determining which vessels 
and/or delivery aircraft are utilized.  
The heaviest force packages (COAs for this exercise) are not surprisingly the two 
(COAs 6 and 8) catered for the highest threat level in each of the two scenarios. COA 3, 
which has the same defense systems and land forces as COA 6, is tied with COA 6 for 
the second-heaviest force package. 
The lowest weight options for each scenario are COAs 1 and 7, respectively, but 
they are designed for lower threat levels. 
b. Cost Analysis 
Each subsystem in the solution space has a cost attached to it. The total cost of each 
COA includes the price of the subsystems themselves (e.g. Patriot battery), the spares cost 
if needed (e.g., Patriot missiles) based on the Salvo-Equations Model and the logistics cost 
for a 7 days deployment (e.g., fuel) based on the Consumption Model. The specific costs 
for the subsystems and the spares are stated in Appendix C, while the total cost for each 
COA is summarized in Table 11. The logistics costs are stated in Appendix C. 
COA 8 is not only the heaviest, it also (again, not surprisingly) ranked the highest 
in costs. The cost of COA 6 is, however, lower than COA 4 or 5 which are meant for 
medium threat levels. The reason is mainly due to the fact that the unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) Predator RQ-1 is used in COA 6 while Shadow RQ-7 is used in COA 4 
and 5. We required more RQ-7s to meet the required detection range but the costs of both 
UAVs are very close ($3.875M for RQ-7 and $4M for RQ-1), resulting in the slightly 
higher costs in COA 4 and 5.  
COAs 1 and 7 have the lowest costs but they are designed for lower threat levels. 
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Table 11.   Weights and Costs for Ten Marine COAs 
 
 
From Table 11, the wide range in costs from $3.8M to $240M require careful 
consideration for a decision maker, but also provides a large spectrum of cost options.  
c. Defendability Analysis 
The defendability score is aggregated from four aspects (defendability against 
surface threats, defendability against air threats, detection range for surface threats, 
detection range for air threats), each having equal weightage of 0.25. 
The score is derived from passive and active defense capabilities. Passive defense 
is the detection of threats while active defense allow counter-attack capabilities from the 
island. The scores could be found in Table 12. We can obtain from the table that a score 
of 0 can deal with a low level of threat while a score of more than 5 would suffice against 
higher threat levels. The highest score that could be achieved is 8.4, which would suffice 
against the highest threat level in the Natuna Besar scenario. 
COAs 1, 2, and 7, which are designed for the low-level threats, have no air or 
surface defenses, therefore their total defendability scores are the lowest.  
COAs 6 and 8 have the highest defendability scores in the Spratly islands and 
Natuna Besar scenarios, respectively. 
We ranked the scores in the final ranking, where rank of 1 is the best COA. 
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d. Tradeoff Analysis (Weight, Cost and Defendability) 
The most cost effective option for Spratly Islands is COA 6 as it has the highest 
defendability score while costing $10M less than other COAs for the same scenario. The 
tradeoff is that COA 6 weighs 46,000 pounds more. Depending on the transport vessel 
used, this additional weight may not pose a large logistic problem.   
COA 9 is the most cost and weight efficient for Natuna Besar scenario. It costs 
$31M less and weighs 22,000 pounds less than COA 6. Even though COA 9 does not 
have the highest defendability score, its score of 7.55 is still high considering that the 
highest is 8.38.  
The costs and defendability analyses for the Marine forces mentioned in the 
sections above serve only as a baseline for decision-making. Depending on the actual 
operational scenario, the stakeholder will more likely have to scale the solutions (COAs) 
up or down to fit the overall demands (defendability) or constraints (costs). 
The Marine force packages are part of the littoral mission that includes COAs 
from the USN and the Army/ Air Force groups; hence the overall score of the integrated 
solutions would be based on factors of defendability, costs, weight, and speed. The score 
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would provide the stakeholders a more thorough overview and practical analysis of the 
solutions. 
E. USMC SYSTEM CONCLUSION  
We have a variety of solutions for the deployment of Marine land troops on an 
island for deterrence purposes. These solutions meet all our functional requirements, 
which were discussed in the Functional Analysis section. 
The costs of COAs range from $34M to $240M while the weight of COAs range 
from 452,000 pounds to 737,000 pounds. The defendability ranges from a score of 0 to 
8.38, which provide options for low, medium and high threat levels. 
On one hand, we have the low cost, lightweight solution but low defendability 
against medium or high threats. On the other hand, the solutions that provide substantial 
defense capability require higher costs (a maximum of seven times more than the COA 
with lowest cost), heavier items and more personnel. 
Most importantly with all the baseline COAs presented, the stakeholder as the 
decision-maker can choose and modify (scale up or down) the COA that best fits the 
operational requirements and constraints. 
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X. U.S. ARMY AND AIR FORCE SOLUTIONS 
A. ARMY AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY 
The U.S. Army conducts forced entry expeditionary operations of Air Assault, 
Airborne landings, and Amphibious Assaults using a mix of highly mobile and 
deployable units.  The overriding issues that the Army must contend with in effecting the 
employment of current forces are the physical effects of time and distance.  Highly 
deployable forces such as the XVIII Airborne Corps in Fort Bragg North Carolina are 
unique in their capability to project combat power anywhere in the world in a short 
amount of time.  The XVIII Airborne Corps’ 82nd Airborne Division Ready Brigade is on 
notice to deploy anywhere in the world for combat operations in under 18 hours.  This 
rapid deployment comes at a price.  The more deployable a force is, the lighter that force 
must become in order to fit within the constraints of available Air Force platforms such 
as the C-130, C-17, and C-5 military transport airplanes.  Being light requires the 
sacrifice of unit vehicles for mobility, armor for protection, combat loading for extended 
operations, and organic long range weapon systems for offensive and defensive 
missions.   
These sacrifices in capability are currently necessary in achieving a crucial time 
advantage over potential adversaries.  Airborne forces have the niche capability of 
rapidly deploying from home base(s) to critical infrastructure nodes such as seaports and 
airfields in an OPAREA.  Airborne forces secure these key nodes in order to facilitate the 
follow-on deployment of heavier and more lethal ground forces. 
B. THREAT TO ARMY EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS 
The short history of American Expeditionary operations and how the U.S. Army 
participated begins in the First World War with the Army’s deployment via the safety of 
French Ports.  Heavy supplies and equipment were transported from CONUS to the 
European theater to the relative safety of a friendly theater seaport.  In WW II, the French 
Ports were not available.  However, the proximity of Great Britain to Nazi held France 
made an amphibious landing feasible onto the beachheads of Normandy.  Amphibious 
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landings were also the preferred tactic in the Pacific theater.  The defending Japanese 
forces had no capability beyond limited fighter aircraft to hold attacking U.S. amphibious 
forces at bay.  Vietnam introduced advances air power where the U.S. could deploy 
troops quickly over long distances via strategic air transport.   During the first Gulf War, 
the U.S. deployed its forces over several months via both air and sea in order to build up 
the requisite combat power necessary to destroy Saddam Hussein’s forces in Kuwait.   In 
each preceding instance, U.S. land forces deployed via sea where it took a considerable 
amount of time to establish theater combat power.   
Airborne troop deployments against a mechanized adversary such as Saddam’s 
armored Republican Guard units carried risks in terms of force factors of light infantry 
versus a more lethal mechanized force. The 82nd Airborne was deployed as a tripwire 
force against Saddam pushing beyond Kuwait into Saudi Arabia.  Had Saddam made the 
force calculations he would have found that he possessed a numerically superior force to 
the lighter American unit.  Fortunately for the U.S., Saddam’s forces held their positions 
in Kuwait allowing the U.S. enough time to deploy heavier forces to the Gulf 
(Matsumura 2000). 
Today the threat to rapidly deployable Army Airborne forces has grown beyond 
the borders of the area of operations (AO). As mentioned in this report, current A2AD 
capabilities threaten ships and aircraft delivering land forces to their objectives. This 
chapter examines a few technologies in the testing and evaluation phase that the group 
believes the U.S. Army needs to consider integrating into an A2AD penetration concept. 
C. USA/USAF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The Army and Air Force CONOPS include: (1) initial delivery of troops and 
materials, as a form of setting up the base for further sustained operations; (2) sustaining 
the operations through resupply of troops and materials; and (3) defending the operating 
base from incoming threats, both conventional and unconventional.  Typically, the nature 
of operations of Army and Air Force components lead to a sub-division of ground 
operations (for the Army), and aerial operations (for the Air Force). 
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D. USA/USAF REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
1. Army/Air Force Specific Requirements 
The Air Force (due to the nature of their operations) will be focused on swift and 
rapid delivery of troops and supplies.  Complementary by the manpower supplied by the 
Army, the various functions of the Army / Air Force is to ensure that the integration of 
the mission requirements are met and accomplished according to the various COAs being 
charted out.  The functional analysis below is deliberated in the next section. 
E. USA/USAF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
1. Functions 
The Army/Air Force group has three primary functions: 
1. To deliver initial supply of troops and materials, if required 
2. To sustain the ground operations through resupply of personnel and 
materials, if required 
3. To defend the OPAREA through aerial means, against possible hostile 
incursion that may disrupt Blue force’s operations 
2. Sub functions 
All three functions are to be analyzed and performed in both naval denial and 
aerial denial environments. 
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F. USA/USAF DESIGN SYNTHESIS  





 Concept System (Photos in Image from Jane’s 2015) Figure 34. 
The current force packages for the Army / Air Force will be centered on swift and 
rapid delivery. Hence, delivery, sustenance and defense will be the core supplementary 
mission for the Army / Air Force components of this Joint Operations. Coupled with the 
Marine Corps requirements of the troop size (approximately 200 marines) for efficient 
operations, the fleet requirements will be sufficiently designed to meet the mission 
requirements based on the functional analysis. In this analysis, the Army will be the main 
manpower component to ensure that the operational functions on the ground can be 
carried out effectively upon successful delivery by the Air Force component. Figure 34 
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2. Component to Function—Air Force 
The Air Force morphological options are detailed in Tables 13–17. 
a. Operational Analysis 1—Delivery 
Table 13.   Delivery Morphological Box 
Prepared Airfield Austere Airfield Unable to Support 
Landing Aircraft 
Unable to Support 
Aircraft & Mined (*) 
• C-17 
• C-130 
• Vertical Lift 
• C-130 
• Vertical Lift 
• High Speed 
AFSB 
• Vertical Lift 
• High Speed AFSB 
• JPADS 
• (3) High Speed 
AFSB 
• (2) JPADS - E 
• (1) Sacrificial 
Afloat Staging 
Barge 
* Number indicates sequence of operations. Entire process may be preceded by rapid mine 
clearing techniques. 
b. Operational Analysis—Sustain (Permissive and Denied Environments) 
Table 14.   Sea Sustainment Morphological Box 
Sustain by Sea 
Permissive Denied 
• Large Cargo Ship 









Table 15.   Air Sustainment Morphological Box 




• Vertical Lift 
• C-17 
• C-130 
• Vertical Lift 
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Sustain by Air 
Permissive Denied 
• JPADS • JPADS 
• Fulton Recovery 
System 
 
c. Operational Analysis 3—Defense 
Table 16.   Defend (Against Conventional Threats) 




• ASM in a Box 




• Combat Air Patrol 
• SAM in a Box 
Table 17.   Defend (Against C4ISR) 
Permissive Denied 
• Current Methods 




• Network Optional 
Communications 




• Network Optional 
Communications 
 
Thus, there are a multitude of available technologies and platforms that cater to 
many of the anticipated operational scenarios during conduct of the missions. 
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G. MODELING THE USA/USAF DESIGN 
1. Deploy the System: COI 1 
The optimal method to deploy any of the desired systems is to employ the large 
capacity aircraft so that delivery can be optimized within the minimal number of sorties. 
However, economies of scale ought to be taken into considerations. A C-17 transporter 
aircraft can efficiently deliver large-size assets including Patriot missile systems for rapid 
deployment into the OPAREA. Once the aircraft had landed, then the ground forces can 
rapidly set up the area or point defense and operations can commence soon after. 
Prior to that, the considerations of the deployment of air force options needed to 
be weighted consciously. The infrastructure allowed within the OPAREA will be a key 
consideration for the method of delivery. If an established and secured airfield is 
available, then transport aircraft can be utilized to deliver large cargo in small amount of 
time frames. If a landing airstrip is unavailable due to lack of land, then the Osprey V-22 
vertical lift option can be considered as an alternative. Lastly, if both of the 
aforementioned options are unavailable, the USAF has at her disposal highly accurate 
GPS steering devices for dedicated airdrops, such as the Joint Precision Airdrop System 
(JPADS). However, the JPADS would not be capable of delivering as large a capacity 
compared to conventional transport aircraft. 
2. Deliver initial Troops and Supplies: COI 2 
The methods of delivering initial troops and supplies can be further deconstructed 
into transportation of personnel/materiel and reinforcement of personnel/
materiel.  Analysis on the reinforcement of personnel / materiel is further broken down 
into sub-divisions of reinforcements via surface channels, and reinforcements via air 
channels.  For the purpose of generality, the methodologies described below would be 
applicable to both initial delivery and subsequent resupplies of personnel and materiel. 
For transportation via air channels, the typical U.S. assets to be used are the C-
17s, and the C-130Js, that are capable of transporting large numbers of personnel and 
critical ground assets.  A slightly non-conventional approach is employed to scan for 
other viable measures for initial delivery, and the vertical lift platform V-22 was also 
 108 
identified as a plausible means of transportation.  The use of the V-22 eliminates the need 
for a dedicated runway with which conventional aircraft requires for takeoff and landing. 
a. Denial of Airspace or Air Superiority 
The U.S. Air Force’s delivery of the initial supplies and subsequent resupply 
missions could be completely jeopardized in denied aerial environments where the 
adversaries could form a protective umbrella around the AO. The umbrella would be 
intended to deny the U.S. Army from using free usage of airspace to conduct air drops of 
troops or supplies.    
For transportation via sea / surface channels, the straightforward ingress option 
would be via the JHSV, which are capable of rapid intra-theater transport of medium-
sized cargo payloads.  This rapid redeployment of forces and slick movement among the 
many islands in the OPAREA provide the BLUE FORCE with a quick responsive option 
during the deploy and sustain phases. 
b. Denial in Naval Environments 
In denied sea surface environments, whereby the ingress routes towards the island 
are assumed to be laid with sea mines.  Minefields could deny the U.S. Army the ability 
to speedily unload its troops off the coast of the AO.  
Comparatively, to minimize potential losses of Blue force assets, the much 
preferred option would be to resupply via the air channel. 
3. Penetrate A2AD with the System: COI 3 
a. Penetrating A2AD with Naval Assets 
A viable option is to employ sacrificial afloat staging barges to detonate and take 
out certain mines in an identified region to clear a forward direction towards the 
contested islands.  This option would constitute loss of assets but would allow the rear 
naval assets to passage through the sea minefield in the shortest possible time.  Once a 
safe passage is clear by the sacrificial barges, high value assets such as an AFSB, or 
JHSV could commence to assault forward to deliver the troops and supplies.  However, 
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the extent of sacrificial necessity needs to be weighed carefully.  If there are enough 
intelligence gathered about the sea mines or patrol route, blockade runners could be 
employed to bypass the sea mines and patrols and penetrate through the A2AD umbrella, 
into the littoral area of the AO.    
b. Penetrating A2AD with Aerial Assets 
With AAM forming the protective umbrella around the AO, conventional aircraft 
options cannot be utilized effectively for airdrops or airbase delivery of cargo.  An 
alternate option would be the employment of Joint Precision Airdrop Systems (JPADS), 
that utilizes GPS coordinates, steerable parachutes, and onboard computers to steer the 
cargo loads to the designated locations where ground troops could pick up the 
supplies.  JPADS allows the cargo to be drop from 25,000 feet and still maintain a 
dropping accuracy of 75 meters 50 percent of the time.  Essentially, this increases the 
standoff range of the aircrew from the adversaries AAM and increases their 
survivability.  With the use of GPS, it reduces the risk of cargo missing a designated drop 
zone. 
4. System Defends Against Attack: COI 4 
The concept of defending can be decomposed into defending against surface 
threats, and defending against aerial threats.  At this stage, it is assumed that Blue force 
had taken over the contested island and is prepared to mount a defensive stance against 
any plausible incursion of the Red force.  The basic advantage that the Blue force 
requires is early warning, which could be achieved via persistent surveillance.  Therefore, 
the in-theatre automated detection and tracking system must be robust to operate 24/7 
round-the-clock, with minimal or no downtime.  Here, the United States Northrop 
Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk is a valuable asset that boasts long loiter times over target 
areas and possesses the capability of long range surveillance (over 40,000 square miles of 
terrain per day).  Ground sensors could be employed on possible land areas for point area 
surveillance around the nearby coastlines. 
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a. Against Surface Threats 
Viable measures to mount a credible defense against surface threats include 
employing Anti-Ship missiles, or mounting a naval barricade along the coastal lines 
towards probable direction of Red force ingress.  In the event of Red force submarines, 
anti-submarines missiles are also warranted in the Blue force arsenal of weaponry. 
b. Against Aerial Threats 
The most basic defense options against incoming air threats are either the 
employment of Ground Based Air Defenses, or (Man Portable Air Defense Systems) 
(MANPADs). MANPADS are better suited to the least accessible waypoints on the 
island.  Combat Air Patrols are the most straightforward defense measures, and they 
could be employed against both aerial and surface threats. 
5. System Communicates: COI 5 
a. Sub-Critical Issues 
To establish and sustain communications, there are 2 COIs to be addressed: 
(1) Interception:  
There is a need to maintain operational security by denying adversaries of any 
opportunities to gain knowledge of operations on the AO. The adversary may place 
intercept receivers in the vicinity of the AOR (at the boundary of 12 NM of the island). 
(2) Jamming:   
There is a need to ensure communication channels are not denied by the 
adversaries. The adversary may use omnidirectional wideband jammers in the vicinity of 
the AOR under the pretext of conducting military exercises. 
b. Operational Context 
In addition, it is recognized that communications can be applied in two contexts: 
(1) Communications within the AO:  
This refers to all means of communication employed within the AO for command 
and control purposes by the relevant local authority. 
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(2) Communications outside of the AO:  
This refers to all means of communications, which allows command and control 
purpose by the relevant remote authority.  
c. Analysis 
Currently, there are many established means of communications, which can be 
used as redundancies for each other. In this section, a qualitative analysis of the available 
means of communications was carried out based on the criteria of interception and 
jamming.  
In addition to conventional wireless military communications (e.g. Ultra-high and 
very-high frequency radios), possible communications alternatives are listed in Table 18. 
Table 18.   Possible Communications Alternatives 
Description Context (internal 
external of AO) 
Effective Against 
Jamming Interception 
User Procedures and Techniques  





Lay Land Lines internal X X 
Low Altitude Balloon with LOS based 
Communications 
external X X 
Firing signal flares to elevated heights external X 
 
Periodic messenger trips via air 
delivery (e.g. UAVs) 
external X X 
Underwater Cables to friendly territory external X X 
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H. USA/USAF TRADEOFF ANALYSIS  
1. Delivery versus Attrition 
The tradeoff analysis is based on delivery of initial troops and materials in a 
mined environment in which the island is incapable of supporting a vertical insertion due 
to insufficient size or lack of dry land. One alternative to aid insertion in such a scenario 
is to create a staging base on the other side of the minefield by sailing unmanned barges 
through the minefield and connecting them to each other once there. This alternative 
could prove acceptable if the gains won in establishing offset the material losses of 
barges due to mine attrition. Figure 18 depicts the expected losses in a scenario that 
requires 10 barges to successfully transit a 12.5 km wide minefield containing 20 mines 
with a .5 km damage radius. In this scenario, any barge that transited within the damage 
radius was deemed to not be capable of being used as part of the staging base. This 
scenario was run 10,000 time (100 simulation runs of 100 iterations each). 
 
 Barge Casualties Figure 35. 
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The results of the simulation show that on average no more than 4 barges will be 
attrited by mines. This indicates that 14 barges need to be sent into the field to have the 
desired 10 successfully make it through the field. An in depth discussion of this model is 
included in Chapter 11.  
2. Use of Smart Sensor Field to Detect Enemy Intrusion 
The probability of successful delivery operations depends on the capability of the 
transport aircraft to maneuver past the myriad of sensors to perform their intended 
delivery drops. Once the OPAREA is established successfully with the delivery of critical 
supplies, then the defensive operational requirements will be critical. On alternative to 
augment organic defensive capabilities is to deploy a smart sensor network in order to 
detect intruders. The nodes in such a network could be randomly distributed which would 
contributed to rapid placement but also incur a penalty in coverage efficiency. While 
randomly distributing the nodes would lower the impact the systems deployment would 
have manpower and time requirements, it will leave physical areas that have more or less 
than the number of sensors required to provide 100% coverage and detection. However, 
this may not be a significant issue if the sensors are used as a trip wire. That is, the primary 
purpose of the sensors would be to alert blue forces of enemy presence, as opposed to 
providing the precise location of every element of the intruding force. 
 
 Intruder Detection by Networked Distributed Sensor Field Figure 36. 
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Figure 37 illustrates that preliminary analysis of 50 sensors randomly distributed 
around an island with a radius of 2 km. Each sensor has a detection range of .2 km and 
the model makes the assumption that there is a 100% probability that a sensor will detect 
an intruder in its detection range. This scenario was run 10,000 times (100 simulation 
runs of 100 iterations each). Results show that a field with the given parameters is 
capable of detecting 85% of the intruders. An in depth discussion of this model is 
included in chapter 11.  
I. USA/USAF SYSTEM CONCLUSION  
While there are many platforms and high-level technologies available for use for 
the USAF, the methodology of employing them at the right scenarios will have a great 
impact on the outcome of the operations. The design synthesis provided an overall broad 
view of the various functions required of the Army/Air Force component, while the 
operational analysis comes in the form of detailed COIs that are critical to the Army  /Air 
Force component, namely delivery, sustenance and defense. The final tradeoff analysis 
provided an alternative perspective for the various COIs and outlines a separate 
functional analysis for the decision makers to make a more informed decision. In 
summary, the available platforms and technologies identified in this chapter allowed a 
multitude of operational options to be utilized by the Army / Air Force components to 




XI. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
A. MODELING CONCEPTS FOR FEASIBILITY 
Multiple models were created in order to provide data for quantitative analysis of 
the proposed courses of action. This section documents those models and presents 
preliminary analysis related to each model. 
1. Distance 
Deployable distances were determined by drawing circles with radii equal to 
platform operational ranges. Centering these circles on blue force deployment locations 
denoted the portion of the AOR a platform could reach. The assumption was made that 
platforms that were capable of refueling in transit would do so. Additionally, enough 
stores would exist on each platform to maintain the platform, crew, and transported 
troops during transit. The effectively infinite range imparted by these assumptions was 
tempered by the fact that project emphasizes speed of arrival at the target island.   
2. Modeling First Arrival to Targeted Location 
A stochastic model built using JavaScript, Cascading Style Sheets, and Hypertext 
Markup Language (HTML), was created to quantify each COA’s ability to arrive at the 
targeted island first. This first arrival model allows the user to place multiple origination 
points for blue and Red forces on a graphic depicting the area of interest (AOI). 
Additional user inputs are: 
 A user defined AOI to be evaluated 
 Average speed of travel (along with a standard deviation) for the force 
stationed at each origination point 
 Travel delay imposed on blue forces. This input is optional. Inputting a 
negative number indicates a head start for blue forces 
 Number of sampling iterations. This number controls how many times 
each sample point is evaluated. 
The AOI is created as a mesh of triangles with each of the triangle’s vertices used 
as a sample point to determine first arrival. The number of triangles in the AOI mesh 
varies based on the size and shape of the AOI. For reference, the AOI shown in Figure 37 
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contains over 2600 triangles resulting in over 7000 sample points. The model measures 
the distance from each origination point to each sample point once per user defined 
iteration.   
The distance between two points is calculated using these algorithm parameters: 
 Get normalized three-dimensional coordinate of origin 
 Get normalized three-dimensional coordinate of the sample point 
 Normalized distance between the two points is the arccosine of the dot 
product of the normalized coordinate of the origin and the sample point 
 This normalized distance is then divided by the user defined travel speed 
of that origin point 
 It is not necessary to convert the normalized distance to real world 
distance because the model is only concerned with who gets to the point 
first  
 As long as each force travels a consistently scaled distance the model will 
accurately determine who covers that distance fastest 
Each point is sampled multiple times based on the number of iterations the user 
inputs. The color of the point is determined multiplicatively. For example, if the Red 
forces achieve first arrival to a point 60% of the time, while the blue forces arrive first 
40% of the time, then the sample point color is set to 60% red and 40% blue. This results 
in a gradient of colors between the red and blue areas. This purple gradient represents the 
level uncertainty of which side will arrive first. 
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 Stochastic “Get There First” Model Output Figure 37. 
Preliminary analysis indicates that the ability to achieve first arrival on the target 
island varies based on four factors. 
a. Red and Blue Force Travel Speed 
The greater the speed advantage of the blue force, the better their chance to 
achieve first arrival. 
b. Deployment and Destination Location 
Each force’s chance to achieve first arrival increases if they can deploy from a 
location close to the target. 
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c. Travel Range 
This simulation assumes that both forces have infinite travel range. However, if 
ranges were to be limited in a subsequent modeling effort, and a target were placed 
outside of a force’s range, then that force would be unable to achieve first arrival. 
d. Delay Time 
This represents the number of positive or negative hours between Red force 
deployment and Blue force deployment. In other words the delay can be a head start for 
either side in this problem. Every hour of exclusive movement the Red force has results 
in an expansion of their area of travel that cannot be recovered. 
3. Initial Delivery and Sustainment Model 
An agent based model was created using SIMIO, a modeling package that was 
originally designed for commercial applications (Kelton 2014). As an agent based model, 
it allows for the creation of individual units with specific physical characteristics 
including speed, cargo capacity, load, unload time, failure rate, and number of entities in 
model among other characteristics. This flexibility made SIMIO an obvious choice to use 
as the backbone of our logistics and supply system modeling.  Additionally, agent based 
models allow for the exploration of a potential future system and encourage a more 
holistic thought process when building or creating a working model of a future system.   
The modeled system represents the initial delivery and the logistics supply chain 
by sea or by air. The base model includes a small port, a large port, an airport, a 
helicopter delivery point and a supply arrival station. In between each of these locations 
are physical paths that mirror the distances required for ships to travel from Singapore to 
Natuna Besar. Each unit loads cargo at one of the ports and off loads the cargo at one of 
two destinations. The first represents the island and simulates the delivery of cargo 
directly to the beach. The second destination represents the need to off load cargo via 
helicopter or RHIB. The delivering unit remains at the offload site and the SH-60s and 
ribs deliver the cargo to the supply depot.   
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Each ship, airplane, or helicopter involved in the delivery of supplies to the force 
located on the island is represented in the model. Each unit has speeds and capacities that 
approximate reality. In most cases capacity was treated as universal in the sense that ten 
tons of food is the same as ten tons of fuel. The C-17 was added to the model to reflect 
the fact that there where physical limits to the Patriot Missile System that necessitated the 
inclusion of a larger aircraft that was capable of delivering the system.   
Table 19.   Unit Types Modeled Using Speed, Capacity, and Travel Distance 
Unit Name Capacity (tons) Speed (kts) Distance to Travel 
Large Cargo Ship 1000 20 400 
LCS 231 40 390 
C-130 22 300 600 
RHIB (LCS) 1 70 390 
SSGN 1 10 400 
JHSV 600 20 390 
MV-22 10 250 600 
LCAT 80 18 390 
SH-60 (LCS) 4 20 20 
C-17 80 400 600 
 
The model using the data in Table 19 includes other elements as well. In this case, 
two sources were modeled: one represented physical cargo to be delivered and one 
represented the non-physical demand for resources by the personnel at the delivery 
location. The demand source generated units of cargo demand based on calculated 
requirements. Demand was modeled stochastically using a triangular distribution with 
inter-arrival times that ranged from 12 hours to 36 hours. This resulted in an average 
demand over a 24-hour period ranging from seven tons per day up to 20 tons per day.   
Table 20.   Experimental Configurations 
 C-17 SSGN JHSV MV-22 LCS LCAT SH-60 
COA-A (LCS) 0 0 1 0 3 0 3 
COA-B (LCAT) 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 
COA-C (MV-22) 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 
COA-D (SSGN) 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 
COA-E (C-17) 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 120 
 
 SIMIO Model Showing SH-60s Shuttling Cargo from LCS Figure 38. 
Each COA was modeled to represent the number of platforms used to execute 
each plan. Additional experiments were conducted to verify that each COA option was 
able to provide sufficient quantities of supplies for sustainment. For example, if a COA 
used all aircraft then the model was tested to verify that one single aircraft would be able 
to provide enough supplies for sustainment. Likewise, if a COA used LCS, then an 
experiment was conducted to verify the suitability of one LCS to deliver timely resupply. 
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 Cargo Capacity versus Speed with Defendability Overlay Figure 39. 
Figure 39 illustrates the relationship of a range of platforms with respect to speed 
and cargo capacity. The upper right corner is where the fastest platform with the highest 
cargo capacity would reside. The chart includes a color coding that highlights three levels 
of defendability: anti-ground, anti-surface, and anti-air. Platforms that are only able to 
deliver ground troops are coded green. All platforms that can deliver troops and surface 
to surface defensive missile systems are coded in blue and those capable of carrying the 
largest anti-air missile system we considered, the Patriot, are coded in red. 
Unsurprisingly, the larger ships and naval vessels are able to deliver the Patriot missile 
system and the smaller ship, the LCS, and aircraft are only able to deliver the anti-ship 
missile systems. The smaller platforms and aircraft, while faster, carry significantly less 
cargo when compared to ships. Of note, the Air Force transports C-17 and C-5 break 
away from the cluster of slower naval vessels and aircraft. They are by far the fastest 
platform suitable for delivering the Patriot system and thus bring maximum defendability 





















































 Cargo Delivered versus Time Figure 40. 
Figure 40 shows the actual time of delivery for each COA in relation to the amount of 
cargo delivered. The delivery time is based on the amount of time it took to deliver all of the 
cargo required. Each COA that uses the Landing Catamaran (LCAT) was inhibited by its 
maximum speed while loaded of 18 knots (“LCAT” 2014). In this case, it had an effect on 
the time to deliver in COA B and C. The limiting factor for COA A was the time to offload 
the LCS vessels using both helicopters and the rib boats. With one rib and one SH-60 per 
LCS, the total time to deliver the initial load of troops was 19 1/2 hours. COA C was the 
median of the five COAs at 17 hours. The unique benefit of COA C was that it would be able 
to reduce the time required by simply moving closer to land.  
Table 21.   Results for Delivery Times 
Experiment Number of  
Simulations  
Mean Time 
to Deliver (hours) 
Distance to 
Travel (NM) 
COA A 30 19.5 390 
COA B 30 30.3 390 
COA C 30 17.7 600 
COA D 30 16 390 
COA E 30 1.5 600 
 
COA  A (LCS), 19.5 
COA  B (LCAT), 
30.33 
COA C (OSPREY), 17 
COA D (SSGN), 16 
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 Normalized Cost versus Normalized Speed Figure 41. 
Figure 41 shows the relationship of cost and speed in the COAs. The fastest and 
the least expensive are in the lower right corner. In this case, the lowest cost option, COA 
B, is also one of the slowest. The fastest option, COA E, is the median cost and the next 
fastest, COA C, is even less expensive. Of the two with the lowest cost, one, COA C, is 
significantly faster.  
4. Resupply Modeling 
Each COA was designed to be able to provide resupply using only the platforms 
available within that COA. The range of supplies required was calculated to be from 
seven tons per day to 20 tons per day based on workload. For example, a single C-130 
would be able to provide 20 tons per sortie. This tonnage equates to a range from 1 to 2.8 
days before more supplies are required. Simple math in this case was enough to establish 
a minimum requirement and show that each COA would over deliver if all of the 
platforms were used for resupply. 
A commander in an operational setting would have a full range of platforms 
available, including civilian contractors. Figure 42 shows the full range of options 
available and how long the supplies would last for the troops located on the island.  
COA A (LCS) 
COA B (LCAT) 
COA C (MV-22) 
COA D (SSGN) 
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 Transit Time versus Resupply Days Figure 42. 
The three top performers were the LCAT, the LCS, and the JHSV. All three of 
these platforms would be able to transit in less than 24 hours and would provide 4, 8, and 
23 days of supplies respectively. Under average demand, 13 tons per day, supplies would 
last for 6, 17, and 46 days.  
5. Force Package Defendability Modeling 
A Microsoft Excel model using the Hughes’ salvo equations was created in order 
to determine organic defensive requirements for the landing force to provide a level of 
defense great enough to deter an enemy attack (Hughes 2000). The Hughes salvo 
equations model is a wide used model for modeling missiles combat. We used it because 
of the major importance of the missile battles for attacking/defending the island, in 
contrast to the land battle. Both of the battles types in our scenarios, the surface-to-
surface battle and the surface-to-air battle could be modeled as rounds of missile or 
bombs attack. The model evaluates the remaining force after each round, until one of the 
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The main question we tried to answer using the model is “How much missile 
systems (Patriot and NSM) the Marines should deploy in the island in order to create a 
credible threat?” we were interested more in rough estimations than exact number 
because we modeled a deterrence force. We assumed that the Red Side will do a similar 
calculations, which should lead them to the conclusion that a battle for the island will be 
hard, if the Marines will pose a credible threat. Two scenarios were analyzed to 
determine these requirements. The first scenario was a battle between surface-to-surface 
missiles pitting the NSM and Patriot systems against the Chinese Type 022, equipped 
with Hongniao missiles. The second scenario was a surface-to-air engagement of Patriot 
batteries against Chinese J-15 tactical aircraft.  
Each scenario was examined at medium and high threat levels using Spratly and 
Natuna Besar-sized islands as references. Nine user inputs were used in formulating 
strengths of both the Red and Blue sides of the engagement, and are listed here: 
1. Number of Weapons systems 
2. Targeting ability 
3. Missiles per Salvo  
4. Probability of hit 
5. Hit absorption 
6. Defensive firepower 
7. Defensive readiness at first round 
8. Defensive alert after 1st round 
9. Scouting effectiveness 
a. Scenario 1: NSM and Patriot Versus Type 022 Vessels 
(1) Medium threat – Natuna Besar  
Several assumptions were required when setting up the three aspects of this 
scenario. These are the assumptions for the first part of this scenario: 
 Chinese forces will shoot first, and U.S. forces operate under defensive 
rules of engagement 
 The NSM is maneuvering, so the Type 022 probability of hit is low 
 We assume firing in range, although Hongniao range is much larger than 
NSM (“Weapons” 2013) (“Strike” 2015”)  
 As a missile, the NSM has a low ability to absorb hits and remain effective 
 The Type 022 missile boat has no anti-missile capabilities. 
 Each Patriot battery has four missiles each with an estimated 0.95 
probability of kill against the Hongniao missiles 
 126 
 The Chinese has advantage in scouting because the island is a stationary 
target. Conversely, their Type 022 vessels have the ability to attack from 
almost any direction 
 We assume that the Chinese will have 7 to 9 Type 022 vessels at the 
medium threat level and 11 to 13 at the high threat level 
 We assume from the air-battle results that Blue forces in Natuna Besar 
will have two Patriot batteries in a medium threat environment 
Table 22.   Input Values: Surface threat—Medium Threat—Natuna Besar 
  U.S. CHINA 
NUMBER OF VESSELS 1 NSM 7 Type 022 (Hongniao) 
TARGETING ABILITY (COEFF.) 0.8  0.3  
MISSILES / SALVO 4  8  
PH 0.8  0.4  
HIT ABSORPTION 1  2  
DEFENSIVE FIREPOWER/SHIP 11.4  0  
DEFENSIVE READINESS 1  1  
SCOUTING EFFECTIVENESS 0.9  1  
 
This resulted in the Chinese forces being able to defeat U.S. forces on the island if 
they attack with at least eight Type 022 vessels.  
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 Salvo-Equations Results: Surface threat—Medium threat—Natuna Figure 43. 
Besar 
The air defense capabilities of the Patriot missiles play a very important role in 
this scenario. There should be very little surprise that the NSM is relatively less effective 
in a situation where there are less than 12 Type 022 vessels because in such cases Patriot 
batteries are able to engage all incoming enemy missiles. The non-linear results shown in 
Figure 43 are due to mathematical properties inherent to the Hughes-Salvo deterministic 
model. These results should be considered with extra care, as deterministic estimates are 
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(2) High Threat  - Natuna Besar  
These are the assumptions for the second part of this scenario: 
 Chinese forces will shoot first, and that U.S. forces operate under 
defensive rules of engagement 
 The NSM is maneuvering, so the Type 022 probability of hit is low 
 We assume firing in range, although Hongniao range is much larger than 
NSM (“Weapons” 2013) (“Strike” 2015) 
 As a missile, the NSM has a low ability to absorb hits and remain 
effective. 
 The Type 022 missile boat has no anti-missile capabilities 
 Each Patriot battery has four missiles each with an estimated 0.95 
probability of kill against the Hongniao missiles 
 The Chinese has advantage in scouting because the island is a stationary 
target. Conversely, their Type 022 have the ability to attack from almost 
any direction 
 We are assuming from the air-battle results that Natuna Besar will have 3 
Patriot batteries in the high threat scenario 
Table 23.   Input values: Surface Threat – High Threat – Natuna Besar 
 U.S. CHINA 
NUMBER OF VESSELS 1 NSM 11 Type 022 (Hongniao) 
TARGETING ABILITY (COEFF.) 0.8  0.3  
MISSILES / SALVO 4  8  
PH 0.8  0.4  
HIT ABSORPTION 1  2  
DEFENSIVE FIREPOWER/SHIP 11.4  0  
DEFENSIVE READINESS 1  1  
SCOUTING EFFECTIVENESS 0.9  1  
 
This model resulted in the Chinese forces needing at least 12 Type 022 vessels to 
achieve a victory. 
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 Salvo-Equations Results: Surface threat—High threat—Natuna Figure 44. 
Besar  
(3) Medium and high threat—Spratly Islands 
These are the assumptions for the third part of this scenario: 
 Chinese forces will shoot first, and that U.S. forces operate under 
defensive rules of engagement 
 The NSM is maneuvering, so the Type 022 probability of hit is low 
 We assume firing in range, although the Hongniao range is much larger 
than NSM (“Weapons” 2013) (“Strike” 2015”)  
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 The Type 022 missile boat has no anti-missile capabilities 
 Each patriot battery has four missiles with an estimated 0.95 probability of 
kill against the Hongniao missiles 
 The Chinese has advantage in scouting, because they know where to aim 
(the island) and the attack could come almost from everywhere. 
 It will not be possible to land more than 1 NSM and 1 Patriot in the 
Spratly Islands because of its size 
 The Chinese will not attack the island with a full force because of its size. 
We assume 4–5 Type 022 for a medium threat scenario, and 7–9 for a high 
threat scenario 
Table 24.   Input values: Surface threat—Medium and High threat—Spratly 
Islands 
 U.S. CHINA 
NUMBER OF VESSELS 1 NSM 4 Type 022 (Hongniao) 
TARGETING ABILITY (COEFF.) 0.8  0.3  
MISSILES / SALVO 4  8  
PH 0.8  0.4  
HIT ABSORPTION 1  2  
DEFENSIVE FIREPOWER/SHIP 3.8  0  
DEFENSIVE READINESS 1  1  
SCOUTING EFFECTIVENESS 0.9  1  
 
The results of this scenario revealed that U.S. forces should expect to win the 




 Salvo-Equations Results: Surface threat—Medium and High Figure 45. 
threat—Spratly Islands 
(4) Conclusion 
The Spratly Islands configuration is capable of mounting a successful defense 
using systems organic to the force protection package. However, no package in the 
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(5) Sensitivity Analysis 
As before, the model is very sensitive to the performance of the Patriot missiles.   
This is because the Patriots create an effective anti-air shield enabling the NSM to attack 
the Type 022 vessels unmolested. 
For example, Figure 46 is a plot showing the maximum number of Type 022 
vessels that a Blue side configuration is capable of defeating. The plot is varied by the 
number of Patriots batteries and the number of NSM batteries.  
 
 Sensitive Analysis of Number of Patriots and Number of NSMs in Figure 46. 
the Salvo-Equations Model 
From Figure 46, it is clear that changing the number of Patriot batteries increases 
the number of Type 022 vessels that can be defeated by three or four ships, while the 
improvement in threats defeated by the NSM over the same range is less than one. This 
reveals a much greater sensitivity for the Patriot system. In fact, 66% of time the NSM 
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b. Scenario 2: Patriot versus J-15 Aircraft 
(1) Medium and High Threat – Natuna Besar 
The assumptions for this scenario are: 
 The LS PGB guided bomb is the primary anti-surface weapon of the J-15. 
(“Laser” 2012) It has a range of approximately 27 NM (50 km), which is 
much shorter than the PAC-2 range of 52 NM (96 km) (“Patriot” n.d.). 
The Patriot’s range advantage gives it first strike capability. 
 The Patriot missile speed (Mach 4.1) (“Patriot” n.d.) is twice the speed of 
the J-15 (Mach 2.4) (“Shark” 2011), resulting in the Patriot having a high 
probability to hit and kill assuming correct guidance. 
 The J-15 has an effective electronic warfare payload providing an anti-
missile capability (Weening, 2014). We assume this capability allows the 
J-15 to shoot down two Patriot missiles each time. 
 Both the Patriot and the J-15 have low ability to survive being hit.  
 A medium threat attack consists of two J-15s. A high level attack consists 
of four J-15s.  
Table 25.   Input Values: Air Threat—Medium and High Threat—Natuna Besar 
 U.S. CHINA 
NUMBER OF VESSELS 2 Patriot 1 J-15 
TARGETING ABILITY (COEFF.) 0.95  0.95  
MISSILES / SALVO 4  2  
PH 0.9  0.8  
HIT ABSORPTION 1  1  
DEFENSIVE FIREPOWER/SHIP 0  2  
DEFENSIVE READINESS AT FIRST ROUND 0.9  1  
DEFENSIVE ALERT AFTER 1ST ROUND 1  1  
SCOUTING EFFECTIVENESS 1  1  
 
The results of Table 25 inputs reveal that U.S. forces can win a in a medium threat 
environment with two Patriot batteries, while three batteries are required to succeed when 
the threat level is high.  
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 Salvo-Equations Results: Air Threat—High Threat—Natuna Besar Figure 48. 
This type of threat can only be handled in a Natuna Besar type scenario; the island 
used in the Spratly Island scenario is too small to support more than one Blue asset of any 
type (NSM or Patriot). With only one defense system, Blue forces lose all air-battles 
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4 J-15 against  2  Patriot  
Red side wins after 2  rounds  
USA Chinese
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6. Surveillance Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV) Modeling 
Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) is an agent based simulator that 
allows for very detailed modeling of various military platforms (Lauren 2002). MANA 
can be programed to allow for units to search, asses line of sight, and attack enemies with 
or without coordination with other friendly units. Single run or multiple run simulations 
can be performed using various stochastic starting points to assess robustness of design. 
One of the goals for the COAs was for each of the deployment packages to have 
an indigenous ISR capability that would allow the occupants to monitor the sea and air 
space surrounding the island for intruders. One possibility was for the use of small low 
cost UAVs, but the number of UAVs that would be required to provide adequate 
surveillance was unknown.  
The UAVs were given basic characteristics of a small quadcopter and assigned 
the task of patrolling around the island. Figure 52 shows the enemy forces, composed of 
15 boats (red dots), staged in a posture surrounding friendly territory, which were 
programmed to move toward the island, as shown in Figure 53. A group of quadcopters 
(blue dots) with sensor ranges of 3,400 yards (3 kilometers) with a sweep width of 320⁰, 
forward, at an altitude of 1,000 feet traveled at 27 knots through the patrol area. When the 
quadcopters randomly patrolled the entire area out to a 12 nautical mile radius from the 
island, they were unable to ensure that none of the enemy vessels made it to the island 
undetected. After 30 simulations, using four UAVs searching randomly, 60% of the 
simulations resulted in at least one enemy vessel getting to the island undetected.  
Given this result, a modified search was tested. The number of quadcopters was 
reduced to three and one was programed to remain hovering over the island. This simple 
change prevented any enemy vessel from closing to within 5,400 yards (5 kilometers) of 
the island. A separate four quadcopter model was tested and it also prevented the enemy 
from closing within 5,400 yards while the overall range at which the enemy was detected 
increased. It demonstrated that search patterns have a greater influence over performance 
then the sheer number of quadcopters used.  
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 Mini-map View of Sea Area Figure 49. 
 
 Map Showing Enemy Ships Moving Toward Island Figure 50. 
7. Insertion Onto a Small Island in a Mined Environment 
A Monte Carlo simulation based on Professor Alan R. Washburn’s “Un-countered 
Minefield Planning Model” (Washburn, 8) was created to calculate platform attrition 
during a sea insertion to an island that was unable to support vertical insertion and inside 
of a mine field. Such a situation would preclude using air assets to deploy due to 
geography, and deploying manned surface assets due to risk of loss due to the mines.   
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 Simulation Snapshot of Multiple-Barge Minefield Transit Figure 51. 
One solution would be to send relatively inexpensive unmanned barges through 
the field using the same path. Barge attrition due to a mine would also result in the 
attrition of that mine and removal of its ability to affect subsequent barges using the same 
path. Eventually, enough barges would make it through the field that they could connect 
and form the basis for a landing pad for follow on vertical lift efforts. Analysis would 
indicate expected barge loss given these user inputs: 
 Number of mines in the field 
 Damage radius of individual mines 
 Width of the mine field 
 Probability of activation for each mine 
 Number of platforms required on the other side of the field 
 Platform travel jitter 
The mitigation effects of rapid mine clearance techniques could be included by 
altering the overall number of mines in the field. 
This simulation works by uniformly distributing the given number of mines 
across the width of the field, which is simulated by the x-axis. Next, a random location is 
selected on the x-axis representing the path the barges will take through the field. If the 
selected x-value falls within the damage radius of a mine then both the mine and the 
barge are destroyed, otherwise the barge is considered to have made it through the field 
safely. Subsequent barges use approximately the same x-values (the amount of deviation 
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is based on the given jitter values); either activating remaining mines in the vicinity or 
safely passing through the minefield. The simulation stops after the desired number of 




 10 barges required 
 12.5 km wide 
minefield 
 20 mines 
 Mines actuate 
upon detection 
 0.5 km kill radius 
per mine 
 Mines randomly 
distributed across 
minefield 
 100 simulation 
iterations per run 
(total of 10,000 
simulations) 
 
 Monte Carlo Simulation Output for Minefield Casualties Figure 52. 
Preliminary analysis indicates that platform attrition is dependent on the mine 
density as well as the detection and damage radius of the mines. A field that is less 
densely filled with less sensitive and damaging mines has a lower attrition rate than one 
that is more densely filled with more dangerous mines. 
The attrition results of a denser field with more mines in shown in Figure 53: 
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  Barge Attrition as a Function of the Number of Mines Figure 53. 
Figure 54 shows the effect that mine damage radius has on the number of barges 
required to achieve tasking. 
 
 Barge Attrition as a Function of Individual Mine Damage Radius Figure 54. 
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8. Smart Sensor Detection 
The Smart Sensor Field Detection model is a Monte Carlo simulation created to 
quantify intruder detection through a sensor field consisting of a randomly distributed 
network of sensor nodes. The equipment simulated in this model is meant to alert the 
defending forces to the presence of the intruder. It is not beyond the realm of possibility 
that this concept could be expanded to include a sensor system with an engagement 
component; however, such a component lies beyond the scoped boundaries for this 
particular project. 
User inputs in this model are: 
 Number of sensors in the field 
 Detection radius of individual sensors 
 Width of the sensor field 
 Probability of detection for each sensor  
This model is also based on the aforementioned Washburn model mentioned in 
the Section 3 of this chapter. An example output is shown in Figure 52. The differences 
between the outputs shown in Figure 53 and Figure 54 come in the form of three 
exceptions for the latter simulation. The first is that any intruders enter the field at 
random locations. The second is that in this case sensors are not destroyed upon 





 50 sensors 
 250 meter 
detection radius 
 90% probability 
of detection 
 12.5 km wide 
sensor field 
 100 simulation 
iterations per 
run (total of 
10,000 
simulations) 
 20 intruders 
 
 Monte Carlo Simulation Output for Smart Sensor Field Detection Figure 55. 
Figure 55 shows that the percentage of the 20 intruders that are detected is 
influenced by the number of sensors in the system. In this simulation, only the number of 
sensors parameter is changed; all other parameters remain the same as Figure 52. It 
indicates that a denser sensor field is more effective at detection. 
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 Intruder Detection as a Function of the Number of Sensors Deployed Figure 56. 
Additionally, higher sensor capability in the form of a larger detection range 
results in a requirement for fewer sensors to maintain a given level of detection. The 
effects of changes to detection ranges are shown in Figure 57. Once again, the only 
parameter altered is the sensor detection range. All other parameters remain the same as 




 Intruder Detection as a Function of Sensor Detection Range Figure 57. 
9. Sea Transit Through Blockade or Quarantine 
A discrete Monte Carlo simulation was created to enable analysis of the impacts 
of various levels of speed and stealth on the success of a blue force supply ship transiting 
through a sea blockade placed around the island by red forces. This model was based on 
work presented by Professor James Eagle (Eagle, 1). It allows the user to input the 
following: 
 Barrier width 
 Search traversal speed across the barrier 
 Searcher detection radius 
 Blockade runner transit speed 
 Time between discrete simulation steps 
The model itself works by moving the searcher on the x axis according to the 
input speed and the time between discrete steps. The runner is placed at some location on 
the x-axis at a distance from the actual barrier and moves towards the barrier based on the 
searcher traversal speed and time between the simulation steps. The distance between the 
searcher and the runner is measured at each step, and the runner is counted as having 
been detected if that distance is less than the searcher detection radius. The assumption is 
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made that the searcher has a probability of detection of 100% for any contact that is 
within its detection radius. 
Table 26 depicts runner success as a function of runner and searcher speeds. 
Preliminary analysis indicates that the runner is more likely to successfully run the 
blockade when it has a large speed advantage over the searcher. Table 27 depicts runner 
success as a function searcher speed and detection range. Preliminary analysis indicates 
that a runner that is detectable at longer ranges is less likely to successfully make it 
through the blockade than a runner that can only be detected at short range. For both 
tables, the percentage in each cell represents the percent of simulation runs in which the 
runner was detected. Two thousand simulation runs were performed for each speed 
combination in each table. 









10. Logistics Requirements 
Logistics requirements were tallied using information using a variety of sources. 
The Logistics Planning Factors were used to determine the consumption of the following 
items by similar units: 
 Water – 7.4 gallons per person per day for hot climates 
 Fuel – varies based on number of vehicles used 
 Clothing – 2.1 pounds per day 
 Barrier materials – 8.1 pounds per person per day 
 Medical supplies – 2.4 pounds per person per day 
 Personal demand – 3.4 pounds per person per day 
High, mid-level, and minimum requirements were calculated for assault and 
sustainment scenarios. Supply requirements for situations in which water was supplied 
and created on-site were analyzed. 
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 Daily Consumption Excluding Electrical Generator Fuel Figure 58. 
Additional fuel requirements were determined based on electricity generation 
using diesel generators. The amount of energy required (in kilowatt hours) was calculated 
based on data from the 2008 CENTCOM Sandbook and 249
th
 Engineering Battalion 
Interviews (Varin 2010). There was a wide variation between these two sources; 
individual power requirements ranged from 0.7 to 3.7 kilowatts per day. For usages 
calculated in Table 28, the assumption was made that the overall power requirement 
would be equivalent to 12 hours of full power draw. Table 29 followed-up by 







Table 28.   Electrical Energy Consumption Estimates 
 
Table 29.   Generators Identified for Determining Fuel Consumption 
 
 
Table 30 shows that dividing the kilowatt value for each generator by the fuel 
consumption value results in an average value for fuel consumption per kilowatt hour. 
Table 30.   Average Fuel Consumption per Kilowatt-Hour 
 
 
Using the average value from Table 30, an estimate for the amount of fuel needed 
in order to meet daily electrical generation requirements can be determined, as shown in 





MEP 012A 750kW 55
MEP 806A/B 60kW, 60/400Hz 4.6
MEP 805A/B 30kW, 60Hz 2.6
Generators kW/GPH
MEP 012A 750kW 13.6
MEP 806A/B 60kW, 60/400Hz 13.0
MEP 805A/B 30kW, 60Hz 11.5
average 12.7
 149 
Table 31.   Daily Electrical Energy Sustainment Fuel Requirements 
 
 
Combinations of generator units were combined to meet the energy requirements 
as dictated above. Fuel consumption values were then added to the LPF requirements 
above to determine overall fuel requirements. Figure 59 shows fuel requirements 
(including mid-level power generation use) combined requirements from the Logistics 
Planning factors. This information was used to determine the rate at which supplies 











CENTCOM Sand Book, 2008 1,680               132                           0.49                         
Averaged 5,280               414                           1.53                         
249th ENGR BN Interviews 8,880               697                           2.58                         
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 Daily Consumption Including Electrical Generator Fuel Figure 59. 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
A.  SOME INSIGHTS 
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Version 3.0 was published in 2009 
and it details a vision for the future of joint operations. We believe that our system of 
systems achieves the “implications of adopting this concept” outlined in the report 
(Mullen 2009). Some elements of this report follow from which we make our case for 
validating the SOS we have constructed. 
Build a balanced and versatile joint force (Mullen 2009). Our concept includes a 
range of equipment and personnel from across the DOD. It includes, but is not restricted 
to, Army, Navy and Air Force. Several varieties of mission packages are available and 
interchangeable based on the mission’s requirements and the commander’s intent. Where 
speed is required above all else, the Army/Air Force package can deliver equipment that 
has both anti-air and anti-surface capability. 
Institute mechanisms to prepare general-purpose forces quickly for mission 
changes (Mullen 2009). Our concept can be expanded or contracted as the mission 
dictates. The capability of the delivery systems to provide initial force packages and 
resupply means that more than one location can be serviced by resupply efforts. This 
means that several locations can be maintained simultaneously. The JHSV, for example, 
can deliver more than three weeks’ worth of supplies to one location or one week’s worth 
of supplies to three locations. Likewise, a single C-17 sortie can provide more than three 
days’ worth of supplies to one location and supplying three locations could be 
accomplished by one sortie per day. 
Improve knowledge of and capabilities for waging irregular warfare (Mullen 
2009). Our force is will be tasked with a mission that has not been required since the end 
of World War II. They may be asked to occupy, hold, monitor and defend sea and air 
space around an island or any other territorial claim against a potential adversary. They 
may need to be both a deterrent by presence and a deterrent by force.  
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Create agile general-purpose forces capable of operating independently at 
increasingly lower echelons (Mullen 2009). One of our goals was to create a force that fit 
the need while maintaining a high level of indigenous capability. This lead to the 
conclusion that several systems were needed to bolster our forces ability to detect and 
target enemy forces. The repurposing of the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense 
Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS), or even the Army’s RAID (Rapid Aerostat 
Initial Deployment) tower, helps to fulfill the need for an autonomous ISR capability and 
makes use of items already in our inventory. Our current inventory of weapons does not 
include a land based anti-ship missile system, thus we have recommended the use of the 
NSM to provide our deployed force with the ability to operate and defend at the unit 
level.   
Maintain the capability to project and sustain military power over global distances 
(Mullen 2009). Our system of systems has the ability to be rapidly deployed using 
multiple services air transport capabilities. Naturally, the Army/Air Force COA has the 
longest reach in the least amount of time. Once the equipment is assembled and staged, 
the time to deploy is a matter of hours instead of days or weeks.   
Improve capabilities and capacities for covert and clandestine operations (Mullen 
2009). The need to be the first to arrive has only one key requirement: that you get there 
first. When the physical limits of time and distance are not in your favor then 
consideration must be given to deciding to move before an adversary makes their final 
decision. The ability to deliver troops covertly prevents the enemy from moving the 
timeline forward as a reaction to more overt signs that a mission to deploy forces is 
underway.  As General Martin E. Dempsey stated: 
The reality of force development is that about 80% of Joint Force 2020 is 
programmed or exists today. We do, however, have an opportunity to be 
innovative in two ways. We can significantly change the other 20% of the 
force, and we can change the way we use the entire force. While new 
capabilities will be essential, many of our most important advancements 
will come through innovations in training, education, personnel 
management, and leadership development. (Dempsey 2012)  
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The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, a 2012 publication 
by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff examined the concept of Globally Integrated Operations 
in detail. These were some explicitly pertinent statements from that publication: 
 Globally Integrated Operations requires a commitment to mission 
command 
 Globally Integrated Operations must provide the ability to seize, retain and 
exploit the initiative in time and across domains 
 Globally Integrated Operations both enable and are premised upon global 
agility 
 Globally Integrated Operations place a premium on partnering 
 Globally Integrated Operations provide for more flexibility in how Joint 
Forces are established and employed 
 Future Joint Forces will leverage better integration to improve cross-
domain synergy 
 Flexible, low-signature or small-footprint capabilities such as cyberspace, 
space, special operations, global strike, and ISR will play more 
pronounced roles in future joint operations (Dempsey 2012) 
In the current fiscal environment, with the threats facing the United States and its 
allies, options are limited. Joint efforts and force tailoring are essential to accomplish 
some of the new missions presenting themselves. This project succeeded in establishing 
concepts, models, and recommendations for the flexible, global integration sought in the 
preceding points. 
There are several facets of modern strategy that are confirmed in our analysis. For 
example, we know that stealth will reduce reaction time; this is why we found 
detectability to be a key measure for effectiveness. As a counter, we know that possessing 
significant speed requires aircraft, and this impacts decision making on the importance of 
the speed of one’s own force weighed against the opponent’s reaction time. The cheapest 
option is slow, and knowing this makes the decision tougher for leaders, knowing they 
must strike a balance between effectiveness and cost.  
Do we need a land force equipped with extensive supplies or heavy defensive 
systems? Heavy cargo lift requires large airplanes or very slow ships. ARGs are good for 
middle of the road in cost and speed, but can deliver large amounts of cargo. As such, 
ARGs have served this nation well, but may not be sufficiently effective in or near an 
A2AD environment when the risks are weighed. 
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The tools for force shaping geared towards these types of problems are available. 
Here we have created several models and one tool particularly tailored for decision 
making. We believe we know our enemy. It is only through also having self-knowledge 
that we can achieve victory. A decision making tool such as the one we have made 
required that self-knowledge because a leader must set priorities. The risks and rewards 
should become clear once that is complete. 
We found through analysis that Air Force C-17s and C-130s are the best options 
for delivery of an expeditionary force when considering average performance ability 
across the entire range of inputs we explored. It is possible for individual leader inputs to 
change the most favorable anticipated outcomes based on reconfiguration of MOE 
weights on a case-by-case basis. Such priority-result sets were detailed in Chapter XI and 
Appendix F. In representing our stakeholders, our team found speed to be the top priority. 
Therefore, to accomplish the given mission we submit for recommendation a force 
package that utilizes COA E (Air Force C-17 and C-130) aircraft deployment of land 
force packages COA 6 for small islands or COA 8 for large islands. 
In Chapter VII, we stated that within the DOD the ability to network and pull 
disparate systems together quickly, in order to seize an island, does not exist. Our team 
followed through on its promise to examine this current gap in capability integration and 
prove that there are a set of existing capabilities within DOD, as a whole, to accomplish 
the mission of quickly seizing an island before an opponent. After all that we have 
discovered through exploratory analysis, not only do we highly recommend, we implore 
the DOD to make plans to seize small island areas on short notice in the A2AD 
environment using existing capabilities integrated for a short-notice flexible response.  
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APPENDIX A. U.S. NAVY-MARINE CORPS TASK LIST 
No. Task Name Description 
1 A.0  Amphibious Tasks  
2 MCT.0  Marine Tasks  
3    MCT.1.0  Conduct Maneuver 
4       MCT.1.3  Conduct Maneuver and Close Forces  
5          MCT.1.3.5  Navigate  
6       MCT.1.4  Deploy Conduct Maneuver (marines)  
7          MCT.1.4.1  Conduct Mobility Operations  
8          MCT.1.4.2  Conduct Breaching Operations  
9             MCT.1.4.2.1  Breach Enemy Defensive Positions  
10             MCT.1.4.2.3  Breach Barriers and Obstacles  
11       MCT.1.6  Dominate the OPAREA  
12          MCT.1.6.1  Conduct offensive operations  
13    MCT.3.0  Employ Firepower (marines)  
14       MCT.3.2  Attack Targets (marines)  
15          MCT.3.2.1  Conduct Fire support tasks  
16    MCT.4.0  Perform Logistics and Combat Service Support (marines)  
17       MCT.4.1  Conduct Supply Operations  
18          MCT.4.1.1  Conduct Aviation Supply Operations  
19          MCT.4.1.2  Conduct Ground Supply Operations  
20       MCT.4.3  Conduct Transportation Operations  
21          MCT.4.3.1  Conduct Embark Support  
22          MCT.4.3.2  Conduct Port Support  
23          MCT.4.3.3  conduct Motor Transport  
24          MCT.4.3.4  Conduct Air Delivery Operations  
25    MCT.5.0  Exercise Command and Control (marines)  
26       MCT.5.1  Acquire, Process, Communicate info  
27          MCT.5.1.1  Provide and Maintain Communications  
28          MCT.5.1.2  Provide Means of Communicating Information  
29       MCT.5.2  Prepare Plans and Orders  
30          MCT.5.2.1  Conduct Rapid Response and Planning Process  
31       MCT.5.3  Direct, Lead, Coordinate Forces and Operations  
32          MCT.5.3.1  Direct Operations  
33          MCT.5.3.2  Establish means to command and control  
34 NTA.0  Naval Tasks  
35    NTA.1.0  Deploy/Conduct Maneuver  
36       NTA.1.1  Move Naval Tactical Forces  
37          NTA.1.1.1  l Prepare Forces for Movement  
38             NTA.1.1.1.1  Identify Lift Requirements  
39             NTA.1.1.1.2  Stage Marshal Forces  
40             NTA.1.1.1.3  Embark Forces  
41             NTA.1.1.1.5  Conduct Shore-to-Ship Movement  
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42             NTA.1.1.1.7  Prepare Ship for Movement  
43                NTA.1.1.1.7.1  Provide Engineering/Main Propulsion  
44                NTA.1.1.1.7.2  Provide Combat Systems/Deck/Coms  
45                NTA.1.1.1.7.3  Provide Damage Control  
46          NTA.1.1.2  Move Forces  
47             NTA.1.1.2.2  Move Embarked Forces  
48             NTA.1.1.2.3  Move Units  
49                NTA.1.1.2.3.1  Conduct Sail Ship from port  
50                NTA.1.1.2.3.3  Conduct Flight Operations  
51                NTA.1.1.2.3.4  Conduct Convoy Operations  
52                NTA.1.1.2.3.5  Conduct Well Operations  
53                NTA.1.1.2.3.7  Conduct small boat operations  
54                NTA.1.1.2.3.8  Conduct Submerged Operations  
55             NTA.1.1.2.4  Conduct Tactical Insertion and Extraction  
56             NTA.1.1.2.5  Conduct Employ Remove Vehicles  
57          NTA.1.2  Navigate and close forces  
58             NTA.1.2.1  Establish Force area operations  
59                NTA.1.2.1.1  Establish Plan for Water Space management  
60                NTA.1.2.1.2  Conduct Air Space Management and Control  
61                NTA.1.2.1.3  Establish Amphibious Objective areas  
62                NTA.1.2.1.5  Determine Command Relationship for the Force  
63          NTA.1.2.2  Stage Forces  
64          NTA.1.2.4  perform surf Observations  
65          NTA.1.2.5  Conduct Terrain Analysis  
66          NTA.1.2.6  Conduct Meteorological Analysis  
67          NTA.1.2.8  Conduct Tactical recon/surveillance  
68             NTA.1.2.8.1  Conduct route and road reconnaissance  
69             NTA.1.2.8.2  Conduct Helicopter Landing Zone Reconnaissance  
70             NTA.1.2.8.3  Conduct Airborne Recon/Surveillance  
71          NTA.1.2.10  Conduct Beach Party Operations  
72          NTA.1.2.11  Conduct Navigation  
73          NTA.1.2.12  Maneuver in Formation  
74       NTA.1.3  Maintain Mobility  
75          NTA.1.3.1  Perform Mine Countermeasures  
76             NTA.1.3.1.1  Conduct Mine Hunting  
77             NTA.1.3.1.2  Conduct Mine Sweeping  
78          NTA.1.3.2  Conduct Breaching of Minefields and Barriers  
79             NTA.1.3.2.1  Mark Barriers and Obstacles  
80             NTA.1.3.2.2  Clear Minefields / Barriers / Obstacles  
81             NTA.1.3.2.3  Transit Mine Threat Areas  
82          NTA.1.3.3  Enhance Force Mobility  
83       NTA.1.4  Conduct Counter-Mobility  
84          NTA.1.4.5  Conduct Blockade  
85          NTA.1.4.6  Conduct Maritime Interception  
86             NTA.1.4.6.4  Escort Detained Vessels  
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87             NTA.1.4.6.5  Stop and/ or Neutralize Noncompliant Actors  
88          NTA.1.4.7  Enforce Exclusion Zone  
89       NTA.1.5  Dominate the Operational Area  
90          NTA.1.5.1  Dominate the Area through Employment of Combat 
Systems  
91             NTA.1.5.1.1  Maneuver Naval Forces  
92             NTA.1.5.1.2  Occupy Battlespace  
93             NTA.1.5.1.3  Integrate Forces  
94          NTA.1.5.2  Conduct Amphibious Operations  
95             NTA.1.5.2.1  Conduct Ship-to-Shore / Objective Maneuver  
96             NTA.1.5.2.2  Conduct Amphibious Assault  
97                NTA.1.5.2.2.1  Conduct Forcible Entry in AOR  
98                NTA.1.5.2.2.2  Seize and Hold Lodgment  
99                NTA.1.5.2.2.3  Build up the force  
100                NTA.1.5.2.2.4  Stabilize the Lodgment  
101                NTA.1.5.2.2.5  Insert Follow-on Forces  
102             NTA.1.5.2.4  Conduct an Amphibious Withdrawal  
103          NTA.1.5.3  Conduct Attack  
104          NTA.1.5.4  Conduct Security  
105             NTA.1.5.4.1  Conduct Screen  
106             NTA.1.5.4.2  Conduct Cover  
107             NTA.1.5.4.3  Provide Area Security  
108             NTA.1.5.4.4  Secure an Area  
109          NTA.1.5.5  Conduct Ground Tactical Enabling Operations  
110          NTA.1.5.7  Conduct Naval Special Warfare  
111          NTA.1.5.8  Conduct Unconventional Warfare  
112          NTA.1.5.9  Conduct Information Superiority  
113    NTA.3.0  Employ Firepower  
114       NTA.3.1  Process Targets  
115          NTA.3.1.1  Request Attack  
116          NTA.3.1.2  Select Target to Attack  
117          NTA.3.1.4  Develop Order to Fire  
118    NTA.3.2  Attack Targets  
119       NTA.3.2.1  Attack Enemy Maritime Target  
120          NTA.3.2.1.1  Attack Surface Targets  
121       NTA.3.2.2  Attack Land Targets  
122          NTA.3.2.2.1  Attack Submerged Target  
123       NTA.3.2.3  Attack Enemy Aircraft and Missiles  
124       NTA.3.2.4  Suppress Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)  
125       NTA.3.2.5  Conduct Electronic Attack  
126          NTA.3.2.5.1  Conduct C2 Attack  
127       NTA.3.2.6  Interdict Enemy Operational Forces  
128       NTA.3.2.7  Intercept, Engage, and Neutralize Enemy Aircraft  
129       NTA.3.2.8  Conduct Fire Support  
130          NTA.3.2.8.1  Organize fire support assets  
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131          NTA.3.2.8.2  Illuminate/Designate Targets  
132          NTA.3.2.8.3  Engaged Targets  
133          NTA.3.2.8.4  Adjust Fires  
134    NTA.4.0  Perform Logistics and Combat Service Support  
135       NTA.4.1  Arm  
136          NTA.4.1.1  Schedule Armament of Task Force  
137          NTA.4.1.2  Provide Munitions Management  
138          NTA.4.1.4  Maintain Explosive Safety  
139          NTA.4.1.5  On-Load and Off-Load Ordnance  
140    NTA.4.2  Fuel  
141       NTA.4.2.1  Conduct Fuel Management  
142          NTA.4.2.1.1  Schedule Refueling  
143       NTA.4.2.2  Move Bulk Fuel  
144    NTA.4.4  Provide Personnel and Personnel Support  
145       NTA.4.4.1  Distribute Support and Personnel  
146          NTA.4.4.1.2  Provide Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting  
147          NTA.4.4.1.3  Provide Replacement Personnel Management  
148          NTA.4.4.2.2  Provide Food Services  
149    NTA.4.5  Provide Transport  
150    NTA.4.6  Supply the Force  
151       NTA.4.6.1  Provide General Supply Support  
152       NTA.4.6.3  Provide Underway Replenishment  
153       NTA.4.6.5  Provide Vertical Replenishment  
154       NTA.4.6.6  Provide Air Delivery  
155    NTA.5.0  Exercise Command and Control  
156    NTA.5.1  Acquire, Process, Communicate Information and Maintain Status  
157       NTA.5.1.1  Exercise Command and Control 2  
158       NTA.5.1.2  Manage Means of Communicating Information  
159       NTA.5.1.3  Maintain and Display Unit Readiness  
160       NTA.5.1.4  Exercise Command and Control 5  
161       NTA.5.1.5  Exercise Command and Control 6  
162    NTA.5.2  Analyze and Assess Situation  
163       NTA.5.2.1  Analyze Mission and Current Situation  
164          NTA.5.2.1.3  Review ROE  
165          NTA.5.2.1.5  Exercise Command and Control 10  
166    NTA.5.3  Exercise Command and Control 11  
167       NTA.5.3.1  Develop Concept of Operations  
168       NTA.5.3.2  Issue Planning Guidance  
169       NTA.5.3.3  Develop Course of Action  
170       NTA.5.3.6  Prioritize Subordinate Command Requirements  
171    NTA.6.0  Protect the Force  
172    NTA.6.1  Enhance Survivability  
173       NTA.6.1.1  Protect against combat area hazards  
174          NTA.6.1.1.2  Remove Hazards  
175          NTA.6.1.1.3  ID Friendly Forces  
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176       NTA.6.1.6  Protect the Environment  
177    NTA.6.3  Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means  
178       NTA.6.3.1  Protect and Secure OPAREA 
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 SSGN. Image from “Jane’s” 2015  Figure 60. 
 Converted Ohio class ballistic missile submarine that has been converted 
into a cruise missile submarine. 
 Cruise missiles: Up to 154 Raytheon Tomahawk Block III and Block IV 
 Torpedoes: 4 bow tubes capable of firing Mk 48 ADACPs 
 Unit Cost: 4 billion (Estimate) 
Table 32.   SSGN Specifications (after Jane’s 2015) 
Length Overall 170.7 m 
Beam 12.8 m 
Draught 11.1 m 
Top speed 25 kts 
Crew 174 
SOF 66 for 90 days or  




B. MH-60S “SIERRA” 
 
 MH-60S “Sierra” (from Jane’s 2015) Figure 61. 
 Helicopter that is capable of performing a wide range of maritime 
missions and can be deployed on the LCS 
 Unit Cost: 20.7 million (Balle 2014) 
Table 33.   MH-60S Specifications (after MH-60 2015) 
Max. takeoff gross weight 23,500 lbs 
Maximum useful load 9,070 lbs 
Dash speed 153 kts 
Approximate range 245 NM 
Engines (2) T700-GE-401C 
Weapons 7.62 mm and 50 cal. guns 
Maximum cabin seats 14 
Auxiliary fuel Up to two external tanks 
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C. JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL  
 
 Joint High Speed Vessel (from Jane’s 2015)  Figure 62. 
 Contains either 150 troops in berths or 312 troops in airline style seating 
 Landing ramp can support M1A2 Abrams tank 
 Flight Deck is CH-53E Capable 
 Unit Cost: 185 million (“JHSV” 2014) 
Table 34.   JHSV Specifications (after Jane’s 2015)  
Length Overall 103 m 
Beam 28.5 m 
Draught 3.8 m 
Crew 41 
Payload 635 MT 




D. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP INDEPENDENCE CLASS (LCS) 
 
 LCS Independence Class (from Jane’s 2015). Figure 63. 
 Accommodates mission module change-out ability 
 Large Mission Bay (15,200 square feet)  
 Can support any mission with a reserve module onboard 
 Unit Cost: 440 million (O’Rourke 2014) 
Table 35.   Independence LCS Specifications (after Jane’s 2015) 
Length Overall 127.4 m 
Beam 31.6 m 
Draught 4.27 m 
Crew (Core) 40 
Crew (Mission) 35  
Payload 210 MT 
Range 4300 NM at 18 kts 




E. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP FREEDOM CLASS 
 
 LCS Freedom Class (from Jane’s 2015). Figure 64. 
 Accommodates mission module change-out ability 
 Transports three 11m RHIB capable of supporting transport of 30 
passengers per trip 
 Aircraft: 2 SH-60(R&S)  
 Unit Cost: 440 million (O’Rourke 2015) 
Table 36.   Freedom LCS Specifications (after Jane’s 2015). 
Length Overall 115 m 
Beam 17.5 m 
Draught 3.9 m 
Crew (Core) 50 
Crew (Mission) 15  
Endurance 21 Days 
Range 3500 NM at 18 kts 
Max Speed 45+ knots 
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F. LANDING CATAMARAN (L-CAT) 
 
 French Landing Catamaran (from Jane’s 2015). Figure 65. 
 Fast landing craft capable of docking with LPD and LHD 
 Transports personnel, vehicles and equipment 
 Unit Cost: 16.5 million (“Shifting” 2011) 
Table 37.   L-CAT Specifications (after LCAT 2014). 
Length Overall 30 m 
Beam 12.6 m 
Draught 0.6 m 
Crew (Core) 4-8 
Crew (Mission) 40 
Load capacity 80 tons 
Range 430 NM (loaded) 
600 NM (light) 
Speed 30 kts (light) 




G. MV-22 OSPREY 
 
 MV-22 Osprey (from V22 n.d.) Figure 66. 
 Tiltrotor aircraft capable of vertical take-off/landing. 
 Can accommodate up to 24 troops. 
 Unit Cost: 72 million (“Budget” 2014) 
Table 38.   MV-22 Specifications (after V-22 n.d.). 
Max. Vertical takeoff gross weight 53,600 lbs 
Maximum useful load 19,141 lbs 
Cruise speed 280 kts 
Mission radius (extra tank) 242 NM 
Engines (2) AE 1107C 
Crew 2-3 
Maximum cabin seats 14 
Auxiliary fuel Up to one external tank 
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APPENDIX C.  U.S. MARINE CORPS PLATFORMS 
A. PATRIOT MISSILE 
 
 Patriot Missile (from Jane’s 2014) Figure 67. 
Table 39.   Patriot Missile Specifications 
Cost $30.44M per Battery 
Weight 10,000 lbs per Battery 
Range 52 NM (96 km) for PAC-2 
Number of missiles per battery 4 
 
 
B. NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE (NSM) 
 
 Naval Strike Missile (from Jane’s 2014) Figure 68. 
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Table 40.   NSM Specifications (after Strike 2015) 
Cost $12.6 M per Battery 
Weight 51,600 lbs per Battery 
Range 62 NM (115 km) 
Number of missiles per battery 4 





 Avenger (from Boeing n.d.) Figure 69. 
Table 41.   Avenger Specifications (after Avenger n.d.) 
Cost $652,000 per Battery  
Weight 8,600 lbs per Battery  
Missile Range 4.3 NM (8 km) 
Number of missiles per battery 4-8 





 JLENS Figure 70. 
Table 42.   JLENS Specifications (after JLENS 2015). 
Range 296 NM (340 mi) (horizontal), 15,000 ft (vertical) 
Operation Fiber optic cable 
Weight 7000 lbs 
 
 
E. GIRAFFE AMB 
 
 Giraffe AMB (from Wolff n.d. [b]). Figure 71. 
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Table 43.   Giraffe AMB Specifications (after Wolff n.d.[b]) 
Range 54 NM (62 mi) (horizontal), 60,000 ft (vertical) 
Operating frequency C-band (5.4-5.9 GHz) 




 AN/TPS-80 Radar (from GATOR 2015). Figure 72. 
Table 44.   AN/TPS-80 Radar Specifications (after GATOR 2015) 
Range Estimated 139 NM (160 mi), as it is a replacement for 5 
radars: TPS-63 (air defense), TPS-73 (air-traffic 
control), MPQ-62 (short range air defense), TPQ-46 
(counter-fire target acquisition), and the UPS-3 (target 
tracking) 
Operating frequency S-band (2–4 GHz) 
Weight 8500 lbs 
Airlift Three CH-53E or one MV-22B or one C-130 
Operating temperature -40ºC to +55ºC 





 AN/MPQ-53 Radar (from Wolff n.d. [a]). Figure 73. 
Table 45.   An/MPQ-53 Radar Specifications (after Wolff n.d. [a]). 
Range 92 NM (170 mi) 
Operating frequency C-band (4-8 GHz) 




H. MQ-1 PREDATOR 
 
 MQ-1 Predator (from Jane’s 2014)/ Figure 74. 
Table 46.   MQ-1 Predator Specifications (after Predator 2010). 
Range 669 NM (770 mi) 
Ceiling 25,000 ft 
Speed 261 kts (300 mph) 
Weight 5667 lbs 
 
 
I. RQ-7 SHADOW 
 
 RQ-7 Shadow (from Jane’s n.d.) Figure 75. 
Table 47.   RQ-7 Shadow Specifications (after Shadow 2015) 
Range 59 NM (68 mi) 
Ceiling 15,000 ft 
Speed 90 kts (103 mph) 
Weight 375 lbs 
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J. REMUS 600 
 
 REMUS 600 (REMUS 2015) Figure 76. 
Table 48.   REMUS 600 Specifications (after REMUS 2015) 
Vehicle diameter 12.8 in (32.4 cm) 
Vehicle length 10.7 ft (3.25 m) 
Weight in air 529 lbs (240 kg) 
Trim weight 2.2 lbs (1 kg) 
Maximum operating depth 1969 feet (600 m) 
Energy 5.2 kWh rechargeable lithium ion battery 
Endurance Typically 24h dependent on speed and sensor 
configuration, operating environment and 
mission program 
Propulsion Direct drive DC brushless motor to open two 
bladed propeller 
Velocity Range Up to 4 kts (2.1m/s) 
Transponders  9-16 kHz operating frequency range 
Navigation Navigation Processor, Inertial navigator, Long 
Baseline (LBL) acoustic, WAAS GPS 
Sensors Acoustic Doppler Current Profiling,  
Inertial Navigation System, Pressure 
Conductivity and Temperature, Depth, GPS 
 
 
K. QUADCOPTER (MICRODRONE MD4-200) 
 
 Quadcopter (Microdrone md4-200) (from Microdrones 2015) Figure 77. 
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Table 49.   Quadcopter (Microdrone md4-200) Specifications (sfter 
Microdrones 2015) 
Rate of climb 10 kts (5.0 m/s) 
Operating speed 984 ft/min (5.0 m/s) 
Maximum thrust 15.5 N 
Weight 1.8 lbs (800 g) 
Recommended load 0.44 lbs (200 g) 
Maximum load 0.55 lbs (250 g) 
Maximum take-off weight (MTOW) 2.3 lbs (1,050 g) 
Dimensions 540 mm (from rotor hub to rotor hub) 
Flying time Up to 30 minutes (depending on load/
wind/battery) 
Battery 14.8 V, 4S LiPo, 2300 mAh 
Flat core motors yes 
CFD optimized propeller yes 
Closed carbon housing yes 





Logistics costs are estimated based on fixed assets and consumable supplies. 
 
(a) Fixed assets include generators, transport vehicles, handheld and vehicular 
communication systems, and tools for the combat engineers. These assets 
are brought in via a one-time effort at the beginning of the mission. 
 
The cost of an equipped HMMWV is estimated at $220,000 (“HMMWV,” 
2011). The costs of the generators, tools for the combat engineers and the 
Communications equipment have been estimated based on similar units.  
 





(b) Consumable supplies include water, food, medical supplies, and fuel for 
generators and vehicles. These supplies are dependent on the land force 
package and ISR package. 
 
The water is estimated to be $9.38 per gallon (“Water,” 2011) and each 
person would require 7.38 gallons per day. Each Meals-Ready-to-eat 
(MRE) pack cost $7.25 (“MRE,” 2005) and each person would have 3 
meals a day. The medical supply for each soldier is the USMC Individual 
First Aid Kit, which costs $107 (“First,” n.d.). The fuel for both generators 
and vehicles is estimated at $14 per gallon (“Energy,” 2011).  
 
The supply of each consumable item is to last for 7 days and the costs for 
each package are stated below. The supplies that are dependent on land 
forces packages are water, food, medical supplies and fuel. The ISR 
packages would require supply of fuel for ISR generators. 
Table 51.   Costs of Consumable Supplies 
 
 
(c) The logistics costs for each COA are summarized below. 
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Table 52.   Costs of Logistics for Each COA 
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 JPADS (from JPADS 2014)  Figure 78. 
 U.S. military airdrop system that utilizes precision of the GPS and 
steerable parachutes for precise point of impact on drop zone 
 Able to carry extra light to heavy payloads 
 Can receive weather updates and real-time adjustments during mission 
 Stealthy with minimal visibility 
Table 53.   JPADS Specifications (after JPADS 2014) 
Unit Cost ~US$68,000 
Payload Micro-light : 10 lbs 
Heavy: Up to 60,000 lbs 





















 Fulton Recovery System (from Fulton 2007) Figure 79. 
 Designed to retrieve persons on ground using compatible aircraft. 
 Uses overall-type harness and self-inflating balloon attached to lift line 
 Typically used in hard-to-reach places 
Table 54.   Fulton Recovery System Specifications (after Fulton 2007) 
Main purposes: Personnel recovery system 
Quick recovery 
Designed for: One or Two-Man retrievals 
Tested with: S2-Tracker Aircraft 











C. AFSB (AFLOAT FORWARD STAGING BASE) 
 AFSB (from LaGrone 2014) Figure 80. 
 Can be configured to work with helos configured with mine 
countermeasures and Special Forces. 
 Features large helo landing pad and huge accommodations up to 250 
troops 
 Fast and efficient form of large-scale transportation 
 Used as intermediate staging base for operations 
Table 55.   AFSB Specifications (after LaGrone 2014) 
Main purposes: Staging base for operations 
Designed for: MCMs, SOF 










D. C-17 GLOBEMASTER III 
 
 C-17 Globemaster III (from Globemaster 2004)  Figure 81. 
 Unit Cost: 202.3 million (Globemaster 2004) 
Table 56.   C-17 Globemaster III (after rom Globemaster 2004) 
Cruise speed 450 kts 
Mission radius (extra tank) Global with inflight refueling 
Crew 3 
Load 102 troops/paratroops; 36 litter and 
54 ambulatory patients and 
attendants; 170,900 pounds (77,519 





E. C-130H HERCULES 
 
 C-130H Hercules (from Hercules 2003)  Figure 82. 
 Unit Cost: 30.1 million (Hercules  2003) 
Table 57.   C-130H Hercules Specifications (after Hercules 2003) 
Cruise speed 318 kts 
Mission radius (extra tank) 1050 NM 
Crew 5 
Load 6 pallets or 74 litters or 16 CDS 
bundles or 92 combat troops or 64 
paratroopers, or a combination of 
any of these up to the cargo 




F. MV-22 OSPREY 
Refer to MV-22 OSPREY of Appendix B. 
G. LOW ALTITUDE BALLOON 
Refer to JLENS of Appendix C. 
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APPENDIX E. RED FORCE PLATFORMS 
A. SHENYANG J-15 CARRIER-STRIKE AIRCRAFT 
 
 Shenyang J-15 Carrier-Strike Aircraft (from CMO March 2013)  Figure 83. 
 
Table 58.   Shenyang J-15 Specifications (after Shark February 2015)  
Maximum Speed Mach 2.4 
Range 1781 NM (2050 mi) 
Service Ceiling 65,700 ft 
Rate of Climb 64,000 ft/min 
Armament 8xPL-12/R-77 and 4xPL-9/R-73 AAMs, 






B. LIAONING, VARYAG-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER 
 
 Aircraft Carrier, Liaoning (from CD August 2011)  Figure 84. 
Table 59.   Aircraft Carrier, Liaoning Specifications (after Kreml 2011)  
Displacement 59,100 tons (full-load), 67,500 tons (max-
load) 
Speed 32 knots 
Range 3,850 NM 
Endurance  45 days 






C. TYPE 071 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIP 
 
 Type 071 Amphibious Landing Ship (from CMO March 2013)  Figure 85. 
Table 60.   Type 071 Amphibious Landing Ship Specifications 
(after Chinese May 2013; Yuzhao July 2013)  
Characteristics  
Displacement 20,000 tons 
Speed 22 knots 
Range 6,000 NM at 18 knots 
Armament  1x AK-176 (76mm), 4x AK-630 (30mm)  
Load 15-20 armored vehicles and 500–800 troops, 4x 
Z-8 Super Frelon helicopters, 4x Type 726 
















D. TYPE 052C DESTROYER 
 
 
 Type 052C Destroyer (from CMO March 2014)  Figure 86. 
Type 052C Destroyer Specifications (after Luyang 2015) 
Table 61.    
Displacement 7,000 tons 
Speed 29 knots 
Armament  48x HHQ-9, 8x C-805, 1x Type210, 2x Type 
730, 6x torpedo tubes 





E. TYPE 022 HOUBEI-CLASS MISSILE BOAT 
 
 Type 022 Houbei-class Missile Boat (from Bussert 2007)  Figure 87. 
Table 62.   Type 022 Houbei-class Missile Boat Specifications 
(after Lague 2012; Bussert 2007) 
Displacement 224 tons 
Speed 36 knots 
Armament  8x C-801/802/803, 8x Hongniao, 12x QW-class 





F. DF-21 ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE (ASBM) 
 
 DF-21 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (from CD 201)  Figure 88. 
Table 63.   DF-21 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Specifications 
(after Kazianis 2013; Stokes 2009)  
Range 956 NM (1,100 mi) 
Speed Mach 10 




APPENDIX F.  OA ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
A. COA ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
COA assessment was based on each system’s performance for each MOE. The 
relative importance of each MOE was determined using stakeholder requirements 
interpreted by subject matter experts. The pairwise comparison technique was used to 
give each MOE a mathematically consistent weight commensurate to that MOE’s 
perceived importance amongst all MOEs. The SME weight pairwise comparison is 
shown in Table 64, and percentage weights for the MOEs are shown in Figure 89.  
Table 64.   SME-Derived MOE Weights 
 
 
 SME-Derived MOE Weights Figure 89. 
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During initial COA evaluation, it was determined that all COAs satisfied the 
adequacy and sustainability MOEs at an equal level. This was because the COAs were 
designed to include the number of platforms required to satisfy those two MOEs. This 
resulted in the detectability, sustainability, and defendability MOEs being used to 
differentiate COA performance. 
B. MOE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
1. Detectability 
Detectability is based on the cardinal concept of distance. Since the exact range of 
detectability depends on the particulars of the target, the environment, the sensor and its 
transforms, the ranking of order of range is meant to be representative of the magnitude 
of distance between the various objects characterized by detectability. Therefore, 
detectability as characterized by range and therefore platform type is a crude cardinal 
representation by order of magnitude. A multiplicative value (cardinality) is then applied 
as a constant to maintain the order of magnitude difference between the six platforms. No 
arithmetic operations can be performed on ordinal numbers. Since order of magnitude 
characterization of detectability range is a cardinal concept, multiplication by the order of 
magnitude rankings is used to determine relative “stealth-ness” on a scale from 1 to 10 
with 10 being the least detectable. 
2. Timeliness 
Individual performance scoring for the timeliness MOE is based on delivery 
systems. Each delivery system was evaluated using the Stochastic Get There First Model 
by building an AOI in the South China Sea, and placing blue and Red force origin 
locations in Singapore and Hainan Island respectively. Blue force speed was set 
according to delivery platform speed while Red force speed was set to 30 knots. 
Each COA received a timeliness score based on its average performance 19 
different time based scenarios ranging from a 96 hour head start over Red forces to a 12 
hour delay. COA score was calculated from the scaled average performance of the COAs. 
Table 65 shows the performance of each COA for the timeliness MOE. 
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Table 65.   First Arrival COA Performances 
 
 
3. Adequacy  
Adequacy measured each COA’s ability to deliver 70% of the initial landing force 
with the initial wave of transport craft. This was measured by dividing the amount of 
landing force delivered by the initial force by the size of the total force. 
Each COA was designed to deliver the full landing force as part of the initial 
package. Thus, all COA performed at the same level in the COA. 
4. Sustainability 
Sustainability was calculated using a combination of the percentage of the first 30 
days of operations that supplies were maintained above a 70% threshold as well as the 
amount of time spent waiting to bring supplies above the that threshold. 
Logistics modeling showed that all COA’s were able to provide sufficient 
sustainment such that the landing force never dropped below the 70% threshold. 
5. Defendability 
COA Defendability scores were calculated using a combined scoring system that 
took into account air and surface detection ranges and the air and surface salvo equation 
for each of the 10 force packages to be delivered to the island. This combination of 
individual measurements resulted in four sub-measures that were weighted equally to 
determine an overall COA score in this MOE. 
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C. COA SCORE CALCULATION METHODOLOGY 
The performance score for each delivery platform COA was calculated using 
Equation 1, which multiplies the decision maker’s assigned weighting for each MOE by 
the score each individual platform achieved in that MOE.  It is important to recall that 
through metrics described in this chapter and in previous chapters, platform scores for 
MOEs have been determined and held constant before decision makers are able to set 
weights on MOE importance. Once set by the decision maker, the MOE weighting 
remains constant for each platform’s MOE score. This results in a “one-to-many” 
calculation, giving the decision maker consistent COA scores for overall performance.  
 
∑ 𝑀𝑂𝐸 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑂𝐸 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑀𝑂𝐸𝑠
 
Equation 1: COA Score Calculation 
From Equation 1, performance scores could be compared to pertinent independent 
variables such as cost or manning in order to also determine the optimality of each COA. 
D. COA ASSESSMENT TOOL 
Our team determined early in our COA evaluation process that MOE weighting 
could be variable based on a number of different factors. Decision maker preferences and 
operational factors could result in significant differences in MOE importance from our 
own stakeholder model. A COA Assessment Tool was created in order to facilitate COA 
evaluation under different MOE weights. This assessment tool allows a decision maker to 
alter the weights attached to each of the three MOEs. The assessment tool provides real 
time information as to which COAs score the best using cost and manning as scoring 
criteria. The techniques used to create this assessment tool make it scalable and capable 
of including many more MOEs and scoring criteria, if desired.  
Figure 91 shows a visual representation of the assessment tool output when 
configured for the stakeholder requirements and derived MOE weighting used for the 
team’s scenario, analysis, and conclusions. Figure 92 offers the reader a look at some 
different outputs from equal MOE weighting. Figures 93–95 show the extremes in for 
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100% MOE weighting assigned to each of detectability, timeliness, and defendability, 
respectively. 
 
 Flexible System Assessment Tool: Scenario Weights Figure 90. 
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 Flexible System Assessment Tool: All Equal Weights Figure 91. 
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 Flexible System Assessment Tool: 100% Detectability Figure 92. 
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 Flexible System Assessment Tool: 100% Timeliness Figure 93. 
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 Flexible System Assessment Tool: 100% Defendability Figure 94. 
For this project it was determined that it would be useful to measure COA 
performance against both cost and manning. Costs were calculated based on 30 day 
operational costs of the platforms, platform manning, sustainment, and force package 
manning for each COA. The scatter plots shown plots each COA’s score against its 
normalized price and normalized force package and platform manning. These two 
independent variables were chosen as indications of the amount of resources needed to 
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affect the COA as well as the amount of resources placed inside the A2AD area. The 
scatter plot is designed so that the most optimal solution possible will achieve a score of 
1.0, 1.0 in the upper right of the plot; the closer a COA’s point is to the optimal, the better 
that COA’s overall performance relative to that particular independent variable and the 
set MOE weights. Each scatter plot is accompanied by a graph that shows the overall 
distance of that point from the optimal 1.0, 1.0 position. The distance is calculated using 
Equation 2.  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙:
= √((1 − 𝐶𝑂𝐴 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)2 + (1 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)2)  
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